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# THE FREEDOM STRUGGLE IN HYDERABAD

(A CONNECTED ACCOUNT)

Vol. I

(1800–1857)

Published by

The Hyderabad State Committee appointed for  
the compilation of a History of the Freedom Movement  
in Hyderabad

1956

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## **FOREWORD**

The compilation of the History of Freedom Movement in India is a gigantic task and I am happy to see that the State Committee appointed for the purpose has been able to prepare its first connected account of the Freedom Movement in Hyderabad from 1800 A.D. to 1857 A.D.

It is the general belief of the people in India that it was Hyderabad and its Ruler the Nizam who were the bulwark of strength to the British Empire and that the first war of Indian Independence by the people in 1857 failed because of the invaluable help rendered by the late Sir Salar Jung representing Hyderabad State. While there can be no doubt that the Rulers of Hyderabad at the time rendered yeoman service by helping the British during that period, it will, I think, be an eye-opener to many who will read this Volume, that this part of the Deccan was not free from the flames of freedom which were raging elsewhere in the country. This brief connected account prepared by the State Committee will show that there were many patriots, both among the commoners, the zamindars and Rajahs, who thought and acted wholly in consonance with the spirit of the freedom struggle. That their attempts failed as the attempts of their compatriots in the country was no fault of theirs. We must pay whole-hearted tribute to those who participated in the struggle and suffered extinction. Some of the letters and despatches which have been quoted, go to show the extent of feeling existing in this part of the country.

I congratulate the members of the Committee on completing a portion of this valuable work entrusted to them. I hope it will be possible for them to complete the other sections and periods of the freedom struggle in India, and present to the world a connected picture of the movement in this part of the Deccan. I wish them all success in their attempt.

**B. RAMAKRISHNA RAO,**  
*Chief Minister.*

**'SHAH MANZIL'**  
***Hyderabad-Deccan.***

**June 21, 1956.**

## PROEM

I am really very happy to commend the present first volume of the History of Freedom Movement in Hyderabad to the public of the Hyderabad State. When I returned from my European tour in the second week of August 1953 I was pleased to learn that the Chief Minister of Hyderabad had constituted a widely representative State Committee for the compilation of the History of the Freedom Movement in India and that I was also associated with this Committee. This Committee had been expected to be actively busy in collecting material from all available sources. In my capacity as the President of the Committee I had requested all the members to exert themselves to approach all possible sources, private, individual and institutional, to acquire information about this national struggle. In the early stages I spent some hours at the Central Records Office exploring files. But it was realized that men like myself and the members of the Committee whose major part of attention was appropriated by other engagements and occupations could do little and therefore the Committee was reorganized and was equipped with an Executive Committee in 1954 under the Chairmanship of our enthusiastic Education Minister, Shri Gopal Rao Ekbote. This Executive Committee consisted of two full-time and two part-time researchers working under the Convener, Shri Setu Madhav Rao, M.A., I.A.S., the present Education Secretary.

I have glanced through the pages of the draft typescript. I find that Hyderabad too had not swallowed the pill of foreign rule with a complacent mind. The people in the State acutely resented the unsympathetic and mortifying aggression and displayed their unwillingness in their own way. That the Executive Committee could collect so much fresh information as to enable it to print the present good manual about a period prior to 1857 is really a very commendable thing. Everybody will be very much delighted to learn that even the second volume directly dealing with the struggle for independence, wrongly styled the mutiny of 1857, is well-nigh ready.

I trust that this volume which seems to be the first of its kind in the whole of the nation will be warmly welcomed by the public.

K. S. VAIDYA, M.A., LL.B.,  
*President,*  
*Hyderabad State Committee,*  
*History of Freedom Movement in India*  
*and Speaker, Hyderabad Legislative Assembly.*

HYDERABAD-DECCAN,  
June 19, 1956.

## PREFACE

I deem it a great privilege that I was associated with the actual work of the Hyderabad State Committee, History of Freedom Movement in India, in my capacity as the President of the Executive Sub-Committee and Minister for Education. I watched, with ever-growing interest, how research scholars were tapping all the erstwhile unexplored resources and collecting material. No doubt it was an onerous task but it was always accompanied with a thrill of joy for the workers in the field. The Executive Committee came across several topics concerning which only scraps of papers could be discovered as an authenticated source, while there have been so many incidents, the records relating to which are in riotous plenty. The achievement of Indian Independence has so delicately shifted the focussing point in the narration of Indian history that one is tempted to rewrite the whole history of India from the new perspective. It is an undisputed fact that India never tolerated alien rule. No period of Indian history was so poor in talent and bankrupt in intelligence as to believe that the civilization evolved by Indians was full of ignorance and darkness, parochialism and intolerance, cowardice and abjectness. Aliens have achieved resounding victories over Indians, masses of armies have been annihilated but the resurgent spirit of the people has always endeavoured to recover the lost ground. This rhythmic process has culminated in the people achieving complete democratic independence.

The history of the Hyderabad State for about half a century before the war of Independence in 1857 covers the reigns of the third and the fourth Asaf Jahs, Secunder Jah and Nasiruddowla, who had no doubt very able ministers like Mir Alam, Munir-ul-Mulk, Raja Chandu Lal, Siraj-ul-Mulk and Salar Jung I and had to deal with British Residents like Col. A. Kirkpatrick, Captain Sydenham, Sir Henry Russell, Sir Charles Metcalfe, Mr. Martin, Col. Stewart, Col. Fraser and Mr. G. A. Bushby. It is known that the British Officers outwitted the Asaf Jahi rulers and their ministers and circumscribed their activities in such a way that Hyderabad became a strong bastion of British imperialism. The force of circumstances was such that British diplomacy triumphed. The British politicians and

generals had greater experience and discipline, one shall have to admit, but the human values of the conquerors and the conquered were the same. The terms of the Subsidiary Alliance, the eradication of French influence from Hyderabad, the formation of the Hyderabad Contingent, a white elephant for the State, the huge hoax of the usurious Palmer Company, the confiscation of Berar, the harassment of Mahipat Ram, Nurul Umrah, Rao Rambha, and the incessant attempts to suppress and eradicate Wahabism and its great sponsor, Mubariz-ud-Dowlah are nothing less than political aggressions skilfully planned and thoroughly executed. Sparks of an independent spirit and national fervour did detonate and fulminate here and there, but they were all declared as anti-social mischiefs of the lawless miscreants. Heroes like Dharmaji Pratap Rao, Nawasaji Naik, Veerappa and Shivalingayya, Ram Rao and Rao Saheb, Ranga Rao and Sonajee pant and the Rajah of Koulas would have all lain buried in the limitless expanse of oblivion wasting the sweetness and fragrance of their spirit, unnoticed by anybody.

The great genius who first received the impulse of compiling the History of the Freedom Movement in India deserves all admiration and homage. Specially because this freedom is achieved by the united efforts of all Indians, who were awakened, disciplined and organised by the Father of the Nation to fight the battle, in the most unprecedented way with the unfailing weapons of truth and *ahimsa*. The second peculiarity of this history is the fact that the majority of the generals and commanders and even the soldiers in this war are still alive and installed in authority. No doubt it is a fact that an endeavour to compile the history of such a colossal phenomenon so early will not give a dispassionate and correct picture of the whole struggle, but it will be able to catch some of the interesting facets of this national achievement which may be wiped out and erased by the currents of time.

The Convener, Shri Setu Madhav Rao, and the band of researchers working under his direction, have done their best to collect material for this history. Our thanks are due to Shri K. S. Vaidya, the President of the Hyderabad State Committee of the History of Freedom Movement in India, who keenly watched the progress of this compilation,

Doctor B. Ramakrishna Rao, our Chief Minister, has followed this national work with remarkable interest and has been very liberal in providing adequate funds for this work. To him we owe a deep debt of gratitude.

GOPAL RAO EKBOTE,  
*Vice-President,*  
*Hyderabad State Committee,*  
*History of Freedom Movement in India,*  
*and Education Minister, Government of Hyderabad.*

*Hyderabad-Deccan.*

*June 15, 1956.*

## INTRODUCTION

In December, 1952, the Government of India constituted a Board of Editors in connection with the compilation of the History of Freedom Movement in India. This Board in its meeting held on 3rd January, 1953, resolved to request all State Governments to appoint State Committees in consultation with the Board to assist it in the collection of material for writing the History of Freedom Movement in India. Accordingly the State Committee for the Compilation of the History of Freedom Movement in Hyderabad was set up in June 1953 with the following persons:—

1. Shri Kashinath Rao Vaidya.	<i>President.</i>
2. Shri Madapati Hanumanth Rao.	
3. Shri M. Narsing Rao.	
4. Shri P. Setu Madhav Rao.	
5. Shri M. Fazlur Rahman.	
6. Shri Raghavendra Rao Sharma.	
7. Shri Krishnachari Joshi.	
8. Shri A. K. Waghmare.	
9. Shri Krishnaswamy Mudiraj.	
10. Shri S. Pratap Reddy.	
11. Shri S. K. Vaishampayan.	
12. Shri R. M. Joshi.	<i>Convener.</i>
13. Prof. S. Hanumanth Rao.	
14. Shri Bakar Ali Mirza.	
15. Shri S. Krishna Sarma.	

The Committee was reconstituted in June 1954 with the following persons:—

1. Shri Kashinath Rao Vaidya.	<i>President.</i>
2. Shri Gopal Rao Ekbote.	<i>Vice-President.</i>
3. Shri Bakar Ali Mirza.	
4. Shri M. Fazlur Rahman.	
5. Shri Raghavendra Rao Sharma.	
6. Shri S. Krishna Sarma.	
7. Shri R. M. Joshi.	
8. Shri Krishnachari Joshi.	
9. Shri Krishnaswamy Mudiraj.	
10. Shri Kasim Ali Sajanlal.	
11. Shri M. Narasing Rao.	
12. Shri Naseeruddin Hashimi.	

13. Dr. Yusuf Hussain Khan.
14. Dr. N. G. Nandapurkar.
15. Dr. M. Rama Rao.
16. Dr. P. Srinivasachar.
17. Shri P. Setu Madhav Rao.

*Convener.*

Four Research Scholars, *viz.* (1) Shri Naseeruddin Hashimi, (2) Shri R. M. Joshi, (3) Shri B. S. Rao and (4) Shri M. Narasing Rao were also appointed for the purpose of scrutinising the papers, documents and other available material in Government Offices and other institutions, public and private. For day-to-day supervision of the research work an Executive Committee of the State Committee was constituted with the following persons:—

1. Shri Gopal Rao Ekbote, *President.*
2. Shri B. S. Rao.
3. Shri R. M. Joshi.
4. Shri M. Narasing Rao.
5. Shri Naseeruddin Hashimi.
6. Shri Kasim Ali Sajanlal.
7. Shri P. Setu Madhav Rao. *Secretary.*

Under instructions of the Board of Editors the work of the History of Freedom Movement in India was divided into three phases. The first phase from 1800-1884 A.D.; the second phase from 1885-1919 A.D. and the third phase from 1920-1947 A.D.

During the last two years Research Scholars have been able to scrutinise records available in the Central Records Office, Home Department and other offices dealing with all the three phases of the freedom movement relating to Hyderabad. They have also contacted a number of individuals and institutions in the State. They also scrutinised all published material and material available in manuscript form relating to the freedom struggle in the Osmania University, other Colleges and Libraries, both private and public, and papers available with ancient and leading families. As a result considerable material has accumulated with the State Committee relating to the freedom struggle in the State of Hyderabad for the period from 1800-1948. The bibliography of the material collected was forwarded to the office of the Board of Editors, New Delhi, from time to time.

In August, 1954, the Board of Editors wrote to the State Committee drawing its attention to the decision of the Kutch State Committee to prepare and publish a short note on the

first phase of the freedom movement in connection with Kutch from 1800-1888 A.D. in the form of a booklet and desired that a similar attempt might be made in other States also. This was taken into account by the State Committee and a decision was taken to write a connected account of the Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad.

In August, 1955, the Chief Minister of Hyderabad wrote to the Chairman of the State Committee stating "It would be good to prepare a separate volume from this collected material under the heading '1857 and Hyderabad'", and suggesting to the State Committee to prepare in a concise form a resume of the events connected with the first War of Independence in so far as it relates to the Hyderabad State.

In pursuance of the above instructions the Research Scholars of the State Committee scrutinised the material collected so far with a view to write the first phase of the freedom struggle from 1800-1884 in two volumes. The first volume dealing with the period from 1800-1857 is now ready and placed before the public. The work of writing the second volume dealing with the period from 1857 to 1885 has been taken in hand and will be published shortly.

With the signing of the Treaty of Subsidiary Alliance between the Nizam and the East India Company on 12th October, 1800 A.D. Hyderabad lost its political independence.

Soon, with the organization of the Contingent Forces paid by the Nizam, but administered under the sole control of the Resident, officered by Europeans and recruited mostly from outside the State, Hyderabad had to bear a grievous burden for the maintenance of these forces.

Throughout the period 1800-1857 A.D. attempts were made by men who resented British rule to disrupt the power of the East India Company. Among these the names of Raja Mahipat Ram and Mubarez-ud-Dowla stand out prominently. There were rebellions against the Hyderabad administration continuously, occurring in one part or other of the State upto 1857. Noteworthy among these were the rebellions in Aurangabad; the Deshmukh's rebellions in Udgir and Nizamabad and the rebellions in the districts of Raichur

and Karimnagar. There were also mutinies against European Officers in the army of the Nizam; in the Contingent Forces and in the Subsidiary Troops of the East India Company. These mutinies were characterised by sporadic assaults on or murders of British officers and had links with the forces working outside the State. Raja Mahipat Ram intrigued with Holkar while the attempts of Mubarez-ud-Dowla were a part of the All-India Movement which is generally known as the "Wahabi Movement in India." Public opinion in Hyderabad was not only conscious politically but was also sensitive to Western influence operating in the State. Even as early as the first half of the 19th century there were intimate social contacts between European and Indian communities mainly as a result of the predominant French influence in Hyderabad. As early as the latter half of the 18th century a number of persons in Hyderabad were well conversant with English. Meer Dauran, Shams-ul-Umrah, Salar Jung I, Raja Rameshwar Rao Wanparti and Raja Venkatappa Naik of Shorapur were well conversant with English and acquainted with European societies. The taste for higher learning was developing in Hyderabad under the patronage of the Paigah nobleman Shams-ul-Umrah who started the Madrasa-e-Fakhria, the Translation Bureau and the Printing Press about 1840.

People in Hyderabad had also been acquainted with the weakness of the European official and non-official classes, like the Residents Kirkpatrick, Russell and Martin and the Palmer brothers. These resulted in increased resentment of Indians against the European domination in India.

It would therefore not be fair to say that Hyderabad was static during this period. There was a considerable body of public opinion which was against the dominance of the British in Hyderabad. Due to extravagant financial demands on account of the Contingent Forces and unscrupulousness of men like Chandu Lal, chronic maladministration had set in and this gave rise to a number of rebellions in the State. These rebellions which were organized attempts by communities like Bhils, Hukkers and Marathas were put down by the British-trained and British-equipped Contingent Forces. The Residents were very prompt in putting down these rebellions and were habitually interfering in the internal affairs of Hyderabad with a view to secure the continuous maintenance of the Contingent Forces "calculated to improve their military positions", but when it came to

introducing reforms in the administration they pleaded the policy of non-interference. Thus the politics of the people and their conflicts with the Contingent Forces assumed the form of a freedom struggle. An English authority has described the position thus, "A starved peasantry was crushed and much British blood was spilt in this bad business."

In the connected account of the period from 1800-1857 new material has been unearthed from the office of the National Archives, New Delhi, particularly relating to the episodes of Raja Mahipat Ram and Mubarez-ud-Dowla. Maharaja Ranjit Singh's letter to Chandu Lal and Syed Ahmed Brailvi's letter to Sikandar Jah have also been brought out in this volume for the first time.

The State Committee is deeply indebted to the Director, National Archives, New Delhi for allowing its Research Scholars to work in the Archives and make use of all the required material. The State Committee is also grateful to the Government of Hyderabad for facilities of research afforded in the Central Records Office, Home Department and other offices. It is hoped that the connected account of the freedom struggle in Hyderabad for the period 1800-1857 will prove useful and encourage further fruitful research in this field.

**P. SETU MADHAV RAO, M.A., I.A.S.,**  
*Convener,*  
*Hyderabad State Committee,*  
*History of Freedom Movement in India,*  
*and Secretary to Government,*  
*Education Department.*

*Hyderabad-Deccan.*  
*June 10, 1956.*



## CHAPTER I

### THE TREATY OF SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE

The Treaty of 12th October 1800 A.D., concluded between the Nizam and the East India Company altered the status of Hyderabad from an Independent Political Unit to that of a State in subordinate co-operation with the British, while the troops of the East India Company, known as the Subsidiary Forces were to be stationed in perpetuity in the State of Hyderabad. The Nizam, on his part undertook, "neither to commence nor to pursue in future any negotiations with any other power whatever, without giving previous notice and entering into mutual consultation with the Honourable East India Company's Government, and never to commit any act of hostility or aggression against any power whatever; and in the event of any differences arising, whatever adjustment of them the Company's Government, weighing matters in the scale of truth and justice, may determine, shall meet with full approbation and acquiescence." As it was from this date that the State of Hyderabad ceased to exist as an independent political unit the treaty is reproduced fully below<sup>1</sup> :—

#### *"Treaty with the Nizam, 1800*

Treaty of perpetual and general defensive alliance between the Honourable the English East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Mook Asaf' Jah Bahadur, Subadar of the Deccan, his children, heirs, and successors; settled by Captain James Achilles Kirkpatrick, Resident at the Court of His Highness, by virtue of the powers delegated to him by the most Noble Richard Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the most illustrious Order of St. Patrick, one of His Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Governor-General in Council, appointed by the Honourable the Court of Directors of the said Honourable Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies, and Governor-General in Council of all the British possessions in the East Indies.

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1. *Hyderabad Affairs*, Vol. II, by Syed Mahadi Ali, Revenue and Finance Secretary to H.H. the Nizam's Government, pages 52-56.

Whereas, by the blessing of God, an intimate friendship and union have firmly subsisted for a length of time between the Honourable English East India Company and His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah Bahadur, and have been cemented and strengthened by several Treaties of alliance, to the mutual and manifest advantage of both powers, who, with uninterrupted harmony and concord having equally shared the fatigues and dangers of war and the blessings of peace, are in fact become one and the same in interest, policy, friendship, and honour. The powers aforesaid, adverting to the complexion of the times, have determined on principles of precaution and foresight and with a view to the effectual preservation of constant peace and tranquillity, to enter into a general defensive alliance, for the complete and reciprocal protection of their respective territories, together with those of their several allies and dependants, against the unprovoked aggressions or unjust encroachments of all or of any enemies whatever.

### *Article 1*

The peace, union, and friendship so long subsisting between the two States shall be perpetual; the friends and enemies of either shall be the friends and enemies of both; and the contracting parties agree that all the former Treaties and agreements between the two States now in force and not contrary to the tenor of this engagement shall be confirmed by it.

### *Article 2*

If any power or State whatever shall commit any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against either of the contracting parties, or against their respective dependents or allies, and, after due representation, shall refuse to enter into amicable explanation, or shall deny the just satisfaction or indemnity which the contracting parties shall have required, then the contracting parties will proceed to concert and prosecute such further measures as the case shall appear to demand.

For the more distinct explanation of the true intent and effect of this agreement, the Governor-General in Council, on behalf of the Honourable Company, hereby declares that the British Government will never permit any power or State whatever to commit with impunity any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against the rights or territories

of His Highness the Nizam, but will at all times maintain and defend the same, in the same manner as the rights and territories of the Honourable Company are now maintained and defended.

### *Article 3*

With a view to fulfil this Treaty of general defence and protection, His Highness the Nawab Asaf Jah agrees that two battalions of sepoys and one regiment of cavalry, with a due proportion of guns and artillerymen, shall be added in perpetuity to the present permanent subsidiary force of six battalions of sepoys of one thousand firelocks each, and one regiment of cavalry five hundred strong (with their proportion of guns and artillerymen), so that the whole subsidiary force furnished by the Honourable East India Company to His Highness shall henceforward consist of eight battalions of sepoys (or eight thousand firelocks) and two regiments of cavalry (or one thousand horse), with their requisite complement of guns, European artillerymen, lascars, and pioneers, fully equipped with warlike stores and ammunition, which force is to be stationed in perpetuity in His Highness's territories.

### *Article 4*

The pay of the above-mentioned additional force shall be calculated at the rate of the pay of the existing subsidiary force, and shall commence from the day of the entrance of the said additional force into His Highness's territories.

### *Article 5*

For the regular payment of the whole expense of the said augmented subsidiary force (consisting of eight thousand infantry, one thousand cavalry, and their usual proportion of artillery) His Highness the Nawab Asaf Jah hereby assigns and cedes to the Honourable East India Company in perpetuity all the territories acquired by His Highness, under the Treaty of Seringapatam on the 18th March 1792, and also all the territories acquired by His Highness under the Treaty of Mysore on the 22nd June 1794, according to the Schedule annexed to this Treaty.

### *Article 6*

Certain of the territories ceded by the foregoing Article to the Honourable Company being inconvenient, from their

situation to the northward of the river Toombuddrah, His Highness the Nawab Asaf Jah, for the purpose of rendering the boundary line of the Honourable Company's possessions a good and well defined one, agrees to retain the districts in question, namely, Copul, Gujjinderghur, and others (as marked in the annexed Schedule) in his own possession; and, in lieu thereof, assigns and cedes in full and in perpetuity to the Honourable Company the district of Adoni, together with whatever other territory His Highness may be possessed of, or is dependent on His Highness's Government, to the south of the Toombuddrah, or to the south of the Kistnah, below the junction of those two rivers.

#### *Article 7.*

The territories to be assigned and ceded to the Honourable Company by the fifth Article, or in consequence of the exchange stipulated in the sixth Article, shall be subject to the exclusive management and authority of the said Company and of their officers.

#### *Article 8*

Whereas the actual produce of a considerable portion of the districts ceded to the Honourable Company by Article fifth is ascertained and acknowledged to be greatly inferior to their nominal value, as specified in the Schedule annexed to this Treaty, and the said districts cannot be expected for a long course of years to reach to their said nominal value; and whereas differences might hereafter arise between the contracting parties with respect to the real value of the same, and the friendship and harmony happily subsisting between the contracting parties be disturbed by discussions relating to the adjustment of accounts of the produce and value of the said districts; in order to preclude all causes of any such future difference or discussion between the two States, the said East India Company agrees to accept the said district (with the reservation stated in the sixth Article) as a full and complete satisfaction for all demands on account of the pay and charges of the said subsidiary force; and therefore to whatever extent or for whatever length of time the actual produce of the said districts shall prove inadequate to the amount of the subsidy payable by His Highness on account of the said subsidiary force, no demands shall ever be made by the Honourable Company upon the treasury of His Highness on account of

any such deficiency or on account of any failure in the revenues of the said districts, arising from unfavourable seasons, from the calamity of war, or any other cause. His Highness the Nizam, on his part, with the same friendly views, hereby renounces all claim to any arrears or balances which may be due to him from the said districts at the period of their cessation to the Honourable Company, and also to any eventual excess in the produce of the said districts, beyond the amount of the subsidy payable by His Highness on account of the said subsidiary force. the true intention and meaning of this Article being, that the cessation of the said districts and the exchanges stipulated in the sixth Article shall be considered as a final close and termination of accounts between the contracting parties with respect to the charges of the said subsidiary force.

### *Article 9*

After the conclusion of this Treaty, and as soon as the British Resident shall signify to His Highness Asaf Jah that the Honourable Company's officers are prepared to take charge of the districts ceded by the fifth Article, His Highness will immediately issue the necessary perwannahs or orders to his officers to deliver over charge of the same to the officers of the Company; and it is hereby stipulated and agreed that all collections made by His Highness's officers subsequent to the date of the said perwannahs or orders, and before the officers of the Company shall have taken charge of the said districts, shall be carried to the account of the Honourable Company.

### *Article 10*

All forts situated within the districts to be ceded as aforesaid shall be delivered to the officers of the Honourable Company with the said districts; and His Highness the Nawab Asaf Jah engages that the said forts shall be delivered to the Honourable Company as nearly as possible in the same state as that in which His Highness received them.

### *Article 11*

His Highness the Nawab Asaf Jah will continue to pay the subsidy of the former subsidiary force and also that of the additional troops from his treasury in the same manner as hitherto observed, until the Honourable East India Company's officers shall have obtained complete possession from

His Highness's officers of the country ceded to the said Company by the fifth Article. The Company will not claim any payments of subsidy from His Highness's treasury after their officers shall have obtained possession of the said districts from the officers of His Highness.

*Article 12*

The contracting parties will employ all practicable means of conciliation to prevent the calamity of war; and for that purpose will at all times be ready to enter into amicable explanations with other States and to cultivate and improve the general relations of peace and amity with all the powers of India, according to the true spirit and tenor of this defensive Treaty. But if a war should unfortunately break out between the contracting parties and any other power whatever, then His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah engages that, with the reserve of two battalions of sepoys which are to remain near His Highness's person, the residue of the British subsidiary force (consisting of six battalions of sepoys and two regiments of cavalry with artillery) joined by six thousand infantry and nine thousand horse of His Highness's own troops, and making together an army of twelve thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, with their requisite train of artillery, and warlike stores of every kind, shall be immediately put in motion for the purpose of opposing the enemy; and His Highness likewise engages to employ every further effort in his power for the purpose of bringing into the field as speedily as possible the whole force which he may be able to supply from his dominions; with a view to the effectual prosecution and speedy termination of the said war, the Honourable Company in the same manner engage on their part, in this case, to employ in active operations against the enemy the largest force which they may be able to furnish over and above the said subsidiary force.

*Article 13*

Whenever war shall appear probable His Highness the Nawab Asaf Jah engages to collect as many benjarahs as possible, and to store as much grain as may be practicable in his frontier garrisons.

*Article 14*

Grain and all other articles of consumption and provision, and all sorts of materials for wearing apparel, together

with the necessary quantity of cattle, horses, and camels, required for the use of the subsidiary force, shall, in proportion to its present augmentation, be, as heretofore, entirely exempted from duties.

*Article 15.*

As by the present Treaty the union and friendship of the two States are so firmly cemented as that they may be considered as one and the same, His Highness the Nizam engages neither to commence nor to pursue in future any negotiations with any other power whatever without giving previous notice and entering into mutual consultation with the Honourable East India Company's Government; and the Honourable Company's Government on their part hereby declare that they have no manner of concern with any of His Highness's children, relations, subjects, or servants, with respect to whom His Highness is absolute.

*Article 16.*

As by the present Treaty of general defensive alliance, mutual defence and protection against all enemies are established, His Highness the Nawab Asaf Jah consequently engages never to commit any act of hostility or aggression against any power whatever; and in the event of any differences arising, whatever adjustment of them the Company's Government, weighing matters in the scale of truth and justice, may determine, shall meet with full approbation and acquiescence.

*Article 17*

By the present Treaty of general defensive alliance, the ties of union, by the blessing of God, are drawn so close that the friends of one party will be henceforward considered as the friends of the other, and the enemies of the one party the enemies of the other; it is therefore hereby agreed that if in future the Shorapore or Gudwall Zemindars, or any other subjects or dependants of His Highness's Government should withhold the payment of the Circar's just claims upon them, or excite rebellion or disturbance, the subsidiary force, or such proportion thereof as may be requisite, after the reality of the offence shall be duly ascertained, shall be ready, in concert with His Highness's own troops, to reduce all such offenders to obedience. And the interests of the two States being now in every respect identified, it is further mutually agreed that if disturbances shall at any time break

out in the districts ceded to the Honourable Company by this Treaty, His Highness the Nawab Asaf Jah shall permit such a proportion of the subsidiary troops as may be requisite to be employed in quelling the same within the said districts. If disturbances shall at any time break out in any part of His Highness's dominions, contiguous to the Company's frontier, to which it might be inconvenient to detach any proportion of the subsidiary troops, the British Government, in like manner, if required by His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah, shall direct such proportion of the troops of the Company as may be most conveniently stationed for the purpose to assist in quelling the said disturbances within His Highness's dominions.

### *Article 18*

Whereas, by the favour of Providence, a perfect union, harmony, and concord, have long and firmly subsisted between the Honourable East India Company, His Highness the Nawab Ausuph Jah, His Highness the Peishwa Rao Pundit Prudhan and Rajah Raghojee Bhooslah, therefore should His Highness Rao Pundit Prudhan, and Rajah Raghojee Bhooslah, or either of them, express a desire to participate in the benefits of the present defensive alliance, which is calculated to strengthen and perpetuate the foundations of general tranquillity, the contracting parties will readily admit both or either of the said powers to be members of the present alliance, on such terms and conditions as shall appear just and expedient to the contracting parties.

### *Article 19*

The contracting parties being actuated by a sincere desire to promote and maintain general tranquillity, will admit Dowlat Rao Sindia to be a party to the present Treaty whenever he shall satisfy the contracting parties of his disposition to cultivate the relations of peace and amity with both States, and shall give such securities for the maintenance of tranquillity as shall appear to the contracting parties to be sufficient.

### *Article 20*

This Treaty, consisting of twenty Articles, being this day settled by Captain James Achilles Kirkpatrick with the Nawab Ausuph Jah Bahadoor, Captain Kirkpatrick has delivered one copy thereof in English and Persian, signed and sealed by himself, to the said Nawab, who, on his part, has

also delivered one copy of the same, duly executed by himself; and Captain Kirkpatrick, by virtue of especial authority given to him on that behalf by the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, hereby declares the said Treaty to be in full force from the date hereof, and engages to procure and deliver to His Highness in the space of thirty days a copy of the same from the Governor-General in Council, in every respect the counterpart of that executed by himself; and on the delivery of such copy the treaty executed by Captain Kirkpatrick shall be returned; but the additional subsidiary force specified in the third Article shall be immediately required by His Highness the Nizam and furnished by the Honourable Company, and all the other Articles shall be in full force from this time.

Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Hyderabad on the 12th October, Anno Domini 1800, or 22nd Jammadee-ul-Awul, Anno Hegirae 1215.

(Sd.) **J. A. KIRKPATRICK,**  
*Resident.*"

Separate and secret Articles were added to the above Treaty mainly with reference to Maratha affairs. This treaty was soon to be followed by another Commercial Treaty with the Nizam in 1802 A.D. which regulated the trade and commerce between the territories of Hyderabad and the East India Company.

## CHAPTER II

### ATTITUDE OF HYDERABAD IN THE MARATHA WAR OF 1803 A.D.

In the year 1803 war broke out with the Marathas. In pursuance of the treaty of 1800 A.D., the Nizam was bound to furnish a force of 6,000 Infantry and 9,000 Cavalry to the British in the event of war. This help was not forthcoming from the Nizam in a full measure. It was alleged that the Hyderabad Government had proved obstructive, if not positively inimical in the campaign. The remnants of the army organized under the French had after the disbandment been reorganized and placed under the personal command of Raja Mahipat Ram. In view of their past association with the French they were not expected to be co-operative. This spirit of obstruction and hostility also manifested itself in the rank and file of officers of the Hyderabad Government. The Nizam, Nizam Ali Khan, who had negotiated a treaty with the British had died on 7th August, 1803 A.D. and was succeeded by Sikandar Jah, who was not very favourable to the British cause. The battle of Assaye between the British and the Marathas took place on 23rd September, 1803 A.D. in which the Marathas were defeated. It was alleged that instead of co-operating wholeheartedly with the British, the Nizam's troops were actually engaged at the time of the battle in plundering the baggage of the British army. After the battle the Governor of the fort of Daulatabad refused to admit the sick and the wounded of the British troops in the fort. The Governor of the fort at Badnapur in Aurangabad district fired upon the detachment of the British troops on its way to join Major-General Wellesley. A number of such incidents took place during the Maratha war which showed that the Hyderabad Government and its officials were not only non-co-operative, but were obstructive and to a great extent hostile to the British armies. The following despatch from General Wellesley to the British Resident written on 25th October, 1803 A.D. throws a light on the attitude of the Hyderabad Government officials<sup>1</sup> :—

1. *A History of the Hyderabad Contingent*, by Major R. G. Burton, p. 144.

“ It is very obvious that His Highness the Soubah is not aware of the benefits which he derives from his alliance with the British Government. In fact his Government could not stand, and would not have stood one day without the powerful support which it has received.

“ The war in which the British Government is engaged is in support of the Government of the Soubah of the Deccan. The immediate cause of the war was the refusal of the Maratha Chiefs to remove from His Highness’s territories, the large armies which they had collected for the purpose of invasion. The remote cause may be supposed to be the treaty of Bassein. But however desirable in other respects to the British Government that treaty might have been, the completion of it was a most essential object with a view to the security of the Nizam.”

The Governor General, the Marquis of Wellesley, later took a serious view of these lapses in the following despatch dated 25th November 1803 A.D.<sup>1</sup>:—

“ It appears from the contents of those despatches—

1stly,—That the Killadar of Daulatabad refused to admit the sick and wounded of the British troops engaged in the Battle of Assaye at Major-General Wellesley’s requisition.

2ndly,—That the Killadar of Badnapur fired upon a detachment of British troops on its march to join Major-General Wellesley with a convoy.

3rdly,—That Raja Sukrudar refused to permit the sale of grain in the district under his charge to the British troops.

4thly,—That the Killadar of Dharur refused to give protection under the guns of his fort to a convoy coming to the army; that he declared his intention to compel the British troops by force to retreat from the vicinity of his fort and stated that he could not give protection to the troops without express orders for that purpose from Hyderabad.

5thly,—That the authority granted to Major-General Wellesley by the late Nizam over His Highness’s officers is utterly disregarded.

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 145 to 150.

6thly,—That the existing connection with the British power is viewed by almost all ranks and descriptions of people in the Soubahdar's dominions with jealousy, distrust, and aversion.

7thly,—That His Highness the Soubahdar himself is supposed to be not altogether free from this contagion, and that he was known to be indisposed to the British Government previously to his accession to the musnud.

8thly,—That His Highness the present Soubahdar distinctly asserted that the British Government exercised a degree of interference in the internal concerns of his Government inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty; that the British Government was not entitled by the terms of the Treaty of Hyderabad, concluded in the year 1800, to make representations to him respecting the misconduct of the Killadar in time of joint war, and that it was a matter of indifference whether His Highness's Killadars did or did not admit the British troops into his forts in time of joint war, under the general defensive alliance.

3. If such a state of affairs were to continue, it would constitute an act of dissolution of the engagements between the two States. The Governor-General is resolved not to suffer our real relations with the Government of Hyderabad to continue in this ambiguous and doubtful state, but immediately to bring the question to an issue with the Soubahdar himself.

4. The necessity of this proceeding is not diminished by the measures which His Highness the Soubahdar has adopted in consequence of your remonstrances for the punishment of the offenders, and for preventing the occurrence of similar acts of hostility on the part of His Highness's officers and of similar impediments to the progress of our military operations.

5. The Governor-General in Council is satisfied with the notice which the Government of Hyderabad has taken of the conduct of Raja Sukrudar and of the Killadars of Daulatabad, Dharur, and Badnapur. The Governor-General in Council also approves the reinstatement of the Killadar of Daulatabad at the intercession of Azim-ul-Umra; and is of opinion that the delegation to Raja Mohipat Ram of a controlling power over the officers of His Highness the Soubahdar's Western provinces under the authority of the Hon'ble Major-General Wellesley is calculated to secure the professed object of that measure. But

the disposition manifested by the public instruments of His Highness' Government and especially the sentiments which His Highness himself is said to have avowed with respect to the nature of our claims under the treaty of Hyderabad, affect the fundamental principles of our alliance with the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and demanded a remedy beyond the mere redress of those particular grievances which formed the subject of your late remonstrances to the Court of Hyderabad.

6. If His Highness the Soubahdar really entertains the sentiments ascribed to him, it must be inferred that His Highness secretly approves the late conduct of his officers. At all events His Highness must either be considered to be responsible for the conduct of his public officers in points affecting the mutual obligations of the subsisting alliance, or if the Government of Hyderabad does not possess sufficient energy to control their conduct, His Highness must transfer to the British Government such a degree of authority over those officers as may secure the due fulfilment of the obligations imposed on His Highness by the stipulations of the alliance between the two States.

7. Either those stipulations must be distinctly acknowledged and faithfully fulfilled on the part of the State of Hyderabad, or the alliance must be considered to be dissolved and the British Government must be left at liberty to pursue such a course of measures as may be necessary for the security of our rights and interests, under such a state of affairs. His Highness the Soubahdar cannot expect to derive the advantage of both these predicaments.

8. The Governor-General in Council deems it expedient that these sentiments should not only be fully explained of His Highness the Soubahdar, but that they should be openly and publicly declared. The Governor-General in Council therefore directs that you will immediately demand an audience of His Highness, and that you will address to him a remonstrance in public Durbar, founded on the following topics which comprise the detail of the sentiments of the Governor-General in Council on the subjects to which they refer.

1st. The general principle of the alliance and the obligations imposed on both parties by the stipulation of the Treaty.

2nd. The benefits which the late Nizam derived from the operation of the alliance.

3rd. The repeated occasions on which the dominion of the Nizam has been preserved from destruction by the interposition and protection of the British power, enumerating those occasions from the commencement of the late war with Tipu Sultan down to the present time.

4th. A distinct intimation to His Highness Sikandar Jah that he owes his elevation to the musnud and probably his life entirely and exclusively to the support of the British power.

5th. The liberal and equitable conduct of the British Government towards the late Nizam, and particularly towards His Highness Sikandar Jah.

6th. That no instance can be adduced of any interference on the part of the British Government in the internal administration of the State of Hyderabad, nor of the slightest deviation on our part from the obligations of the alliance either during the lifetime of the late Nizam or since the accession of Sikandar Jah.

7th. That, although the value of the territory assigned in payment of the Subsidiary Force was inadequate to the actual charges of that force, for which it was mutually understood as the basis of the arrangement, that those cessions were amply sufficient, and, although various pecuniary claims on the part of the Company upon the State of Hyderabad existed after the conclusion of the Treaty of 1800, no demand was ever made on the late Nizam for compensation or for payment.

8th. That, although the peculiar situation of Sikandar Jah at the period of the late Nizam's decease added to the existence of the claims which the Company possessed to compensation as above described and would have justified the demand of concessions from Sikandar Jah as the condition of our supporting his succession to the musnud, no such demand has been made upon him. He was placed upon the musnud by the British power unconditionally, and after his accession he was merely required to recognise the obligations of subsisting Treaties, and the British Government voluntarily executed a corresponding act of recognition; thereby affording the most unequivocal proof of its determination to adhere implicitly to the principles of the established alliance.

9th. That in the present war, and previously to its commencement, the Soubahdar has owed the security of his dominions exclusively to the exertions of the British power.

10th. That when the combined armies of the confederates were assembled on the frontier of his dominions, their incursion was checked by the position of the British troops, and by the measures adopted by the British Government for the defence of the Deccan.

11th. That in concluding the Treaty of Bassein the interests of the Nizam were consulted in an equal degree with those of the Company; and the stipulations which the Nizam so anxiously required from the Peshwa were rendered a condition of the alliance with the Maratha power.

12th. That we engaged in the present war as much for the support of the rights and interests of the State of Hyderabad as for the security of our own.

13th. That the State of Hyderabad has not in any instance fulfilled its part of the obligations of the Treaty, by affording the aid of the forces and the resources of the State for the prosecution of the war to the extent required by the obligations of the alliance; so far from it, that the conduct of its officers has been actually hostile to the British Government. In this place it will be proper to state the conduct of Raja Sukrudar and of the Killadars of Daulatabad, Badnapur, and Dharur, with comments to the following effect:—

That the conduct of the Killadar of Daulatabad in refusing admittance to the sick and wounded of the British army is contrary not only to every principle of the alliance but to every principle of humanity.

That the commandant of a fort belonging even to a neutral State, who should refuse an asylum to the sick and wounded of either of the contending armies, would justly be considered to have violated the principles of common humanity, recognized by every civilized State.

That in the present case the Killadar of Daulatabad refused an asylum to the sick and wounded of that army which had not only been employed in supporting the cause of his Sovereign under the sacred obligations of Treaty, but had with matchless valour and skill defeated the troops of

a rapacious enemy which had ravaged the country of his Sovereign, and which intended to proceed even to the capital of that Sovereign's dominions.

Similar observations are applicable to the conduct of the Killadar of Dharur.

That the conduct of the Killadar of Badnapur in firing on the British troops was an act of direct aggressive war.

14th. His Highness the Soubahdar should be required to state distinctly whether he avows the principle which he is said to have maintained to the Minister, as described under the 8th head.

15th. That the maintenance of that principle will be a direct violation of the spirit of the alliance, and will place the State of Hyderabad in the condition of a public enemy to the British Government.

16th. The Soubahdar must be required to execute an additional Article of Treaty declaring that, in time of joint war, all the Forts in His Highness' dominions shall be open to the British troops, and that all the officers of his government shall employ their power and the resources at their command in facilitating the operations of the British troops. This obligation will be made reciprocal. In the progress of the existing war, if the Soubahdar, from want, either of will or power, does not correct the treachery of the Commanders of his forts, all forts necessary for the protection of the supplies and convoys of the army must be placed in Major-General Wellesley's hands.

17th. That if the course of the war had occasioned any movements of the Soubahdar's troops within the British dominions, no similar conduct on the part of any British officer could have happened. The convoys and supplies moving towards His Highness' army in such a case would have been respected and protected with as much care as if they had been our own.

18th. That His Highness the Soubahdar neither adheres to the spirit or even to the letter of his defensive engagements, when he justifies the officers exercising his authority, not only in refusing their aid and co-operation, but in committing acts of decided hostility against the power with which he is in alliance, with which he is united in the prosecution of a war for the preservation of his own possessions, rights, and interests, and those of his allies, and against

the troops to whose exertions he owes the acquisition and actual possession of his present power.

19th. That it is no encroachment on the Soubahdar's rights of independence to remonstrate against the conduct of his officers who withhold the supplies expressly collected for the use of the combined armies; who are believed to be guilty of treason, and to hold correspondence with the enemy; who refuse an asylum to the sick and wounded of the British army; who fire upon the British troops; and who refuse obedience to orders issued by their Sovereign for the declared purpose of promoting the operations of the allies against the power of the common enemy.

9. The Governor-General in Council directs that you will immediately address the Soubahdar to the effect above described, in public Durbar, and require from His Highness the most solemn and distinct recognition of all the obligations of the alliance, according to the true principles and just spirit of that alliance as herein explained."

The Resident communicated the views of the Marquis of Wellesley to Sikandar Jah, the Nizam, on 15th December, 1803 A.D. The result was that a supplementary treaty was concluded between the Nizam and the British for removing the causes of complaint.

It is apparent from the despatch of the Governor-General that the attitude of Sikandar Jah with regard to the British alliance was not co-operative. The treaty of 1800 with the British was also not popular among the Hyderabad Government officers, both civil and military. The Nizam's army, a considerable number, especially those who were associated with the French were definitely hostile to the British.

## CHAPTER III

### DISAFFECTION IN THE SUBSIDIARY TROOPS AND THE ACTIVITIES OF RAO RAMBHA AND NOOR-UL-OOMRA

After the death of Arastujah, the prime minister, in 1804 A.D. Meer Alum was appointed in his place by the Nizam. He was well-known for his attachment to the British cause. During the period when he was the prime minister (1804-1808) disaffection manifested itself in the native troops of the East India Company's army stationed in Hyderabad in 1806 A.D. The palpable reason for the disaffection was the change in dress and uniforms effected in the army but one can easily see that there was no other method in which the subdued indignation caused by the loss of freedom could be displayed by the soldiery. This led to a great discontent in the troops not only in Hyderabad, but in places like Bellary, Bangalore and Nandurberg.

When disaffection spread in the troops at Secunderabad, the native commissioned officers and a number of sepoy established contacts with two noblemen of Hyderabad *viz.* Raja Rao Rambha Nimbalkar and Noor-ul-Oomra. A number of soldiers deserted the Company's army and were entertained in the service of Noor-ul-Oomra. Raja Rao Rambha was also suspected of tampering with the loyalty of the soldiers of the Subsidiary forces. The Resident succeeded in quietening the discontent of the troops, who believed that the change in dress and uniform was calculated to convert them to Christianity. The Nizam and Meer Allum were approached by the Resident to take strong action against Raja Rao Rambha and Noor-ool-Omra for their improper conduct, with the result that Rao Rambha was banished to his jagir and Noor-ool-Umrab was dismissed from service. This dismissal was later converted into his banishment to the fort of Ousa in the district of Osmanabad. The details of these proceedings may be found in the following correspondence<sup>1</sup>:-

1. The Hyderabad Residency Records, Vol. 29 (13-1-1805 to 2-1-1809 A.D.). The other letters and notes which follow in this chapter are also reproduced from the same source, unless indicated otherwise.

To

THE HON'BLE SIR GEORGE HILARY BARLOW, BART.,  
*Governor-General etc. etc. etc.,*  
*Fort William.*

HONOURABLE SIR,

Para 1st. The several letters which I have addressed to the Secretary in the Political Department will have made you acquainted with the measures which have been adopted at Hyderabad relative to the late disaffection and discontent in the Subsidiary Force. I shall now briefly relate the circumstances which gradually led to the wise and beneficial steps which this Government took to remove from the capital Rajah Rao Ramba and Noor-ool-Oomra.

2nd. When I had received sufficient information to induce me to suspect that those chieftains had been guilty of very improper conduct, the first by tampering with the Native Troops and the second by seducing our sepoys to desert, I waited upon Mir Allum and in a private conference at which no third person was present related to him the origin and progress of the discontent which had subsisted amongst the Native Troops and of the information which I had received relative to the conduct of Raja Rao Ramba and Noor-ul-Oomra.

3rd. Mir Allum first anxiously enquired whether the discontent had been composed? I replied that when Colonel Montresor and myself had discovered that the proposed introduction of a New Turband and the orders respecting the dress and appearance of the sepoys had produced such serious discontent, we had agreed that the Colonel should assure the sepoys that they would not be compelled to wear the Turband and that the objectionable orders would not be enforced. That since the publication of the order the men appeared well satisfied and I trusted the ferment had been allayed. Mir Allum observed that we had acted very prudently, for that the sepoys had been in despair (*bc-dil and lachar*) and that our timely concession had prevented a most serious calamity. Meer Allum then proceeded to enquire about the shape and appearance of the Turband and about the orders which had excited so much dissatisfaction. When I had replied to those enquiries, the Mir expressed his surprise that after the long experience and intimate knowledge we had gained of

the character of the natives of his country, we should have attempted any innovations on such delicate prejudices as were attached to turbands, the whiskers and beard and the marks of caste amongst the Hindoos. I replied that the Mir must be convinced of the absurdity of the notion which had been circulated of an attempt to enforce the Christian religion on the native Troops, as one of the first maxims of our Government was to extend a general toleration to all the religions and sects that prevailed in the country. That the proposed Turband had been considered to be more convenient and ornamental than the present one, and that the sole object of the Regulations had been to establish a more general uniformity of dress and appearance amongst sepoys. The Mir observed that all men of sense and judgment, particularly those who were acquainted with the principles and maxims of our Government would no doubt consider the notion I had mentioned to be most absurd and ridiculous but we should consider that the people of whom our Native Battalions were composed had not that sense and judgment. They were ignorant credulous men who were bigoted to certain prejudices and customs and who might easily perceive or be made to perceive in the late orders a systematic design to introduce the Christian religion by gradually abolishing those peculiarities of dress and habit which distinguished them from Europeans. I know, said the Mir, that you wish to make the men look like European soldiers only because you think they will fight better, but the natives ascribe these changes to your desire to make them look like Christians. However, courage resides in the breast and not in the dress, and be assured that your sepoys will be more attached to you in proportion as you foster and promote their distinctive and favourite prejudices of religion, custom and appearance.

4th. I have thought it proper to report exactly what the Minister said on this subject, as it may be interesting to Government to know the sentiments of a person who is so distinguished for good sense and judgment, who has a mind superior to the common prejudices of this country, who has so intimate a knowledge of the character of the Natives and who is sincerely concerned in everything that affects the British Government.

5th. The Minister then made particular enquiries concerning the information which I had received of the intrigues of Raja Rao Ramba and Noor-ool-Omrab. I communicated to him precisely what I had heard on the subject, and

I mentioned that the Buckshi Begum's name had been employed as the person who was the real authority from which Rao Ramba's offers had proceeded. The Mir replied that he could not bring himself to believe the Buckshi Begum implicated in such a design. He knew her character, disposition and sentiments and his information through Chandoo Lal of everything that occurred in the Mahal was so particular and regular that nothing of the nature which had been ascribed to the Buckshi Begum could have taken place without his receiving at least some intelligence or hint of it. But the case was different as it regarded Rajah Rao Ramba and Noor-ool-Omrah. He could easily understand their readiness to take advantage of the discontent which existed amongst the Troops to direct that spirit against the British interests. Rao Rumba was weak and rash; professed great enmity against the English, and had carried on a correspondence both with Scindea and Holkar. Noor-ool-Omrah was turbulent, factious and designing. The Mir assured me that he did not know so dangerous a man at this capital as Noor-ool-Omrah. He told me that Noor-ool-Omrah had twice offered to him to dispatch Azim-ool-Omrah and had once proposed the same service to His Highness the Scubahdar. He knew that Noor-ool-Omrah was in the habit of speaking of the English with great insolence and contempt, and had often said that if he were properly supported he would drive us from the Deccan. The Mir concluded by observing that both Noor-ool-Omrah and Raja Rao Ramba were very likely to be associated in any design which was hostile to our interests and power.

6th. The Mir then proposed that Rajah Chundoo Lal should be sent for, as this was a subject of great importance and he should wish to have the assistance of Chandoo Lal, in whose discretion and secrecy he could place the greatest confidence. Chandoo Lal was accordingly sent for, and after he came in the Mir recapitulated to him all the information which I had communicated. Chundoo Lal appeared to be very well informed of the nature of the discontent which had existed in the Cantonment, and mentioned that for some days past he had reason to suspect an intercourse between the House of Rao Rumba and certain persons in the Cantonment, but had not been able to discover either the nature of that intercourse or the persons by whom it was conducted. He had also heard that a report was prevalent amongst many respectable families in the city of an insurrection being meditated amongst the native troops in the

Company's service, which had been encouraged by two or three sirdars in the City. I enquired whether the name of Sultan Mecan had been mentioned. Chundoo Lall replied that no names had been specified, but that Sultan Mecan was a Mahdie, who had five thousand of his own tribe at his command, and was capable of the most desperate undertakings. Mir Allum mentioned the report of the Buckshi Begum, but Chundoo Lall immediately said it was impossible she could countenance so treacherous a design, and both Mir Allum and Chundoo Lall agreed in opinion that the name of the Begum had been employed with a view to give a credit and authority to the offers of Rao Rumba.

7th. Mir Allum then asked what measures I should propose His Highness the Soubahdar to adopt on the present occasion. I replied that my evidence of the guilt of Rajah Rao Rumba was not so conclusive as could justify my specifying the measure which ought to be adopted against him. I had considered it to be my duty to communicate to him the information which I had received, and after having done that, I had only to recommend to his Government to take such measures as it might judge most conducive to its security and repose. Rajah Chundoo Lall remarked that on such an occasion as the present, which threatened the most imminent danger to the State, no delay should occur in adopting a most decided line of conduct, and he proposed that Rajah Rao Rumba should be instantly apprehended and confined in Goleonda. Mir Allum appeared to be of the same opinion, but I observed that it did not seem to me to be necessary to precipitate a measure, which might be followed by the most serious consequences, that I had every reason to suppose that the bulk of the Native Troops had returned to a proper sense of their duty, and that while we could depend on their fidelity, no immediate danger could arise from the intrigues of any chieftain in the city. Mir Allum agreed that the disaffection of our Troops was the only instrument by which the enemies of the British Government could accomplish their designs, but though the bulk of our Troops might be satisfied, yet there might be many dangerous persons in the Cantonment who might have influence over the minds of the common sepoys and provoke them to insurrection even after the concession of every point of alleged grievances. I replied that I had strong reason to suspect some of the native officers of having inflamed the minds of the sepoys, and of having been in correspondence with our enemies in the City, that Colonel Montresor and

myself had instituted some enquiries which we trusted would bring to light the persons so engaged. The Mir asked why we did not send from Hyderabad such persons as were suspected of having taken a leading part in the disturbance? I replied that we had that intention, but were desirous of deferring it until we should have procured more conclusive evidence of the nature and extent of the connection which we suspected to have been established between the Cantonment and the City.

8th. I then told the Minister that I thought he and Rajah Chundoo Lall should take the information I had communicated to them into their serious consideration, that they should make every enquiry that were consistent with prudence and the secrecy which should be observed on so delicate an occasion; that they should lay the whole of the information before His Highness the Nizam, and that they should temperately deliberate on the measures which ought to be taken to preserve the repose of the city, and the combined interests of the two States.

9th. The Mir enquired how many deserters had gone over to Noor-ool-Omrah. I replied that I had detected only four, but I had reason to believe that about twenty had been sent off to his jaghirs, and I had evidence to prove that the Native Commandant of Noor-ool-Omrah's sepoys had endeavoured to seduce many others and had made a specific offer to a Naigue (Naik) to promote him to the rank of Soubahdar on the pay of 100 Rupees per mensem if he would bring over one hundred men with their arms and accoutrements. Mir Allum asked whether Noor-ool-Omrah was supposed to have authorised the conduct of his commandant. I replied that I should suppose he had, for Noor-ool-Omrah had sent for the four deserters before him and had himself given the order to enter their names in the Roll of his Battalion. The Minister expressed great indignation at such improper conduct, and said he hoped His Highness would dismiss Noor-ool-Omrah from his service; that Noor-ool-Omrah was not only a most dangerous man but a most useless incumbrance on the State, that he enjoyed a jaghire of 25 lacks of Rupees without furnishing more than fifty horsemen, that he had no claims on this State as he had been introduced into the service, without either merit or pretensions, by his patron Azim-ool-Omrah to whom he had been guilty of the blackest ingratitude.

10th. The Minister said that he would wait on the

Nizam the following day for the purpose of submitting to His Highness the several circumstances I had related, and that after having consulted His Highness's sentiments, he would inform me of the measures which they should consider it advisable to adopt regarding Raja Rao Rumba and Noor-ool-Omrah. I recommended to the Minister to assure His Highness that all instant danger was over, and that it was unnecessary to feel alarm on the occasion, and I begged that the greatest caution and secrecy might be observed.

11th. On the following day the Minister waited upon the Nizam and submitted to His Highness the several circumstances which I had related respecting the discontent that had prevailed in the Subsidiary Force, and the information I had received of the conduct of Rajah Rao Rumba and Noor-ool-Omrah. His Highness appeared to be much surprised and terrified by the communication and requested Mir Allum to adopt any measure that he and I might judge necessary to the security of the State. The Mir replied that I had recommended great caution and deliberation, and that I was of opinion that as the danger was past, precipitate measures were unadvisable. His Highness could not be made sensible of the propriety of this advice, and asked the Minister what measures he proposed? The Mir replied that he had proposed to apprehend and confine Rao Rumba and to dismiss Noor-ool-Omrah. His Highness requested that this might be immediately carried into execution, and after some consultation it was proposed that His Highness should make an excursion to Golconda, that Rao Rumba should be ordered to join the Suvari, and that he should be suddenly seized and confined in the fortress of Golconda.

12th. The Minister during the whole of the audience did everything in his power to quiet the apprehension of the Nizam, and His Highness affected to be perfectly confident and at ease, but the Minister had scarcely left the palace before His Highness sent to Amzud-ool-Moolk to come to the palace with two thousand of the Paigah party. As his alarms increased, he sent for Shayar-ool-Moolk, the Arz Begee Zeah-ool-Moolk, the Khansaman, and at last Shums-ool-Omrah, with the remainder of the Paigah party. His Highness ordered all these Omrahs to reside at the palace, to make a proper distribution of the troops at the different avenues to the palace, and to observe the strictest vigilance and circumspection.

13th. When I heard of these preparations I sent to the

Minister to enquire the reason of them, and to express my surprise and concern at such an absurd and impolite manifestation of alarm. The Minister replied that these measures had been adopted without his concurrence or knowledge, that he disapproved of them, but that any attempt to prevail upon His Highness to dismiss the Omrahs and Troops from attendance would only increase the absurd alarm under which His Highness laboured.

14th. But though the terror of the Soubahdar continued to increase, he appeared to be equally alarmed at the notion of seizing the person of Rajah Rao Rumba, and sent for Mir Allum to consult with him on the subject. His Highness observed that the family of Rao Rumba had very strong claims on the Asofiah State, and that he was reluctant to deprive the present Rajah of his dignity and estates without the most pressing necessity for so arbitrary a measure. The Mir replied that he did not wish to urge His Highness to any measure that might appear arbitrary or oppressive, but that some notice must be taken of the conduct of a man who was strongly suspected of designs which menaced much more danger to His Highness' power than they should to that of the British Government, that His Highness was of course at perfect liberty to determine whether any step should be taken on the present occasion and to decide upon the nature of that step. His Highness said that under the suspicion which rested against Rao Rumba it would be imprudent to permit that chieftain to remain at Hyderabad, but he wished to avoid seizing him or depriving him of his rank and estates, without, I thought, the security of the Government required that measure. Mir Allum replied that I had declined offering any specific opinion upon the subject, but wished to leave it to His Highness' uninfluenced deliberation and judgment. His Highness then requested that I might be invited to call on him the following night, and Mir Allum replied that he would write to me to that effect. His Highness said that the case of Noor-ool-Amrah was very different. That chieftain had no claims on the State, enjoyed a large revenue without performing any service in return, and was a turbulent, dangerous character. His Highness added that Noor-ool-Omrah had long (been) obnoxious to him, and that he was rather pleased at an opportunity to dismiss him from the service.

15th. Agreeably to the invitation communicated to me by Mir Allum, I waited upon the Nizam the following night,

and found his palace surrounded by Troops. When His Highness entered he received me with more than usual cordiality, and after desiring every person to withdraw excepting Mir Allum desired me to relate all the circumstances which had come to my knowledge. Having done this, His Highness very anxiously enquired what measures I recommended to him to adopt on the present occasion. I replied that the information which I had received was not sufficiently conclusive to justify my specifying any particular measure and that I wished to leave it to the wisdom and judgment of His Highness, who I was convinced, would do everything that was proper for the security and dignity of his Government. His Highness said that he could not do anything less than removing Rao Rumbha from Hyderabad to his jaghire, but that he wished to know whether I thought it was necessary for him to do anything more, and His Highness after a short pause added that if we could substantiate guilt Rao Rumba either by producing any papers or bringing forward any of his emissaries, he could inflict the severest punishment upon the Rajah and all his associates. I was going to reply when Mir Allum interfered and observed that it was not probable any papers had passed between Rao Rumba and the disaffected in the cantonment, that at so short a distance the most dangerous conspiracy might be carried on only by one or two secret emissaries whom it might be impossible to intercept; that if His Highness waited for positive evidence of treachery, a revolution might be effected while we were in search for proofs, and that according to maxims of Nana Furnavees, matters of State (*raj-karan*) could not be settled by a jury (*Punchact*). The question was what was the nature of the suspicions that rested against Rao Rumba and what the measures which the security and repose of the State demanded in consequence of those suspicions?

16th. I observed that as the Troops appeared to be perfectly satisfied and well-disposed, all immediate and instant danger appeared to me to be past, and I did not apprehend any serious consequences from the intrigues of Rao Rumba, be they what they may. But I thought it proper for His Highness to manifest to the World that the designs of our enemies were not unknown to us, and that some mark of His Highness's displeasure against Rao Rumba should be displayed to deter other chieftains from endeavouring to alienate the fidelity of our Troops and from meditating any designs hostile to the security of the combined interests of

the Two States. Whether or not Rao Rumba had made any offers to the Troops, it was certain that the Troops had placed implicit confidence in the authenticity of those promises, and had been led to expect from him, the most active assistance and co-operation in the event of an insurrection. As His Highness appeared to be disposed to lean towards the side of clemency and to respect the long established claims of Rao Rumba's family, and as I considered the danger to be past, I should hope that the removal of Rao Rumba to his jaghire would be sufficient to prevent the recurrence of any connection between the chieftains in the city and our native troops, but even that measure I wished to leave to His Highness's uninfluenced and deliberate judgment.

17th. The Nizam expressed himself much gratified by the manner in which I had consulted his wishes, and at the interest which I felt for the honour and security of his Government. He said that he was determined at least to remove Rao Rumba from Hyderabad and to dismiss Noor-ool-Omrah from his service. But he would again consult the Minister on the subject, and communicate to me whatever might be the result of their deliberation.

18. The following day Mir Allum again waited on the Nizam and it was finally resolved that Rao Rumba should be ordered to retire to his jaghire, and that Noor-ool-Omrah should be dismissed and ordered to return to his native country. These measures were instantly carried into execution. Rao Rumba is by this time arrived at his jaghire. The districts held by Noor-ool-Omrah have been transferred to other persons, and that Omrah has pitched his tents near Golconda preparatory to his journey towards Delhi.

19th. These decided measures at first excited considerable sensation. The cause of them was however soon generally understood, and when His Highness dispensed with the attendance of the extraordinary guards that had been collected round the palace, the public mind became tranquillised.

20th. I have the happiness to report to you, Honourable Sir, that the measures which have been adopted, in apparent concert, in the city, at the Residency and the Cantonment have been followed by the most favourable consequences. This Government has executed its authority with great moderation, dignity and efficiency. The Troops,

appear perfectly satisfied and cheerful, and I am willing to believe that we may repose the greatest confidence in their future good conduct, fidelity and attachment.

*Hyderabad.*  
31st August 1806.

I have the honour to be  
(Sd.) THOS. SYDENHAM,  
*Resident.*

The following letter from the Governor-General is again interesting:—

To  
CAPTAIN SYDENHAM,  
*Resident at Hyderabad.*

SIR,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch dated the 14th ultimo stating the progress of your investigations into the origin of the spirit of disaffection which lately manifested itself among the troops composing the subsidiary force, and the measures adopted by His Highness the Soubadar against Raja Row Rumba, and Noor-ool-Omrah and by Lieutenant Colonel Montresor against the suspected Soubadars of the subsidiary force.

2nd. The Governor-General in Council is apprehensive that your proceedings may have been too much regulated by a supposition that the late disaffection originated in the intrigues of persons of rank, subjects of His Highness the Soubadar. Every successive information however has tended to confirm the justice of the opinion upon this subject, formed by the Governor-General in Council, and communicated to the Government of Fort St. George, in a dispatch under date the 11th instant, of which a copy has been transmitted to you.

3rd. The obnoxious orders respecting the dress of the sepoys, unquestionably constituted the foundation of the late disaffection in the army of Fort St. George, wherever it has appeared. The discontent of the sepoys afforded to all, whose views were hostile to the interests of the British

Government, an obvious instrument for the prosecution of their designs. This concurrence of the object with the means of its accomplishment, existing both in the Carnatic and at Hyderabad, at one and the same time has produced the appearance of a combination, of which not the slightest proof has been submitted to this Government. That many persons of considerable rank at Hyderabad are adverse to the British interests, has always been known and it might be expected that they would encourage the growth of that disaffection among our native troops; the maturity of which would constitute the most powerful instrument of revenge, or ambition, and the most serious danger to which the British Empire in India has ever been exposed. No systematic original plan of corruption appears to have existed either in the Carnatic, or at Hyderabad. Without the preparatory foundation of discontent, no such plan could have afforded a prospect of success. The Governor-General in Council therefore is of opinion that under present circumstances measures tending to restore the confidence and fidelity of the sepoys constitute the most effectual and permanent security against the designs of the turbulent, the ambitious, and the disaffected among the subjects of His Highness's Government.

4th. As you have not yet been enabled to transmit to Government the detail of the information on which you have founded a suspicion of the intrigues of Raja Row Rumba, and Noor-ool-Omrah, the Governor-General in Council cannot at present form a conclusive judgment of the validity of that suspicion. Under the view of the subject above described however, the Governor-General in Council, is disposed to doubt the expediency of the measures of severity adopted by His Highness the Soubadar, against those two persons, on grounds of mere suspicion. Such measures indeed, do not appear to Government to strike at the root of the evil, whilst they necessarily tend to promote faction and disunion in His Highness's Government, and to render both His Highness and his Minister unpopular. Without possessing more detailed information relative to the supposed clandestine proceedings of Rajah Row Rumba and Noor-ool-Omrah, the Governor-General in Council is unwilling to restrict the exercise of your discretion by specific and positive orders, applicable to the case of those persons. I am directed however to state for your consideration whether it might not be advisable with a view to restore general harmony and confidence to suggest to His Highness, and the

Minister the expediency of immediately revoking the orders of banishment, or at least of recalling Rajah Row Rumba and Noor-ool-Omarh from banishment at an early period of time. Such an act of lenity succeeding a measure of severity, may produce a beneficial effect upon the conduct of those persons even supposing the suspicions against them to be well founded. While their banishment continues, they and their adherents must form a party adverse to His Highness and the British Government. A state of reprobation may be expected to give activity to future intrigues, for the prosecution of which their restoration to favour would remove a permanent motive.

5th. But under any circumstances the Governor-General in Council is of opinion that Noor-ool-Omrah's proceeding to Delhi is objectionable in every point of view. It is objectionable precisely in the degree in which he may be supposed to be guilty of the designs imputed to him. The mere circumstance of his banishment must render him adverse to the interests of both the Company and the Soubadar, and it is evidently impolitic to place in a quarter which from recent events and local circumstances is peculiarly susceptible of commotion, a person of Noor-ool-Umrah's rank, and intriguing disposition, animated by a spirit of hostility to the interests of the British Government. If his banishment from Hyderabad should ultimately be necessary, the Governor-General in Council deems it highly expedient that he should be required to reside on one of his jaggeers.

6th. The measures adopted by Lieut. Colonel Montresor with respect to the three native commissioned officers who appear to have been peculiarly active in encouraging the disaffection among the sepoys appear to the Governor-General in Council to be entirely judicious. Examples of severity to that extent are necessary and may be expected to produce a salutary effect. But the Governor-General in Council concurs entirely in the propriety of the reasons assigned by Lieutenant Colonel Montresor, for considering inexpedient the extension of similar measures to other native officers, suspected of being concerned in fomenting the late disposition to mutiny among the sepoys.

7th. I am directed again to request your attention to the temper of proceeding recommended to the Government of Fort St. George in the Governor-General in Council's

despatch to that Government of the 11th instant, of which a copy was enclosed in my letter to your address of the 14th instant.

I have the honour to be  
Sir,

*Fort William,*  
1st (?) Sept. 1806.

Your most obedient humble servant,  
(Sd.) N. B. EDMONSTONE,  
*Secy. to Government.*

The Resident had confidently expected that the Nizam would issue orders for the dismissal of Noor-ool-Omrah as he had expressed a desire to do so, but to the surprise of the Resident the Nizam did not dismiss Noor-ool-Omrah. On the other hand the Nizam desired that "some place shall be pointed out where Noor-ool-Omrah with his family and sons may remain." The following is the note from the Minister Mir Allum to the Resident in this regard:—

*"Translation of a note from the Minister to the Resident.*

Rajah Rao Rumba Bhadur, Noor-ool-Omrah Bhadur, Degumbra Rao Pundit and Narasing Rao having carried on a correspondence with the Native Troops in the British service and information on this subject having been represented by the Resident to His Highness the Nizam, Rao Rumba Bahadur has been ordered to retire to his jagir and Degumbra Rao Pandit and Narasing Rao have been sent to the fortress of Mulkhair. With respect to Noor-ool-Omrah Bhadur, it has been determined by His Highness that some place shall be pointed out where Noor-ool-Omrah with his family and sons may remain.

These circumstances are communicated for your information."

This decision of the Nizam Sikandar Jah to allow Noor-ool-Omrah to reside in the State was due to the influence of Raja Mahipat Ram, the Governor of Berar, and Ismail Yar Jung, an officer at the court of the Nizam. Raja Mahipat Ram, the Governor of Berar, was at this time exercising very great influence on the Nizam Sikandar Jah. He

was known for his anti-British sentiments and at one time his activities caused very serious concern to the British Government. The details of Raja Mahipat Ram's career from his rise to power, his dismissal from the Governorship of Berar, his rebellion against the British and his ultimately seeking refuge in the court of the Holkar form a very important chapter in the history of the freedom struggle in Hyderabad.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE PART PLAYED BY RAJA MAHIPAT RAM

Raja Mahipat Ram was a Gujarati Brahma Khatri who first came to the notice of Arastujah, the Prime Minister of Nizam Ali Khan. He soon gained the confidence of the Nizam, Nizam Ali Khan, and his son Sikandar Jah. He was entrusted with the establishment of the French trained troops led by Mons. Raymond. After the elimination of French influence in the court of Hyderabad in 1798 A.D. the troops were reorganized and placed under the command of Raja Mahipat Ram. Soon he was appointed the Governor of Berar.

He took part in the Maratha Wars and distinguished himself in the campaigns that followed. At the time of the death of Nizam Ali Khan and the accession of Sikandar Jah to the throne in 1803 A.D. Raja Mahipat Ram was the Governor of Berar and was in charge of the Nizam's forces stationed in the Western parts of the Nizam's territories. Within a year of Sikandar Jah's accession to the throne Arastujah died. Raja Mahipat Ram had hopes that he would succeed Arastujah as minister, but the Resident prevailed upon the Nizam to appoint Mir Alam who was attached to the cause of the East India Company as the minister. This was resented by Raja Mahipat Ram. In the year 1804 A.D. the British undertook a campaign against Holkar and called upon the Nizam to supply forces as provided in the treaty of 1800 A.D. Mahipat Ram received the orders of Mir Alam to join the British with the stipulated forces in their campaign against Holkar's fort in Chandur in Nasik District. The forces provided were insufficient not being more than 2,000 cavalry and about 500 infantry. This was complained against by the Resident on 2nd October, 1804 A.D., although Mahipat Ram informed Col. Hally Burton that more troops were on the way. As it subsequently turned out the condition of the force was very unsatisfactory. The British had reason to suspect that Raja Mahipat Ram was lukewarm in his attachment to the British cause. The troops under the charge of Raja Mahipat Ram were, as noted in the despatch of the Resident, the remnants of

the troops trained by the French and as such inclined to be against the British. This was an additional ground for British suspicions against Mahipat Ram. After the close of the campaign Raja Mahipat Ram returned to Hyderabad on 3rd October, 1805 and rapidly gained influence with Sikandar Jah. Mir Alam, the Diwan correspondingly fell from favour. Mahipat Ram's position at the court is described thus<sup>1</sup> :—

“ (11th para). During the lifetime of the late Nizam, Rajah Mohiput Ram was frequently employed about the person of Secunder Jah, and he has always been supposed to possess a large share of His Highness's confidence and attachment. Since the accession of His Highness to the Musnud he has continued to cultivate with care and assiduity the good opinion of His Highness and during the short time that he has already been at Hyderabad he has been treated with more honourable distinction, and more entire confidence than any other person at the Durbar. He is almost daily admitted to a private audience and is said to be consulted on every occasion.”

The Nizam Sikandar Jah was favourably inclined towards Raja Mahipat Ram, who was making a bid for the post of Peshkar, with considerably extended powers so that he could retain his influence over the Nizam. Raja Mahipat Ram and Raja Raghottam Rao, who was also an aspirant for the post of the Peshkar, were at this time counselling the Nizam against the British and his minister Mir Allum. When the Resident suggested to Mir Allum that he should try to regain the confidence of the Nizam, the minister pleaded his helplessness which the Resident reports thus:—

“The Mir (Meer Allum) has replied that he did not mean to assert that the Soubahdar could not be conciliated, but that he was only to be conciliated by such means as he could not in honour adopt. Ragotim Rao could conciliate the Soubahdar by abusing the Company, by feeding him with delusive hopes of shaking off the alliance, and by wild plans of a general confederacy to exterminate the British nation from India. Mahipat Ram could conciliate the Soubahdar by promises of extortion and rapacity to fill the Treasury at the expense of the country, and by political plans, which though not absurd and wild as those of Ragottam Rao, certainly intended the British Government no good.”

1. This extract and the others which follow in this chapter are from the Hyderabad Residency Records, Vol. 29, unless indicated otherwise.

Such was the trend of the activities of Mahipat Ram about this period. The Resident was anxious that Mahipat Ram should be removed from the counsels of the Nizam and should return to his post in Berar as his influence against that of Mir Allum in Hyderabad could not be advantageous to the British. This is brought out in the following letter of 18th December, 1805:—

“(13th para). If on the contrary Rajah Mohiput Ram should succeed in effecting the removal of Mir Allum and in obtaining for himself the exercise of an unlimited authority at Hyderabad I am strongly inclined to apprehend that the Government of His Highness the Soubahdar would be rendered more than ever a prey to the extortion and rapacity of Mootusuddies and that our influence would naturally become precarious and insecure. It is probable that Mohiput Ram would confine his sense of obligation to him alone on whose pleasure he would depend for the maintenance of his power and I am decidedly of opinion that even should Secunder Jah find a Minister in whose attachment and devotion he could implicitly rely for the accomplishment of his purposes, it would become impossible for the British Government to maintain even the original principles and objects of the Alliance without a constant and invidious interference in the internal affairs of the administration at Hyderabad and without exciting a degree of jealousy and dissatisfaction in the mind of the Soubahdar which it is on all accounts desirable to avoid.”

At last due to the efforts of Mir Allum through prominent noblemen and leaders of the palace a compromise was effected between the Nizam and the Minister, Raja Mahipat Ram consequently left the capital on 7th May, 1806 on his way to take up his post in Berar.

The understanding between the Nizam and Mir Allum was shortlived as even from his post in Berar Raja Mahipat Ram was constantly influencing the Nizam against the British. In his letter dated 25th September, 1806 the Resident Sydenham complained as follows:—

“(5th para). Ever since the departure of Mohiput Ram, that person has been endeavouring to regain his influence over His Highness's mind and to effect his return to the capital. For this purpose he has carried on a clandestine correspondence with His Highness, which His Highness has unfortunately too much encouraged to the infinite prejudice of that confidence which ought to exist between a sovereign

and his principal Minister. Soon after Mohiput Ram's arrival at Baussum, I heard, but not from Mir Allum, that Mahipat Ram with sanction of the Nizam had despatched two messengers to Scindea and Holkar. It was even said that the messengar to Holkar carried with him a string of pearls and some other ornaments as a present to that chieftain. We have since discovered that Mahiput Ram has entered into a very suspicious correspondence with Salabut Khan, which circumstance I have already noticed in a private despatch to Edmonstone. Whatever might have been the object of Mohiput Ram's proposals to Salabut Khan, they are certainly liable to strong suspicions. 1st. Because they were made without the knowledge of Mir Allum and secondly because they were immediately withdrawn as soon as Salabut Khan had expressed his resolution not to engage in any plan which might be injurious to the British Government. My sentiments on this subject will be fully developed in a separate despatch to Mr. Edmonstone to whom I shall transmit copies of the Enayat Namah of His Highness the Nizam, of the several letters written by Mohiput Ram to Salabut Khan, and of the statement of Salabut Khan's respecting the subject. I have lately learnt from good authority that similar proposals were made to the other Mussulman chiefs in the Province of Berar, and that they have signed a Deed (or Ekrar Nama) binding themselves to obey unconditionally all the orders of Rajah Mohiput Ram. The whole of this transaction is certainly liable to suspicion from the cause which I have before stated. For there can be no reason for so unusual procedure adopted with the greatest mystery and secrecy without the privity of the Ministers of the Government, if the object of it were not to be directed against the British Government or at least the subversion of Mir Allum's influence and authority."

Due to the influence of Raja Mahipat Ram and Ismail Yar Jung the Nizam Sikandar Jah had assumed an attitude of defiance towards the British. Mir Alam found himself in extraordinary circumstances. The outburst of Sikandar Jah when the Resident asked him the reason for a change in his decision relative to Noor-ool-Omrah is well illustrated in the following incident which took place when Raja Chandoo Lal took the note of the Resident to the Nizam:—

“Chandoo Lal related that His Highness was sitting in an upper apartment of the palace, apparently intoxicated, and attended by his foster brothers and Burkundaze Khan.

My note was read sentence by sentence at the end of every one of which His Highness betrayed a violent passion and made use of many abusive and improper expressions. At the end of that sentence in which I observed that I had already received from the Mir an official communication of His Highness's determination relative to Noor-ool-Omrah and the rest of the persons mentioned and that I had immediately conveyed it to the Governor-General, His Highness observed, "What is it to me that he (the Resident) received such a communication? Of course he did, and he wrote it to the Governor-General, for every Resident is an Akhbar-nawees." Where I mentioned that Noor-ool-Omrah received the formality of his dismissal, His Highness exclaimed, "What is that to the Resident. I may give an hundred Paundauns of leave in a day, and take them back again, if such be my pleasure." At my observation that His Highness's new resolution might be hurtful to the dignity and interests of his State, he said "Who is to judge of my interests and dignity but myself? How do they concern the Resident? If I choose to hurt and degrade myself, I alone can suffer it. It (was) of no consequence to any other person."

Mir Alum, the Minister, complained to the Resident Capt. Sydenham about the conduct of the Nizam and incidentally threw light on the inherent animosity which Sikander Jah bore to the British as will be revealed from the following:—

"14th. The circumstances which you have just heard from Chandoo Lall are so unexpected and extraordinary that it is incumbent upon me to lay before you all the circumstances which have produced this unpleasant change, as well as to communicate (to) you such information as may enable your Government to form a comprehensive and accurate judgment of the general state of affairs at this court in order that it may be better able to decide upon the nature of the measures which appear to me to be necessary to restore the connection between the two States to its original vigour and efficiency. The present Nizam has always entertained, and seldom failed to express, the most inveterate jealousy of the British power and of its particular influence over the Counsels of this State. When a prince he reprobated the conduct of his father and the late Minister in placing this Government under the influence of the English, and in addition to his personal enmity towards the late Minister, he

detested him as a creature of the British Government and considered him to be a traitor to the Asophiah State. Before his accession to the throne, Mohiput Ram, then the Seri-shtadar of Monsieur Raymond, was his most intimate and confidential friend and adviser, who supplied his wants and relieved his necessities, who paid him the most flattering attention, coincided in all his sentiments, and indulged his hatred of the English name. His Highness, remembering with a degree of gratitude, which is unusual to him the attentions and assistance of the only man, who relieved his wants and courted his favour, while he was neglected and in obscurity, and who even then flattered him with the expectation of subverting the influence and power of the British Government, continues to place the most implicit confidence in Rajah Mohiput Ram, and regards the Rajah as his best and only friend. There can be no doubt that His Highness came to the throne with a predetermination to extricate himself from the controlling influence of the British Government, and it is still the prevailing and favourite object of his most anxious desire. On his first accession to the throne there were insurmountable obstacles to the accomplishment of his wishes. His Highness's authority and (the) extensive influence of the late Minister, the decided interposition of the late Resident, and the general system of Lord Wellesley's Government, to these circumstances may be added the novelty of His Highness's situation, and the successful war with the Confederated Mahratta chieftains, by which His Highness obtained an important acquisition of territory and a considerable increase of revenue. Under this combination of circumstances it was impossible that His Highness should manifest, either by his conduct or expressions, any hostility or indisposition towards the British Government. During the progress and after the termination of a most successful war, with very inferior numbers, against the Maharatta chieftains, in the Deccan and in the Hindustan, it must have appeared hopeless, even to the ignorant and sanguine mind of His Highness to make any attempts against the formidable power of the English either by open aggression or secret intrigue. But even at that period His Highness would have been rejoiced if you had been defeated, in which case he would readily have combined with the Maharattas to complete your defeat and expulsion. Of late many circumstances have been represented to His Highness in such a way as to produce in his mind a conviction that your resources are exhausted, and that you are as incapable, as you

are unwilling, to undertake another war. The emissaries of Ghaulky (Ghatge) and Holkar, who are spread throughout the whole of Inda, are active in representing the termination of the late war as a signal proof of the prowess of Holkar and the defeat of the English. A few sensible men know the contrary but the body of the people give full credit to the falsehoods of Holkar's emissaries. It is likewise generally believed that Holkar and Scindea will soon meet to concert the plan of a new war, and that their immediate views are directed towards Berar. These impressions have been received with implicit confidence by the Nizam, who has been taught to believe that the present is a most favourable opportunity to throw off the control of the British Government and to establish the perfect and exclusive independence of the Asophiah State. Rajah Mohiput Ram and Ragotim Rao have exerted all their influence and talents to convince the Nizam of the weakness of the British Government and of the practicability of removing that control by which he is restricted in his foreign relations with other Native States. It has been pointed out to His Highness that Dowlat Rao Scindea, who was bounden by similar engagements to those by which His Highness connected himself with the British Government, has succeeded in liberating himself from his Alliance, has gained an accession of (strength) by the violation of his engagements and has recovered his independence. It has also been suggested to him that the British Government has no longer the capability of punishing the infraction of engagements of which it was formerly so punctilious, and that Holkar has received and encouraged Serjee Rao Ghaulky in open violation of a particular stipulation of treaty.

15th. Mir Allum enlarged upon all these topics and interspersed them with many anecdotes to illustrate and confirm his remarks. But the object of this part of his discourse was to show me that His Highness had long fostered a jealousy and hatred of the English; that he would avail himself of the first favourable opportunity of manifesting his hostility and that the present had been pointed out to him as an excellent occasion to commence a system of obstinate resistance against every proposal of the British Government and every suggestion and opinion of the British Resident.

16th. I interrupted the Minister to observe that I supposed he was sufficiently convinced of the absurdity of the impressions stated to have been received by His Highness to render it unnecessary for me to show how ridiculous

they were. The Minister replied that he had no doubt of their absurdity, but as long as they were confidently received by the Soubahdar they were calculated to produce the most serious evils. The harmony and confidence of the two States, which had proved the safety of the Nizam's Government, were liable to be interrupted; all the original objects of the Alliance were exposed to risk, and His Highness may be led on step by step, by the insidious advice of ignorant prejudiced counsellors, to forfeit the friendship of the English, and to bring ruin on himself and family.

17th. I enquired whether His Highness had been rash enough to adopt any measures by the advice of those men, which afforded any proof of his hostility against the British Government. The Minister replied that he had no doubt that His Highness had sanctioned a correspondence with Holkar and Ghaulky of which the object was decidedly hostile to the British Government. That the last Arzee which His Highness had received from Mohiput Ram contained two letters to His Highness, one from Holkar and the other from Sujee Rao Ghulky. I enquired whether the Minister could depend upon the authenticity of his intelligence. The Minister immediately in a solemn manner assured me that neither he nor Chundoo Lall could have any doubt of the fact of Holkar and Ghaulky's letters having been received by His Highness and having been read to His Highness by Ismail Yar Jung. I asked whether these letters proceeded in the first instance from Holkar and Ghaulky or whether they were replies to former letters from His Highness or written by His Highness's orders. The Minister answered that he supposed them to be replies to the letters which Rajah Mohiput Ram had by the orders of His Highness addressed to Holkar and Ghaulky. The Minister likewise stated that two letters had been received from Dowlat Rao Scindea, one to His Highness and the other, as far as I can recollect, to himself. That these were formal letters and which he supposed would be communicated to me, but that the messengers were likewise charged with two private letters, one to the Nizam and the other to the Bueshi Begum which had been delivered and received.

18th. The Minister then resumed the subject of his discourse and stated:

'The last Arzee, which Mohiput Ram wrote, and which enclosed the two letters from Holkar and Ghaulky, referred principally to the late measures which

had been adopted against Rao Rumba and Noor-ool-Omrah. It represented that Rajah Rao Rumba was one of the oldest and most faithful of His Highness's officers, who merited His Highness's most implicit and unbounded confidence, and support. That Noor-ool-Omrah was devoted to His Highness and was inimical only to Mir Allum and the English. That Mir Allum was concerned in a plot with the English to remove gradually every officer of Rank and consequence from the service of His Highness, to establish the supremacy of the British Government and to overturn His Highness's State. That the rumours of a disaffection in the Subsidiary Force, and of a combination between the mutineers and Rao Rumba and Noor-ool-Omrah were only a specious pretext to effect the removal of those faithful servants, whom Mir Allum and the English had not been able to bring over to their views. That if His Highness consented to the dismissal of Noor-ool-Omrah, we should next find some pretence to expel Sheyar-oo-Dowlah, Shums-ool-Omrah, Unizud-ool-Mook and every man of rank who was attached to His Highness's State. That if Noor-ool-Omrah should be dismissed, every other chieftain would relinquish the cause of his sovereign and would be induced from motives of self-preservation, to adopt the views of the British Government.

Mohiput Ram therefore entreated His Highness, if he had any regard for his independence, dignity and safety, to oppose the dismissal of Noor-ool-Omrah, to retain that chieftain in service, and to insist upon it in spite of Mir Allum's advice and the Resident's opinions. Mohiput Ram assured His Highness that he might with great safety, insist on anything he chose, in opposition to the wishes of the Resident, as the British Government was exhausted and fearful of provoking the enmity of the Native States, and as the Resident was ordered to comply with all the wishes of His Highness. Mohiput Ram employed many other arguments to prove the necessity of retaining Noor-ool-Omrah, the weakness of the British Government and the impolicy of conceding any point to the British Resident. It was this Arzee, supported by the letters from Holkar and Ghaulky, which produced so sudden a revolution in the mind of His Highness, who immediately consulted with his foster brothers, Burkundaze Khan, and Razdar Khan. These persons were of course prepared to applaud the good advice and fidelity of Mohiput Ram and it was determined that His Highness should immediately order the Minister to communicate to

me His Highness's resolution to retain Noor-ool-Omrah. It was likewise resolved that His Highness should not be at the trouble to assign any reasons for his wish to restore Noor-ool-Omrah to the service, and that if the Resident should oppose that measure, His Highness should insist upon it as an uncontrollable act his prerogative. In short, continued Mir Allum, these are the circumstances of the case. His Highness deliberately resolves to dismiss Noor-ool-Omrah from his service, in consequence of the information laid before him by the British Resident; Mohiput Ram interferes and alarms and misleads His Highness by the most malignant falsehoods, and His Highness, without consulting any person of Rank or Respectability, without receiving the opinions of his Ministers, and without any previous intimation to the Resident, suddenly determines to retain Noor-ool-Omrah in his service. If, added the Minister, His Highness's obstinacy and caprice were confined to this step, the consequence would not be so great, but this is only the preliminary to further and more important opposition. If Mohiput Ram triumphs in retaining Noor-ool-Omrah, Rao Rumba will be recalled; Sureeput Ram will be sent for; Seetal Doss will be countermanded from Berar, Chandoollall will be dismissed and disgraced; and I myself may fall a sacrifice to the folly of my Master and the malignity of my enemies.'

19th. I replied to the Mir that I was seriously concerned to learn that Mohiput Ram could exercise so dangerous an ascendancy over the weak and ignorant mind of the Nizam, as from all that I had seen and heard. I was fearful that his ascendancy would be employed to direct the views and conduct of the Nizam to objects incompatible with those solemn obligations of good faith, friendship and gratitude by which he was connected with the British Government. I was also concerned to observe that the confidence and good understanding, which I had been at such pains to establish between him and the Nizam, should be liable to be interrupted and destroyed by the constant interference of Rajah Mohiput Ram. With regard to Noor-ool-Omrah His Highness had no doubt a right to restore that chieftain to the service, though we might justly complain of the very ungracious and improper way in which His Highness's resolution was communicated, and though we might lament that it did not proceed from His Highness's own deliberation, but was owing to the false and malicious insinuations of Mohiput Ram. If His Highness in the first instance had manifested any disposition to retain Noor-ool-Omrah or to mollify the severity

of his punishment, I certainly should have offered no opposition to His Highness's pleasure. However, as His Highness had himself assured me of his desire to dismiss Noor-ool-Omrah, I should expect to receive from His Highness some explanation of the cause of so sudden and unexpected change in his disposition towards Noor-ool-Omrah, and I therefore requested the Minister to represent to His Highness my anxiety for an audience, which I was desirous of procuring as soon as possible. But I observed that this point about Noor-ool-Omrah was of trifling consideration when compared with what he had stated respecting the conduct and views of Mohiput Ram and the correspondence between Holkar and Ghaulky and His Highness the Nizam.

20th. Mir Allum replied that Rajah Mohiput Ram with the knowledge, sanction and authority of the Nizam was engaged in a clandestine correspondence with Holkar, Ghaulky and Scindea of which the object was most hostile to the Alliance between the Nizam and the Company, and to the interests and power of the Company. It may be said that the Nizam can without impropriety write friendly letters to Holkar and Scindea, who are at peace with the Company. But why is the correspondence carried on with such cautious secrecy through Mohiput Ram? Why are not the public Ministers of his Government employed in writing and receiving the letters? Why is the circumstance of the correspondence concealed from the British Resident? The answer is, that His Highness and Mohiput Ram know that I am faithfully attached to the combined interests of the two States, that I consider them inseparable, and that I would, from policy and honour, resist any procedure which was irreconcileable with the obligations by which His Highness is bounden to the British Government.

21st. I asked the Minister whether it was completely out of his power to conciliate the Nizam and obtain from His Highness that share of confidence which should enable him to impress His Highness with a proper conception of his real interests as well as of the duties which resulted from the solemn obligations of a Treaty, and of gratitude for the liberal and disinterested friendship of the British Government. The Minister replied that as long as he continued to adhere to those principles by which he had always regulated his conduct, it was impossible that he should even obtain the confidence of the Nizam. His Highness considered every man

to be his enemy, who was attached to the British Government, and every man to be his friend who was hostile to the British Government, in direct contradiction of his engagements by which he is bounden to consider the friends and enemies of one to be the friends and enemies of the other. It is therefore impossible that as long as the Nizam labours under so erroneous, so unjust and so dangerous an impression, as long as he is decidedly hostile to the British Government, His Highness should ever place confidence in me or listen to my counsels, who actively promoted the present Alliance, and am devoted, from every consideration of policy, honour and gratitude to that connection which His Highness is so anxious to dissolve. If, continued Mir Allum, I could so far forget my duty to the State of which I am nominally the principal Minister, as to enter into the hostile view of the Nizam; to promise to form a combination with the Mahrattas to dissolve the present Alliance and to expel your Nation from the Deccan and from India, if I gratified the Nizam by a low contemptuous abuse of your nation, Government and religion, I have no doubt of being able to procure the confidence and favour of my sovereign; but I leave you to judge whether I would submit to purchase his favour at such a rate. I enquired whether some sensible, well disposed men such as Umzud-ool-Moolk and Ihtisami-ool-Moolk could not influence His Highness to receive a more appropriate conception of his interests and duty, and to reject the absurd and malicious insinuations of Mahipat Ram, the foster brothers and their associates. The Minister replied that Ihtisami-ool-Moolk was disgusted with the conduct and disposition of the Nizam, who was offended at his honesty and candour, that Umzud-ool-Moolk had twice or thrice given advice to the Nizam, but the conduct of His Highness towards him was not likely to induce him to undertake so ungracious an office again.

22nd. Indeed I had heard that Umzud-ool-Moolk had ventured to speak to the Nizam on the impropriety of suddenly altering his resolutions and on the impolicy, of treating the Minister and Chundoo Lall with indignity, and of blindly opposing all the Resident's suggestions, that the Nizam had been much offended by such unwelcome advice, and had ceased to call Umjud-ool-Moolk to his private councils. This information which I received from good authority, the Minister confirmed.

23rd. I asked whether the Buckshi Begum would not interpose her advice to rescue the Nizam from the desperate

counsels of Mohiput Ram and malignant influence of his Highness's associates. The Minister replied that both the Buckshi Begum and Tyoniat-oo-nissa Begum loudly complained of the capriciousness, obstinacy and folly of the Nizam, and were offended at the disrespectful demeanour of their son, at his indecorum, licentiousness and profligacy. In short, added the Minister, there is no person of Rank or Respectability in the city, who does not despise His Highness, and the commonalty detest him for his rapacity and penuriousness. Indeed such is the feeling towards His Highness both in and out of the city, that if you and I were to go to any other of the late Nizam's sons and present our Nuzrs, the present Soubahdar would lose his Throne, amidst the acclamations of the people, without a life being lost or a sword drawn. His Highness owed his peaceable accession to his Throne and the enjoyment of his undisturbed authority to the disinterested support and friendship of the British Government, and if the Subsidiary Force and your support were to be withdrawn, a revolution in this Government would take place, in the course of a week. Thus said the Minister does the Nizam owe the preservation of his dignity and authority to that very connection which he is so anxious to dissolve. He is secretly endeavouring to undermine that very influence which made him a Monarch, and which alone could protect his authority.

24th. The Minister then addressed me in a tone of unusual seriousness and solemnity and requested that I would submit at full length to the Governor-General all that he had said together with the sentiments which he was now about to express to me. 'I owe,' said the Minister, 'my elevation to my present office to the favourable opinion which Lord Wellesley was pleased to entertain of my character and services. For nearly thirty years I have assiduously laboured to promote the dignity and safety of the Assophia State. I have held situations of great importance and I have been employed on services of delicacy and difficulty. &c. I enjoyed the confidence of my late sovereign, and the good opinion of the British Government. I know, and I admire the character and policy of the British Government and since I have been the Minister of this State my greatest anxiety has been to promote all the objects of the Alliance by which this State is connected with the British Government. This anxiety, independently of all personal motives, prompts me to recommend to the Governor-General to take into his most serious consideration the state of affairs at this court, and

to endeavour to rescue the Nizam from the malignant influence of a few abandoned desperate men by whom His Highness will otherwise be led to destruction. To effect this most desirable end it will be necessary that I should be openly and vigorously supported by the British Government, that I should be invested with plenary powers by the Nizam, and that those persons should be removed who stand between the Nizam and the British Government. Any measures short of these, will only tend to place me in difficulty and danger, without producing any amelioration in the condition of the affairs at this court. Advice and remonstrance will be thrown away upon such a mind as the Nizam's, or they will be counteracted by the evil influence of Mohipat Ram and the profligate associates of His Highness. I do not know how far such decided interposition on the part of the British Government may be consistent with the change which has taken place in the political system of the Company, but I am confident that no other measure but that of decided interposition and the most vigorous control can check the progress of His Highness's disposition to relinquish all the benefits of his Alliance with the Company, and to abandon himself to the destructive friendship of Holkar and Ghaulky. If such measures as those I have recommended be inconsistent with the present political system of the Company I am truly concerned. But I perceive no other alternative than to leave His Highness to an uncontrolled exercise of his authority and to the guidance of a party, who are all the rancorous enemies of the British Government. I beg, continued the Minister, that my motives may not be misinterpreted. I am actuated by no other motive than the extreme anxiety which I feel for these interests of my own sovereign as well as for those of the British Government. If my resignation can in any way promote the good understanding between the two States, I will willingly relinquish my situation and retire either to the Company's Dominions or to the Tomb of the Prophet where I shall continue to offer up my prayers for the prosperity of (the) two Governments, which it is my ambition and anxiety personally to promote. ’ ”

Mir Alam declared that unless the influence of Raja Mahipat Ram and Ismail Yar Jung was removed and he was given sufficient powers it would not be possible for him to carry on his duties. The Resident Capt. Sydenham accordingly wrote to the Governor-General to address a strong letter of remonstrance to the Nizam and desired the removal of persons like Raja Mahipat Ram and Ismail Yar Jung

whose activities were hostile to the alliance of Hyderabad with the East India Company.

On the 21st of September, 1806 A.D. Mir Alam visited the Resident on the plea that his person was in danger and took up his residence in the premises of the Residency. On the 28th of November 1806 the Resident visited the Nizam and delivered the letter of the Governor-General. He also made it clear to the Nizam that the alliance between the State of Hyderabad and the East India Company was as much beneficial to Hyderabad as to the Company and that the State of Hyderabad owed its stability, peace and tranquillity to this alliance and that the Nizam would be well advised to remove Raja Mahipat Ram from the governorship of Berar and Ismail Yar Jung from the court and restore the prime minister Mir Alum to confidence and dignity. After the Resident returned from the Nizam, Ismail Yar Jung again influenced Sikandar Jah to take up an attitude of defiance. Efforts were made to enlist the support of the military chiefs as is revealed from the following letter of Capt. Sydenham, the Resident, dated 5th December, 1806 A.D.:—

“ 4th para. Early the next morning the Nizam summoned Ismail Yar Jung to attend him and they remained in consultation for (a) few hours. It would appear that Ismail Yar Jung had endeavoured with some degree of success to remove from His Highness’s mind the impression which your remonstrances had excited, for on leaving the Nizam he assumed a cheerful aspect, spoke in a loud decided tone, and hinted that the Governor-General’s plan would not succeed. The Band of Favourites took up the same language and affected to laugh at the important measures which I had adopted to obtain some influence over His Highness’s mind. A message was sent to Shums-ool-Omrah to enquire what party he could assemble at the capital. Cossids were despatched to Mahipat Ram. The march of Asud Ali Khan (Moozuffur-ool-Moolk) who has been secretly ordered to the capital, was hastened by repeated messages.

5th. It is proper that I should state the circumstances of Asud Ali Khan’s leaving his jaghire in the ceded districts. I had learnt that His Highness had conveyed a private message to Sheyar-oo-Dowlah to raise one thousand men with every degree of expedition, and Sheyar-oo-Dowlah had delegated this commission to his uncle Asud Ali Khan. This intelligence was confirmed by information which I received

from Mr. Peile, the judge and Magistrate at Cuddapah, stating that numbers of Pathans armed and accoutred were daily resorting towards His Highness's territories with a view of being enrolled into the service of the Nizam or some of His Highness's chieftains. I have already had the honour of communicating in a private form Mr. Peile's letter and my reply to Mr. Edmonstone. It is almost unnecessary for me to recall to your recollection the notorious character of Asud Ali Khan. His treacherous design of deserting with his troops to Tippu Sultan, when Lord Cornwallis was compelled to retreat from Seringapatam, his subsequent attempt against the life of His Lordship, his avowed and inveterate enmity against the English Nation—these and other circumstances of equal notoriety rendered his sudden presence at this capital at this period, without either public summons or permission, a subject of peculiar suspicion and distrust.

6th. At the same time that Ismail Yar Jung and the faction maintained this appearance of resistance, messages of assurance were sent to Noor-ool-Omrah, and that chieftain, for the first time since his disgrace and dismissal, received from the Nizam some supplies of money, which were conveyed to him in dishes of meat and fruit."

The Resident decided to take decisive action to induce the Nizam to accept the proposals for the dismissal of Raja Mahipat Ram and Ismail Yar Jung and the restoration of Mir Alam to confidence. He issued secret orders to the Commanding Officers of the Subsidiary Force to hold in readiness for immediate movement the two regiments of cavalry and a battalion of sepoys with two brigades of field-pieces. When the news of this arrangement was become known the Nizam was advised by Amjad-ul-Mulk to yield to the proposals of the Governor-General. The result was that orders for the dismissal of Raja Mahipat Ram from the Governorship of Berar were issued. Ismail Yar Jung was removed from the presence of the Nizam and instructed to take up his residence in his native town Bidar. Nurul-Umrab was asked to settle at Ousa in Osmanabad district. Asud Ali Khan was refused audience by the Nizam and asked to go back to his estate. Mir Alam was restored to confidence. Raja Govind Baksh, the brother of Raja Chandu Lal was appointed as Governor of Berar in place of Raja Mahipat Ram. It was decided that Raja Mahipat Ram should be ordered to remove himself to Sagar in the district of Gulbarga and take up his residence there,

Mahipat held the office of the Qilladar of the fort of Sagar. The idea was to remove him from Berar to a distant place in the State. As it was feared that Raja Mahipat Ram might be unwilling to hand over charge to Raja Govind Baksh, it was decided to send two battalions of native infantry from the Subsidiary troops with Raja Govind Baksh. When this was carried into effect Raja Mahipat Ram quitted Berar and moved to Sagar. The military chiefs in Berar hesitated to support Mahipat Ram when they heard of the approach of the Subsidiary forces. The proceedings of Raja Mahipat Ram at this stage are brought out in the following:—

“3rd. As soon as the intelligence of the new arrangement reached Baussum, Rajah Mahipat Ram assembled all his friends and adherents, and much time was spent in deliberating upon the nature of the measures which ought to be pursued by them. At length it was given out by Rajah Mohipat Ram that His Highness had required his immediate attendance at Hyderabad with the largest body of troops which could be assembled at the instant. Secret orders were therefore issued to such of the military chieftains as were at Baussum or in its neighbourhood to collect their several quotas, and be prepared to accompany the Rajah to the capital. It would appear that only a few persons evinced a disposition to pay an immediate obedience to these orders. The greater number were willing to observe the issue of events at the capital before they complied with the injunctions, which proceeded from the dubious authority of Rajah Mohiput Ram. It is reported that Buckshee Gholam Hyder Khan, on whose attachment it is natural to suppose that the Rajah placed the greatest reliance, replied that he was the servant of the Government and not of Mohiput Ram and that he would obey only those orders which he was convinced proceeded from their sovereign. Although I have reason to believe that Gholam Hyder Khan did make a reply of the nature which I have described still I am disposed to conclude that it was not sent to Mohiput Ram, until it was previously ascertained that a British Detachment would accompany Rajah Govind Bucksh to Berar. The knowledge of this circumstance indeed determined the conduct of all the military chieftains, but until it was clearly ascertained I have good grounds for supposing that most of them returned evasive answers to the orders which had been issued to them.

4th. I understand that Rajah Mohiput Ram himself, though considerably alarmed, continued to manifest no change of language or conduct until he found that the march of the British Detachment was publicly known; and that his influence over the troops had in consequence entirely ceased. Until that period he did not show any disposition to obey the orders of the Nizam, by delivering over the temporary charge of the province to Seetul Doss, but after the intelligence of the march of the British Detachment he seems to have abandoned all design of opposing the successor Govind Bucksh, and wrote to Seetal Doss declaring his anxiety to resign his station for the purpose of returning to Hyderabad.

5th. After he had come to the resolution of peaceably resigning his office, it would appear that he for a short time entertained the design of escaping from the Nizam's territories with all the treasure he had collected in Berar. It is certain that he packed up his treasure, amounting it is said to twenty-five lacks of rupees, and that it was placed under the custody of a person who made one march towards Nagpur. But he shortly altered his intention and the person who had left Baussim with the treasure was ordered to return to that place. The relinquishment of this and his other designs may partly be attributed to the advice of his elder brother Anant Ram, who resided at Hyderabad and who wrote a letter to the Rajah entreating him to yield a ready compliance to the orders of the Government as the only means of securing to himself and to his family whatever was left to him. But the circumstance of the Rajah's family being in the city of Hyderabad was perhaps the most powerful restraint on his further actions, as either his hostility or his flight might have exposed his family to indignity and distress."

During his residence at Sagar Mahipat Ram carried on correspondence with the Nizam. This is complained of by the Resident in the following letter:—

" 4th. It will be sufficient for me to state that there appears to me no probability of any interruption to the present favourable condition of our interests at this court, except from the intrigues of Rajah Mohiput Ram, who though dismissed from employment and living at a distance from the capital (is) in the active employment of every possible means to re-establish his influence over the mind of His Highness the Nizam.

5th. I wish it were possible for me to assure your Lordship that His Highness afforded no encouragement to the views of Mohiput Ram, but I am sorry to be obliged to confess that His Highness does not resist the Rajah's importunities with that determination and firmness which he ought in justice to his present Ministers and to the disinterested friendship and just and moderate views of his ally. I do not wish to accuse His Highness of positively and directly encouraging the views of Mohiput Ram, but he permits the Rajah to address him in Arzees which are filled with protestations of innocence, with loud complaints of his present degraded situation, and with insinuations that his devotion to his prince has been his only crime and that he has fallen a sacrifice to the enmity and malice of Mir Allum and the British Resident. The continual repetition of such sentiments is calculated to disturb the mind of a prince so credulous, ignorant and suspicious as the present Nizam, whose personal dislike of Mir Allum appears to be as unreasonable and as invincible as his personal regard for Mahiput Ram.

6th. The mind of Mohiput Ram is active, ambitious and sanguine. Not to discourage such addresses is in fact to encourage them and it is not surprising that Mohiput Ram should employ the tacit permission of his correspondence with the Nizam to convince his friends and even his enemies that he still retains the personal favour of his sovereign, and that he may yet return to the exercise of his power.

7th. It is by the circulation of this belief that Mohiput Ram still continues to possess, and I am afraid to exercise so extensive an influence in these territories, and more especially in the province of Berar, where the long exercise of uncontrolled authority had enabled him to attach many persons to his cause and interests.

8th. I have reason to believe that there are very few persons, of those of no respectability, who have any personal attachment to Mohiput Ram, but there are many who dread his return to power, and are therefore obliged to affect regard for him even while in disgrace.

9th. Mohiput Ram from the report of the intelligencers who are publicly stationed with him, appears to maintain an active correspondence with persons in the City of Hyderabad, at Aurangabad, at Baussum, and at Poonah. I have repeatedly advised the Minister to check this correspondence,

by insisting that no letters should be dispatched or received by Mohiput Ram, without being previously submitted to his inspection, but the Minister is reluctant to exercise so common and so just an act of authority, for fear of offending His Highness the Nizam.

10th. With a view to relieve these Dominions from the pernicious influence of so dangerous a character, I have always encouraged Mahipat Ram to retire to Benares, an intention which he has often affected with great solicitude to accomplish, but I shall be very much mistaken in my opinion of Mohiput Ram's character and designs if he ever withdrew voluntarily from these territories. It is much more probable that he should prefer under any circumstances to remain in banishment at Saugor, and wait the issue of events, than to retire to a situation which will afford no field for the indulgence of his habits of intrigue and will effectually shut out all hopes of any return to power.

11th. Mahipat Ram has lately taken an active and leading part in the domestic troubles of the Rajah of Sholapoor (*sic*),<sup>1</sup> which have terminated in the dismissal of the Rajah's former Dewan and the succession to that station of one of the Rajah's relations, who was supported and assisted by Mohiput Ram. ”

Mir Allum now proceeded to call for the account for which Raja Mahipat Ram was held responsible during his tenure in Berar. He took the view that Raja Mahipat Ram had misused State funds. Mahipat Ram protested his innocence. He was also told that he had actually 10,000 cavalry, 500 infantry and 200 Arabs though he had given out that he had only 200 cavalry and 500 infantry with him. When Mahipat Ram's influence was waning and the Nizam was completely in the hands of Mir Allum and the Resident, he assumed a tone of defiance. Mir Alum sent troops against Raja Mahipat Ram. William Palmer, who later became notorious in the transactions of Palmer & Co. was serving in the Nizam's army at this time. The troops were led by Nizamat Jung and Major Gordon. In February 1808 A.D. an attempt was made to negotiate with Raja Mahipat Ram. This is described in the words of Palmer thus<sup>2</sup>:-

“ When the rebellion of Raja Mahipat Ram took

1. Obviously it is a mistake for Shorapur.

2. *Papers Relative to certain Pecuniary Transactions of Messrs William Palmer & Co., with the Government of H.H. the Nizam*, pp. 278-279.

place, I was selected by this Government, with the recommendation of the Resident, Captain Sydenham, to negotiate with him on the part of the Minister. I was in direct communication with the Resident, and my correspondence with him on the subject, I believe, was laid before the British Government.

When the Nizam's troops were defeated by Mahipat Ram, Colonel Montresor, who went after him, took me as his interpreter, and gave me charge of the intelligence department, and I continued to correspond with the Resident at his request.

I have never expected to be called upon to state my services to this Government, and have no copies of the flattering testimonies which have been borne to my conduct by the successive Residents here: but I must say, that I have been employed on many occasions, when nothing but the highest opinion of my integrity could have justified it, and that on some of these occasions the service was hazardous. I will mention my situation with Raja Mahipat Ram.

Pending the negotiation there was a contention between him and his nephew, Sureeput Ram. Mahipat Ram was prevailed upon by me to accept the conditions offered to him by the Minister. Sureeput Ram, who commanded his uncle's troops, being excluded from any participation in the conditions offered to his uncle, used all his influence to dissuade him from accepting them. He resorted to violence, and instigated the troops to mutiny, filling the house where we were forming a conclusive treaty, with armed men and threatening to murder me. One treaty was signed about four in the morning, and the turbulence of the troops prevented an exchange of authenticated copies. As the only resource left to me for my security, I made Mahipat Ram a prisoner in the room where we were sitting, and threatened his destruction if violence were offered to us. Sureeput Ram, in consequence, changed his plan, withdrew the armed men from the house, and posted a body of three hundred Arabs near my tents, from whom I received a message that I should not quit the place till I had paid them their arrears of pay. This ferment was allayed, after some time, by the conduct of Mahipat Ram, and I was allowed to proceed unmolested to my tents.

The next morning a body of horse occupied a position within fifty yards of my tents, and forced me, for my security,

to take possession with my guard of one of the bastions of the pettah within which I was encamped. I was then surrounded by the horse and a body of Arabs, and was kept a prisoner within the bastion for several hours and was only released on the representation and good offices of Mahomed Ruzza Khan Scindee, who commanded a large body of troops under Mahipat Ram."

On 11th February 1808 A.D. Rajah Mahiput Ram broke all negotiations and marching out his troops from Shahpur engaged the troops of the Nizam. The following letter from Capt. Sydenham, describes the battle between the Nizam's army and Mahipat Ram which took place on the 12th of February, 1808 A.D. near Shahpur<sup>1</sup>:-

" Mohiput Ram continued to negotiate with every appearance of sincerity till the 11th of February, when he suddenly changed his tone, threatened the life of Mr. Palmer, marched out his troops from Shahpoor and joined Mahomed Rezza Khan. Mr. Palmer obtained with great difficulty permission to leave Shahpoor. On the morning of the 12th, Mohiput Ram and Mahomed Rezza Khan engaged the Nizam's troops under Nizamat Jung and Mr. Gordon. The Nizam's cavalry behaved with the most shameful cowardice, and fled at the commencement of the action. The infantry, under Mr. Gordon, showed great resolution and spirit, drove the enemy back, took their guns, and would have gained the day, if they had been supported by the cavalry. But being deserted by the cavalry, they were soon surrounded. A general panic seized them. All the exertions of Mr. Gordon and Mr. Palmer were insufficient to rally them; and they were completely destroyed by superior numbers of horse and foot. Mr. Palmer luckily escaped but Mr. Gordon was wounded and taken prisoner. From the concurring testimony of many accounts, I am afraid that Mr. Gordon was cruelly butchered. Mr. Bertie Burgh and a Mr. Bellair were killed. Mr. Pearson was wounded and taken (prisoner). His subsequent fate is uncertain. The other Mr. Burgh escaped. Of 1300 infantry that entered the action, not more than 300 have been able to effect their retreat, and many of them were wounded. The Nizam's cavalry, after this shameful retreat gradually collected at a place about thirty miles from Shahpoor, and are slowly returning to Hyderabad."

1. Unpublished correspondence.

When the disastrous defeat of the Nizam's army sent against Rajah Mahiput Ram was known in Hyderabad, the Resident despatched the Subsidiary Forces under Colonel Montresor against Raja Mahipat Ram. At the approach of the Subsidiary Forces Mahipat Ram quitted Hyderabad and fled to Indore. He persuaded Holkar to write a letter to the Nizam to join with him in driving the British out of India. But under the influence of the Resident the Nizam rejected this offer and declared that Mahiput Ram was a rebel. The subsequent fate of Raja Mahiput Ram is lost in mystery. According to a current version he was killed in an affray with the mutineers' troops while at the court of Holkar.

With the removal of Raja Mahiput Ram from the scene of action in Hyderabad the influence of the British in the court of Hyderabad became supreme. Raja Mahiput Ram's name finds an honoured place in the list of those who in the history of Hyderabad fought to check the British influence in the State. He is the first person after the Subsidiary Alliance of 1800 A.D. who tried to release Hyderabad from the British bondage.

## CHAPTER V.

### RAJA CHANDU LAL AND MAHARAJA RANJIT SINGH

In the year 1808 A.D. the Prime Minister Meer Allum died. The British were anxious that his successor should be one attached to their cause. They proposed the name of Shams-ool-Umrah to which the Nizam Sikandar Jah objected. After a long correspondence Muneer-ul-Mulk, the son-in-law of Meer Allum, was appointed as the Diwan and Raja Chandoorlal continued to be the Peshkar. Although the British acceded to the Nizam's views in the appointment of the Diwan they were determined to see that Chandoorlal wielded the real power and Muneer-ul-Mulk retained only the nominal functions of Diwan. The British were convinced that Sikandar Jah was at heart hostile to them and could not be trusted. The following extracts from the letters of the Residents give a clear picture of the character of the Nizam Sikandar Jah' :—

" It is difficult to say what the Nizam's real views of policy may be. In all probability, he never has had any distinct or uniform system in his mind: he has rather indulged a petulant ill-humour than meditated any precise design. He certainly would be terrified at the notion of being abandoned by us; but the unavoidable control and interference which his personal conduct, as well as the relative condition of the two Governments, have compelled us to exercise, are so offensive to his pride, and act so immediately upon the worst features of his character, that if his natural timidity and indecision would allow him, he would readily engage in any combination which might be formed against our power. It is on his weakness alone that we can rely for his observance of either the spirit or letter of his engagements. He will cease to be faithful whenever he ceases to be afraid."

1. *Papers Relative to Certain Pecuniary Transactions of Messrs William Palmer & Co., with the Government of H.H. the Nizam*, p. 29.

"The Nizam himself has not a single quality to fit him for the administration of his own affairs. His character is a compound of folly and madness, of obstinacy and caprice. He often betrays a capacity for artifice and cunning, but never shews any indication of an upright, manly understanding. The only instance in which he has been at all consistent, is his hatred of us, and his resistance of every measure in which he thinks we are interested. Whatever method of reform your Lordship might suggest would be sure of encountering his decided opposition. Even if it were determined to leave him the uncontrolled administration of his own affairs, he would not be satisfied. He would resist the proposal, if for no other reason, at least because it had proceeded from the English Government. He would then insist on having a Minister, and his only anxiety would be, to choose him whom he thought would not be acceptable to us. On the death of Azim-ool-Omrah we forced Meer Allum on the Nizam; and so many of the inconveniences which attended his administration were considered (with what justice it is not now necessary to examine) as having arisen from that source, that when Meer Allum died, in 1808, it was determined to abstain altogether from interference, and to leave the Nizam the uncontrolled selection of his own Minister. The two principal candidates were Mooneer-ool-Moolk and Shunis-ool-Omrah. But he professed to be undecided between them, and would not declare his choice, until he discovered which of the two was preferred by us. He applied to Captain Sydenham, who declined giving an opinion, but recommended him, if he felt any difficulty, to refer to the Governor-General. The Nizam accordingly wrote to Lord Minto, requesting his advice, and having ascertained by his Lordship's answer that we encouraged the pretensions of Shums-ool-Omrah, he was at once decided in favour of Mooner-ool-Moolk. His only object, from the beginning, was to ascertain which of the candidates we preferred, in order that he might appoint the other: and by this spirit of senseless obstinate counteraction, your Lordship will find him influenced on every occasion."<sup>1</sup>

It will thus be seen that the Nizam Sikandar Jah was constant in his hatred of the British. Even when his father Nizam Ali Khan was reigning Sikandar Jah had as his associates Raja Mahipat Ram and Ismail Yar Jung who were known

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

for their pronounced animosities against the British. When he ascended the throne the war with the Maharattas had started and Arthur Wellesley, the Resident and the Governor-General had reasons to complain against his lack of co-operation. The Nizam's differences with Meer Alum mainly rose from the fact that he considered Meer Allum to be a henchman of the British. He constantly supported Mahipat Ram and Ismail Yar Jung and it was only when the Resident threatened a march of the Subsidiary Forces on Hyderabad that Sikandar Jah agreed to dismiss Mahipat Ram and Ismail Yar Jung. After the death of Meer Allum Sikandar Jah was forced to accept Chandoo Lal, who was supported solely by the British, as Peshkar with full powers in the State. With this powerful combination of Chandoo Lal and the Resident, Sikandar Jah withdrew from active interest in the administration of the country. The Resident Metcalfe in his letter of 20th June 1822 A.D. had occasion to write as follows<sup>1</sup>:-

“ It is not clear to me, whether his abstraction from public business, which is of long standing, proceeds from natural indolence and love of ease, or from disgust at the control exercised by his Minister with our support. ”

From 1808 A.D. when Chandoo Lal became a real power in the State with the support of the British the Nizam and Muneer-ool-Mookl exercised very little influence in the administration of Hyderabad. From this period to his resignation in 1843 Chandoo Lal exercised unbounded power, a power which existed on the full support which the Government of India gave to him. It was through him that the Resident got the scheme of the Hyderabad Contingent started. The British were very well aware how deeply Chandoo Lal was indebted to them for his status and also for his own security. Says the Resident in his letter dated 14th June 1817 A.D.<sup>2</sup>:-

“ He is indebted exclusively to our Government for both his elevation and his support, and he is bound to us by the surest of all ties, that of knowing that the very tenure of his office depends upon our ascendancy. If we were to lose our control over the Government he would certainly lose his authority, and probably his life. On all occasions, of

1. *Papers Relative to Certain Pecuniary Transactions of Messrs William Palmer & Co., with the Government of H.H. the Nizam*, p. 166.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

what magnitude soever, where we may require his co-operation, we may confidently depend upon him to the utmost of his power. He will direct and authorize the measure, but it must be enforced by ourselves."

Such was the man Chandoo Lal, unscrupulous and extravagant caring only for the maintenance of his power and, agreeing to every demand which the Resident made on him which in his long career brought Hyderabad to the verge of bankruptcy. The Hyderabad Contingent Force owed rise and expansion to his support and in course of time became a ruthless machine for dealing with rebellions in the State. The rise of the Hyderabad Contingent will be related in the subsequent chapter.

A noteworthy incident which happened in 1810 A.D. deserves mention. Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the lion of the Punjab, was at this time busy consolidating his power. He was anxious to know the conditions of the various States in India under British influence. He established contact with Chandoo Lal through an emissary. The letter from Maharaja Ranjit Singh to Chandoo Lal forms the subject of a report from the Resident Thomas Sydenham to the Imperial Government. It is reproduced below<sup>1</sup>:

To

N. B. EDMONSTONE Esqr.,  
*Secretary to Government,  
Fort William.*

Sir,

I beg to inform you that yesterday morning Sharfuddin Khan, the Munshi of Raja Chandulall, waited upon me with the following message from the Raja.

That a Sikh of the name Goor Singh had arrived at Hyderabad with a letter from Ranjit Singh of Lahore to the address of Chandulall and delivered the letter. That after many complimentary expressions in the name of Ranjit Singh Goor Singh stated that the Rajah of Lahore had received vakils from Dowlat Rao Sindia, Jeswuntrao Holkar, the Raja of Bharatpur and Amurt Rao, the brother of the Peshwa, who resides at Banaras. That all these

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1. The Hyderabad Residency Records, Vol. 35.

persons were anxious to engage Ranjit Singh in Confederacy against the British Govt. That some time ago Mr. Metcalfe had visited Ranjit Singh for the purpose of framing some engagement between the Sikhs and the British Govt. That the British Govt. insisted upon Ranjit Singh withdrawing all claims to the districts to the eastwards of Sutlej and that after much discussion some engagements had been formed through the agency of Metcalfe. That Ranjit Singh was at a loss what course of measure to pursue and what answer to give the vakils of Sindia, Holkar, the Raja of Bharatpur and Anirit Rao. That he was anxious to receive the opinion and advice of Raja Chandulall not only because they were brothers in faith but because he had a high opinion of Chandulall's wisdom and prudence and because Raja Chandulall must be well acquainted both with the real state of affairs in India and with the resources, power, disposition and views of the British Government.

Goor Singh then stated that it was the wish of Ranjit Singh that Raja Chandulall should acknowledge the receipt of his letter in general terms and that he should depute some intelligent and confidential person to Lahore to communicate his sentiments and advice to Ranjit Singh.

Sharfuddin Khan observed that Chandulall had given a civil reception to the vakil and had listened to all he had said. That he had replied in general terms of compliment to Ranjit Singh's message and had told Goor Singh that as the subject was of much delicacy and importance it would require some days' reflection.

Sharfuddin then put Ranjit Singh's letter into my hands and concluded by saying that Raja Chandulall would be guided implicitly by my advice and begged to know whether any answer should be given to Ranjit Singh's letter and in what terms the letter should be couched; Sharfuddin added that no communication had been made on the subject either to the Nizam or to Munirulmulk.

I told Sharfuddin Khan in reply that upon a point of such delicacy, I should be anxious to consult the wishes of the Governor-General and for that purpose I suggested that he should give no further answer to Goor Singh until I heard from Madras. I was also desirous to send the original letter to Madras and that no answer should be given until I should have ascertained the pleasure of the Governor-General upon the subject.

I do myself the honour to enclose the original letter together with the Kharita and seal.

I am told that Goor Singh is a Sikh of respectable appearance and decent manners and from his conversation it would seem that he enjoyed the confidence of Ranjit Singh.

It may be proper to mention that Raja Chandulall is one of either *kuttaecs* who follow the tenets of Manik Shah (Nanak) and he has many Sikhs in his service, that he is the patron of the college of Sikhs, which is established at Nanded on the Godavari and that he is very bountiful to the Sikhs in general. Chandulall is the Mureed or disciple of a Pir named Shaebjee, who is reputed to be a descendant of Manuck (Nanak) Shah and who is held in great veneration by the Sikhs and those who follow the tenets of Manik (Shah). Raja Chandulall seems to be desirous of replying to Ranjit Singh's letter in such terms as may give the Raja of Lahore a favourable opinion of our character and power and may incline him to court our friendship and alliance.

· I have the etc.,

*Hyderabad,  
2nd April, 1810.*

(Sd.) THOMAS SYDENHAM,  
*Resident.*"

## CHAPTER VI

### ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD CONTINGENT FORCES.

Although the Nizam was bound under the Treaty of 1800 to supply 6,000 Infantry and 9,000 Cavalry to the British whenever required to do so, the state of the Nizam's army was unsatisfactory in the extreme. The total strength of the Nizam's army at this time was about 70,000. This army was composed of Africans, Arabs, Rohillas, Rathodes, and others whose military efficiency was extremely poor. They had been mainly recruited through noblemen and officials. Large bodies of these infantry and cavalry were stationed in the districts and in the province of Berar. There were also remnants of the old corps trained by the French and lately disbanded but now formed and placed under the command of persons like Raja Mahipat Ram who were inimical to British interests. Men of all communities like the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French and a few Englishmen, were serving in these armies.

As early as 1803 A.D. General Wellesley had felt that the army which the Nizam sent in the Maratha Campaign was militarily very inefficient and that a reorganization of this army was necessary. The presence of hostile elements in the army also called for a reorganization of these forces.

The Resident Kirkpatrick had already proposed reforms in the Nizam's army under a scheme known as the Silledari Scheme which would ensure prompt payment of salaries to the troops and the introduction of discipline among them. This was rejected by the Nizam for reasons shown in the following letter of Henry Russell, the acting Resident, dated 23rd October, 1805 A.D.<sup>1</sup>:

“ That His Highness had conceived it to be the intention of the British Government to substitute in a short time

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1. The Hyderabad Residency Records, Vol. 29.

European Officers to the Rissaldars and Jamadaras, who were in the first instance to be selected from the subjects of His Highness, and to assume the entire management and control of the country which was to be appropriated to the payment of the Troops."

That the Nizam had ample reasons to suspect the increase of British influence as a result of the Subsidiary System is borne out by the views of Thomas Sydenham, the Resident, expressed in his letter dated 30th May, 1806 A.D.<sup>1</sup>—

" 10th para. My opinion, of the proposal for the maintenance of a Silledar Establishment when that question was unsuccessfully agitated with this Government, was, that no Establishment of that or any other description of Military Force, could be effective, unless the direction, control and payment of the Force were entrusted to an European Officer of rank and credit. It would even have been necessary, in my judgment, that the provinces from which that Force was to be maintained should be managed by an European Officer."

Writing on this subject relative to the Nizam's infantry stationed in Berar, the Resident reported in his despatch dated 10th December, 1806 A.D. as follows<sup>2</sup>—

" The State of the Nizam's infantry in Berar demands the most serious attention of the British Government. The several corps which are under the immediate and personal command of Mahipat Ram are the remains of Mons. Raymond's party. These corps are dressed in the French costume; they are disciplined in the French exercise and words of command. They are naturally attached to the French cause, and this disposition has been designedly encouraged by Raja Mohiput Ram. An English Officer of the name of Draper was desirous to introduce the English exercise and words of command, but the sepoys peremptorily refused to comply with his orders, and the officer was obliged to concede the point to prevent a disturbance. The person, who really commands these corps and has considerable influence over them, is one Clementi, a Spaniard, faithfully attached to Mohiput Ram, and notoriously hostile to the British cause. This man calls himself a Portuguese and had sufficient interest at Goa to procure the credentials of an Ambassador from the Portuguese Government to the Subahadar of the Deccan. These credentials were seized by the late Resident, and are still in my possession. But

1. *Ibid.*

2. *A History of the Hyderabad Contingent by Major R. G. Burton,*  
pp. 20-21.

the man is really a Spaniard. There are many Europeans and half-caste men of different nations and characters, who are distributed among the several corps in Berar, and are most of them under the control and influence of the Spaniard Clementi. These subordinate officers have gradually crept into the Nizam's service without having excited attention, but it is of much consequence that their numbers, their nation, and their characters should be ascertained, and that such as are liable to suspicion should be dismissed from the service and sent out of the country. In the event of a peace between Great Britain and France the state of the remains of the French corps and the character and dispositions of their Commanding Officers must be regarded with a zealous and vigilant eye. Every effort of the British Resident will be required to prevent the admission of secret emissaries who may be employed in attaching the corps of Infantry in the Nizam's service to the interests and cause of the French nation. I have therefore determined to procure a list of all the Europeans or sons of Europeans at present in the Nizam's service, and to make enquiry of their nation, characters and sentiments. And I propose as a future general regulation, that such Europeans as are worthy of being retained in the service shall receive commissions from this Government countersigned by myself; that a list of them shall be kept at the Residency describing their rank, station, and period of service; and that all Europeans and half-castes who cannot produce these commissions shall be seized and sent out of the country. Upon the principles before stated I have judged it proper to require that Clementi and some others shall be dismissed from the Nizam's service, and Meer Allum has determined to reform the Corps of infantry in Berar, and place them on a respectable footing under the command of English officers who are already in the service of this State. To effect this seasonable reform and to enable the English officers to create and maintain a proper influence and authority over their respective corps, it will be of much importance that a detachment of British troops should be stationed in Berar. By the general influence and example derived from the presence of a British detachment, and under the regulations which Meer Allum intends to adopt, for the regular payment, clothing, and equipment of the corps in Berar, it may be expected that these corps will gradually attain to a degree of discipline and subordination which may render them useful and creditable auxiliaries in any future war."

The presence of non-English Europeans, Eurasians and half-castes was also disliked by the British. Their efforts were aimed at getting them dismissed from the service of the Nizam. They succeeded in this aim as will be apparent from the letter of the Resident Thomas Sydenham dated 15th December, 1806 A.D. extracts from which are given below<sup>1</sup>:-

“ 15th para—After some conversation I observed to the Nizam that many Europeans and half-castes of an improper description, had generally entered his service, that men of such a character could be of no use to the discipline of the Troops, but might hereafter become dangerous, and that I was therefore anxious to ascertain the character and claims of all the Europeans and others in his service, and to propose the dismissal of such men as were unworthy of remaining in the service. To this proposal His Highness readily assented, and I requested the Minister to furnish me with a list of the Europeans and half-caste men who were distributed in the several corps of Infantry or were attached to the different chieftains of the State.”

There were still a number of Englishmen in the service of the Nizam. The plan of the reform of the Nizam’s army which the Resident had in mind was seriously mooted when disaster befell the Nizam’s troops in its battle against Raja Mahipat Ram on 12th February 1808 A.D. when a number of English officers were killed and wounded in that battle, including Gordon, Bertie Burgh and Bellair who were killed and Mr. Pearson who was wounded. Kaye remarks “ That few European officers who were attached to the Nizam’s army in 1808 seemed to be only there to be butchered.”

Mutinies in the Nizam’s army against European Officers were also frequent<sup>2</sup>:-

“ In November 1812 the Muhammadan sepoys of one of the Nizam’s Infantry regiments stationed in the French Infantry lines near the Residency broke into open mutiny, either because they had not received their pay, or under the influence of the relatives of a native officer who had been reduced, whilst it was otherwise said that the mutiny had been brought about by the city people who viewed with displeasure the reform of the Nizam’s troops, and the appointment to them of European officers. The mutineers tied their

1. The Hyderabad Residency Records, p. 29.

2. *A History of the Hyderabad Contingent* by Major R. G. Burton, p. 28.

Commander, Major Edward Gordon, to the muzzle of a gun and threatened to blow him away unless their pay and a free pardon were given them. Major Gordon was eventually released, and the ringleaders of the mutiny were caught and executed."

There was also a mutiny of a similar nature at Indoor (now Nizamabad in the Hyderabad State)<sup>1</sup>:-

"At about the same time a similiar mutiny broke out in a regiment under command of one Clarke, stationed at Indur, eighty miles north of Hyderabad, and probably under the pressure of these events, the Nizam's Government were induced by the Resident to sanction the raising of two battalions of Regular Infantry, to be equipped and disciplined like the sepoys of the Company's army. The men of Major Gordon's regiment who had remained faithful were drafted into Mr. Beckett's newly-raised corps, and Mr. Beckett, an English gentleman of high character and considerable professional attainments, was directed to raise a second battalion, which was placed under command of a Mr. Larride. These two battalions formed the famous Russell Brigade, subsequently the 1st and 2nd Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent. They were armed, clothed, and equipped in every respect like the Company's sepoys, and they were paid regularly on the 1st of every month from the Resident's Treasury."

The reform of the Nizam's troops in Berar was also taken up simultaneously. The Berar Regular Infantry now consisted of two brigades with guns comprising 4 battalions in addition to which were Salabat Khan's two battalions forming the "Ellichpur Brigade", with its artillery which had also undergone reorganization. The Resident was able to report in his despatch of 28th January 1815 as follows<sup>2</sup>:-

"The regular corps in the service of the Nizam form a body entirely distinct in every particular from the corps composing the remainder of his army. They now consist of three brigades: two in the Berar and one at Hyderabad. Of the two brigades in Berar, the first is commanded by Mr. Elliot, who has been 17 years in the Nizam's army, and served during the Seringapatam campaign in 1799, and the second by Mr. Fraser, who was formerly in His Majesty's

1. *A History of the Hyderabad Contingent* by Major R. G. Burton, pp. 28-29.  
2. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

65th Regiment, and entered the Nizam's service in 1809. The command of the Brigade at Hyderabad is held by Lieutenant Hare, of the Honourable Company's army, who was nominated to it by His Excellency the Governor-General in April 1814."

They were soon called upon to deal with the insurrection of Mubarez-ud-Dowla, the son of Nizam Sikandar Jah, the details of which are as follows:—

Mubarez-ud-Dowlah, who was later to play an important part in the Wahabi Conspiracy of 1839 A.D., was the son of Nizam Sikandar Jah and was born in 1795 A.D. From his early days he was known for his obstinate nature and anti-British sentiments. Once his father Sikandar Jah desired that guards from the British army should be posted at the residence of Mubarez-ud-Dowla. The latter refused the posting of British guards on the plea that he would be prepared to die rather than see British guards at his palace gates. Mr. Russell, the Resident had been convinced that Mubarez-ud-Dowla was violently anti-British. In 1815 a minor incident brought Mubarez-ud-Dowla into violent conflict with the Resident. A private quarrel between one of the attendants of Mubarez-ud-Dowla with a tailor residing in the jurisdiction of the Residency led to the arrest of the tailor by Mubarez-ud-Dowla's retainers. On being asked to hand over the person Mubarez-ud-Dowla refused.

On the 20th of August 1815 A.D. Capt. Hare with 700 men and two guns of "The Russell Brigade" was ordered to march into the city. The force was fired upon by the armed men posted on the way leading to the house of Mubarez-ud-Dowla. The resistance to Capt. Hare's advance was obstinate. Two brigades pushed their way and with their guns blew open two of the gates, but so great was the resistance inside the palace that the force was obliged to retire. In this struggle Lt. Durby of the Resident's corps was killed. About twenty of Mubarez-ud-Dowla's retainers also died. The Resident was preparing to send for further troops from Secunderabad when the Nizam intervened and succeeded in removing Mubarez-ud-Dowla to the fort of Golconda where he was confined for five years before being recalled to the city. Mubarez-ud-Dowla was later to be involved in several disturbances which occurred in 1830 and in the Wahabi Conspiracy of 1839, both designed against the British. The

formation of the Hyderabad Contingent was proceeding apace. The Nizam's cavalry in Berar was also reorganized in 1816 A.D. In this scheme the whole force of irregular cavalry in Berar was to consist of 8,000 men distributed into four separate Risalas of 2,000 men each. The organization of these troops was placed in the hands of a European Officer as Commandant, aided by five of the Company's Officers, one of whom was to be a staff officer of the Commandant. It was in this way that Capt. Evans David became the first Commandant with Lt. H. B. Smith, Hamilton, Capt. Pedlar, Lt. Wells and John Sutherland to assist him. The payment of these commandants was made the first charge on the Nizam's treasury. For ensuring prompt payment Raja Chandulal made arrangements with the house of Palmer & Co., who later became very notorious, and even opened an establishment in Aurangabad.

The Contingent Forces thus formed were placed on a very efficient footing. They were nominally in the Nizam's service but the actual control over them with regard to their formation, location and disposal was in the hands of the Resident. It was with these forces that the British were able to put down rebellions against Hyderabad which were continuously taking place in one part or the other of the State from 1818 down to 1857 A.D. Although when the expenditure of these contingent forces was raised to huge sums the Nizam's Government took the stand that the raising of the Contingent Forces was unnecessary and uncalled for, yet, it could not be denied that without the presence of these trained troops the State of Hyderabad would, under the almost continuous rebellions which it had to face, have disintegrated long ago. The role of the Hyderabad Contingent, trained and led by British Officers, was thus a sinister one. The East India Company's control, through the minister Chandulal, had assumed a dominant role in the internal affairs of Hyderabad but it would not force the Nizam or the minister to embark on a scheme of reforms in the State, which would have made such rebellions unnecessary. On the other hand some of the reforms initiated by the Resident Sir Charles Metcalfe were frowned upon by the Governor-General on the plea that they might seem to suggest as interference in the internal affairs of the Nizam. Thus the East India Company did not do anything else but suppress the rebellions against the Nizam throughout the period 1818-1857. It is in this context that these rebellions have to be viewed as the risings of the people against the chronic

maladministration of the Hyderabad Government. Obviously, the British cannot escape the responsibility of having appeared in the role of tyrants and having shirked the duty of forcing the Nizam and his ministers to reform the administration.

The State of Hyderabad at this time was in a very bad condition. The army of Hyderabad which was a mere rabble was nearly 70,000 in strength and was costing the State exchequer a major portion of the revenue. Large parts of the State were in a state of prolonged rebellion against the Government which was ineffective in dealing with them. The Hukkers, a war-like community in the districts of Nanded, Parbhani and Berar across the river Painganga, were in open rebellion from 1798 A.D. Similarly the Zamindars of Sirvancha and Mahadevpur were in rebellion from the same year. There was practically a collapse of administration in the country at this time. Added to this financiers like Palmer & Company were exploiting the financial embarrassment of the State to the fullest extent. It was at this time that the Third Maratha War started. In 1817 the Peshwa Baji Rao II fought against the British in the battle of Khadki. He was defeated and had to flee from Poona. The Nizam's army was co-operating with the British in this war and the Hyderabad Contingent took a leading part in the operations in the Deccan and Malwa. Not all of the Nizam's officers were friendly to the British. The contemporary work *Tarikh-c-Rashid-ud-Din Khani* contains the following significant passage (pp. 327-328) :—

“The British fought a battle with Baji Rao Peshwa and Appaji Rao, prince of Nagpur in 1232 A.H. Sir John Malcolm came from Calcutta to Hyderabad and proceeded to Poona along with the army. Davidson came from Aurangabad and Elphinstone from Madras. The Hyderabad Forces marched under the command of Salabath Khan. Sardar Khan Kadezahi, who was the Jamedar in the army in charge of over 300 cavalry men, picked up some quarrel with Davidson and returned to his Jagir without participating in the battle. He intended to come to Hyderabad but Maharaja Chandulal did not permit him to do so. He therefore went to Poona and accepted service under Baji Rao. On 15th Zilhaj, a battle took place between the British and the Peshwa's forces. In the first campaign, Sadasiv Rao, the agent of Baji Rao was killed. The second

battle was fought on 24th and Sardar Khan fought in this battle on behalf of Baji Rao and he was killed. On 6th Mohurrum 1233 A.H. Baji Rao fled from Poona taking the treasury along with him and on the same day the British took possession of Poona."

Thus the Maratha War ended with the surrender of Baji Rao on 6th June 1818 A.D. In the arrangements with the Nizam which followed, the British gave up their claims to Chouth on Hyderabad to which they had succeeded after the Marathas. Some portions of the Peshwa's territory were also handed over to the Nizam. The taluqas of Jalna and Gangapur had already been ceded by the Shinde in 1803. The taluqas of Vaijapur and Kannad were taken over from the Peshwa and were added to the Nizam's territory in 1818. Similarly the taluqas of Ellora and Aurangabad were taken over from Holkar and were transferred to Hyderabad. The Nizam's Government was thus freed from the perpetual domination of the Marathas and could now breathe a sigh of relief.

Albeit internal rebellions in the State had become numerous, frequent and widespread. These were put down by the Hyderabad Contingent, who had their headquarters at Bolarum in Hyderabad and their out-stations at Raichur, Mominabad, Aurangabad, Jalna, Hingoli and Elichpur.

The following passage which traces the formation of the 'Russel Brigade', an auxiliary of the Hyderabad Contingent, is interesting<sup>1</sup>:-

"This, however, was in 1819. Before that date rebellion flared up in the wretched embers of what had once been a population. To suppress it, Russell suggested that the Nizam's own troops should be given British officers and modelled on the lines of the subsidiary force, which the State already had to support according to treaty. 'The Russell Brigade' was formed therefore, mainly of Hindus from British India—a force devoted to the Company's interest and contemptuous of the Nizam's, and staffed by absurdly overpaid British Officers. Its Commandant received £5,000, and his subordinates salaries in proportion. 'Poor Nizzy pays for all', was the jest. The Brigade must be

1. *Life of Lord Metcalfe* by Thompson, p. 92.

no inconsiderable burthen on the Nizam's exhausted and impoverished dominions", said James Stuart, in his indignant Minute of November 10, 1819. "As starved peasantry was crushed, and much British blood was spilt in this bad business."

In an attempt to justify the expenditure on the Hyderabad Contingent Forces charged to the Nizam the Governor-General wrote as follows<sup>1</sup>:-

"The establishment of the reformed troops in the Nizam's service is noticed by Mr. Stuart, in a manner which appears to imply a disapprobation of the plan. It is perfectly true, that those troops are, in fact, more ours than those of the sovereign by whom they are maintained. Although paid by the Nizam, and nominally appertaining to His Highness, their habit of receiving their stipend through us and of being commanded by British Officers, leave room for the expectation, that in any rupture between the states, they would side with us against their ostensible master. Now, would it be consonant to wisdom, or to the trust reposed in us by the Honourable Company, that we should sacrifice such a security to a casuistical point of equity? I call the point casuistical, because it is wholly gratuitous to represent the arrangement as being imposed in the Nizam against his secret wishes, there never having been the slightest indication of a sentiment adverse to the measure on his part: therefore, the acting upon it would be palpably to act upon an abstract conception. The establishment has gradually grown to its present size, and linked itself with us, not from any antecedent project, but from the course of events. A force, of a quality more operative than the irregular troops of the Nizam, was wanted to reduce to obedience the refractory Zemindars. A disciplined body, under British officers was tried; its superiority for all purposes was experienced, when the Pindarries ravaged the Nizam's dominions in contempt of his ordinary troops. Necessity urged the extending the amount of an efficient soldiery to its present scale. The direct object and immediate advantages were for the Nizam. That a collateral benefit arises from it to us, does not vitiate the quality of the plan. The interests of the two states are identified by alliance, and it cannot be a legitimate reason for the condemnation of a plan that while the welfare of the Nizam is promoted, a convenience accrues to us."

1. *Papers Relative to Certain Pecuniary Transactions of Messrs. William Palmer & Co., with the Government of H.H. the Nizam*, pp. 31-31.

The history of Hyderabad from this period upto the end of 1855 A.D. is mainly one of a series of rebellions in the State which were put down by these Contingent Forces. The Government of India early came to attach importance to these Contingent Forces as calculated to improve their military position in this part of the country. During this whole period from 1812-1853 A.D. the Government of India saw to it that this force was expanded and organized at whatever cost to the Nizam. When it came to a question of asking the Nizam and his ministers for introducing reforms and other ameliorative measures in the State, the Government of India would take the view that this amounted to an interference in the internal affairs of the State, but when it came to a question of preserving the Contingent Forces they did not hesitate to interfere. They found a willing tool in Raja Chandulall in promoting this design. The people of the State were thus denied any reforms whatsoever and when rebellions broke out as a result of all absence of administration in Hyderabad they were crushed and put down by these British trained troops.

## CHAPTER VII

### PALMER & COMPANY

A look at the methods adopted by this disreputable firm throws a lurid light on the malevolent forces that beset the administration of the Hyderabad State.

The firm of Palmer & Co. came into prominence with Mahajah Chandulal entering into an agreement with it for the payment of the 'Contingent Troops'. From that day the firm played a sinister role; extending its nefarious activities into every branch of the State administration to such an extent that it began to eat up the resources of the State like a canker. The sinister influence wielded by the commercial House was coveted and feared by one and all; people began to identify its authority with that of the British Government and the House loomed large on the political horizon of the Hyderabad State till at last nemesis overtook it in the shape of the Resident, Sir Charles Metcalfe, when the Company collapsed like a house of cards.

The rise and fall of this commercial firm is a matter of interesting study against the background of the 19th century politics of Hyderabad.

The founder of the firm of Palmer and Company was one William Palmer, son of General Palmer, by his Indian wife. William Palmer started his early career in the military Service of the Nizam, but he seems to have retired from it about the year 1811 in preference to a commercial career in Hyderabad. From that time onwards, the Firm carried on various transactions in the Nizam's territories; but it drew the attention of the British Government, for the first time when it applied, on the 30th March, 1814, to the Governor-General for permission to open a banking agency at Hyderabad, and also to exploit the timber forests on the banks of the Godavary for building ships. The application was duly forwarded by the Resident at Hyderabad, Mr. Henry Russell.

The Governor-General and his council finding no legitimate grounds for objection, informed the Resident to allow the House to open a banking house.

At this time, the firm was apparently constituted by the following members; William Palmer, Hastings Palmer, William Currie, the Residency Surgeon, Bankati Das, a Hindu millionaire, and one Samuel Russell. The last mentioned person was a friend of the Resident Russell, to whom the latter had entrusted his money to invest profitably.

Samuel Russell invested his friend's money in the Palmer and Co. Thus the Resident Russell was an interested party, when he forwarded the application of Palmer & Co., though, we find him glibly avowing before the Court of Directors, while speaking in his own defence, that he was ignorant of the fact that his money was invested by his friend Samuel Russell in Palmer & Co.

But to refute this statement of Russell, we have the irrefutable evidence of John Palmer the elder brother of William Palmer "that Russell lent his money through the House to the Nizam at 48%".<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the actual membership of the House of Palmer & Co., consisted of not only the abovementioned persons, but it included the Resident Russell himself, his brother Henry Russell, the Engineer Sotheby, the Assistant Resident, and one George Lamb. The truth about the membership of the Residency officials was carefully concealed, and the secret was unearthed only towards the end.

Thus, the firm of Palmers set its foot on the ladder of commercial prosperity under the patronage of the Resident who for all appearances was avowedly interested in promoting the welfare of his ally, the Nizam.

The opening of this commercial House at Hyderabad marks the beginning of the economic exploitation of the State. The patronage extended by the Resident sheltered it from all danger. Its offices were located within the precincts of the Residency building. Mr. Russell used his influence to procure for the firm, customers and funds from

1. Hyderabad Residency Records.

private sources. The firm used to borrow money at 12% and lend it at 25%. Its prospects brightened from day to day. Finding it growing in prosperity rapidly many an European Servant of the East India Company hastened to invest his money in the firm. The interest evinced by the Resident in the firm, and the very fact that the firm itself was located within the Residency buildings, influenced the nobles of Hyderabad including the Minister to covet deeply.

At this juncture Russell, perhaps finding that the location of the firm within the precincts of the Residency could not be reconciled with his position as a public official, asked the firm to remove its offices from the Residency. He subsequently withdrew from the firm also. This action of the Resident for some time created an apprehension that the firm might lose the prestige it was commanding in the public eye, and thus might be put to loss. But the firm's luck seemed to be on the ascendant; for at this critical juncture it acquired a new member in the person of Sir William Rumbold, commenting about which Metcalfe wrote<sup>1</sup> "It was then a masterly stroke of policy on the part of William Palmer to bring in Sir William Rumbold which gave an accession of influence superior to that of the Resident, an influence..... to which the Minister knew no bounds of subservience and sacrifice. From that time the affairs of the firm have gone on more swimmingly till it has reached a point of undue influence and profit never I suppose before heard of in any mercantile concern".

Sir William Rumbold had accompanied the Governor-General Lord Hastings to India in 1813. Lord Hastings was greatly interested in Sir Rumbold for he had married a ward of Lord Hastings towards whom Lord Hastings evinced great affection. This deep affection of Lord Hastings made him blind to the defects in the character of the man his ward had married.

Sir William Rumbold was an unscrupulous man whose sole aim in life was to get rich as quickly as possible. Ever since his arrival in India, he was exploring avenues for acquiring riches and his choice ultimately fell on Hyderabad. Finding in the machinations of the Palmers an easy means of attaining fortune, he duly informed the Governor-General of his intention to become a partner in the Palmer & Company and obtained his consent.

1. *Papers Relative to Certain Pecuniary Transactions of Messrs William Palmer & Co., with the Government of H.H. the Nizam*, pp. 732-734.

The accession of Sir William Rumbold increased the prestige of the Palmer & Co. immensely. The popular belief among the people was that Rumbold was the son-in-law of the Governor General. Russell, who was hitherto the Patron of the firm, now began to take an active interest to gain the firm's and Sir William's goodwill.

The Palmer & Co. knew that to include European members as business partners trading with a native State was illegal. Hence it felt the need of procuring the necessary exemption from the Governor General.

At this juncture, Russell, anxious to gain the goodwill of Hastings, who had a great affection for Rumbold and also because he was formerly a partner in the firm, made the suggestion that the firm should advance money to the Nizam's Government for the maintenance of the Contingent troops.

Considering the fact, that the suggestion came from the Resident, who represented in his person the British Government, Chandulal had no other option than to agree to the Resident's proposal.

On the 27th June 1816, the firm applied to the Supreme Government to allow them to lend money to the Nizam's Government, and thus alleviate the distress of the State; while forwarding this application they also took the precaution of asking in advance, exemption from the Parliamentary Act that prohibited British subjects from advancing money to Native princes. The opinion of the Advocate-General was consulted on this point, and he gave his opinion that the Parliamentary Act applied only to transactions within the British Territories. The Governor-General was anxious that the British operations against the Mahrattas which were being carried on at this time must be successfully carried out at any cost. Hence the necessary permission to the firm to advance money to the Nizam's Government was granted.

The firm after obtaining this permission, agreed to advance two lakhs per mensem, in lieu of the Nizam's Government assigning the revenues of certain districts in Berar. The districts assigned to the Palmer & Co. yielded 30 lakhs annually *i. e.* six lakhs more than what the Palmers gave, to the Nizam. The Palmers explained that the extra six lakhs were essential to cover any contingency that might arise "such as defects in revenues, to cover interests and to

give facility to the establishment to make the required monthly payments". Thus the actual interest levied by the firm on the loans it advanced to the Nizam's Government amounted to 25%. The firm in order to facilitate regular payment to the troops opened a branch at Aurangabad also.

It can be said without any hesitation that from this time the "virtual plunder of the Nizam began".

Rajah Chandulal was a creature of the British Government. He was the instrument through which the British hoped to mould the Hyderabad administration to their own advantage. We find Lord Hastings writing to Metcalfe "I feared that, in your dissatisfaction at not finding in Chundoo-Lal so perfect an instrument as you wished, you had overlooked the deep engagement of the Government to uphold him".

While the British Government was prepared to uphold Chandulal at any cost, the latter was also equally anxious to remain in their good books. Chandulal's supreme passion in life was to hold power, and to keep himself in power he did not hesitate even to sacrifice the interests of his country.

Knowing the Governor-General's predilection towards the Palmers he assiduously cultivated their friendship. He gave regular pensions to the members of the Palmer family from the State treasury. These pensions amounted to nearly Rs. 80,000 per month.

William Palmer tried to explain the cause of his receiving pensions from the Nizam's Government by giving the specious reason, that Chandulal was greatly pleased at William Palmers' effort to bring about the "Russell Reforms" and he wanted to duly reward William Palmer, the great benefactor of the State. When Chandulal asked William Palmer to suggest how he could reward him William Palmer suggested that the cost of the education of his two sons might be borne by the Nizam's State.

The pensions paid to the Palmers were nothing but gross bribery to earn their goodwill. In spite of William Palmers's subtle explanation the Court of Directors did not fail to see the real aim behind the granting of these pensions.

This was not the only ruse adopted by Chandulal to gain the support of the all-powerful British. In order to be in the good books of the Residency officials, he gave clandestine allowances to them. The Residency itself was "a shameful monument of rapacity" built and furnished by the poverty stricken state, whose maintenance and repairs amounted to Rs. 2,000 a month and were secretly borne by the Minister".

The supply of fruits and dinners to keep the Residency officials in good humour was regularly maintained, which made Metcalfe remark that they "came in such quantities as to give them the appearance of regular supplies, instead of being merely complimentary".<sup>1</sup>

Such was Chandulal; one is not surprised when Russell in a most innocuous tone wrote to the Supreme Government that Chandulal was averse to the idea of entrusting his brother Govind Baksh with the payment of the Aurangabad troops, even on the Resident's suggesting it, "on the ground that an efficient system having at length with a great deal of difficulty been completed he was unwilling to forego any part of it".<sup>2</sup>

Russell who belonged to the diehard school was only too glad to hear this answer, *viz.*, "If we owe the foundation of our empire in this country to the weakness in which we found the native powers, we ought not to complain of the evils which that weakness necessarily produced.

The timorousness and the ignoble selfishness of the Minister, coupled with the callousness of the Resident, drove the country into the merciless grip of the Palmers.

The firm grew day by day like a festering gangrene. Its powers increased to such an extent that it could employ armed troops to storm the villages for extorting taxes from the poor inhabitants. From a mere banking agency it rose to the position of receiving commissions, and acted as an agency to collect any one's debt. On account of the prestige and power which it had commanded it began to be identified with the British Government. Where the Nizam's Government failed to realise the revenues, the firm succeeded in coercing them out of the poor peasantry.

1. *Life of Metcalfe* by J. W. Kaye, Vol. II, p. 40.

2. *Papers Relative to Certain Pecuniary Transactions of Messrs William Palmer & Co., with the Government of H.H. the Nizam*, p. 21.

It was regarded as wielding more power than the Resident or the Nizam, or even the Governor-General himself.

While Chandulal fancied that nothing else mattered as long as he had the firm's support, the chaprasis of the Palmer House moved about drunk with power. They represented as it were the double authority of the Palmers and the British Government.

The firm gradually appropriated the role of being the sole commission agency in the State, and no other native firm was allowed to have direct relations with the Nizam's Government. The firm could lay its hands on the entire revenues of the State. The inevitable result of this was that the poor peasantry groaned under the burden of this oppression. Describing their distress, Thompson writes "No country was ever more miserably governed. Their condition was altogether isolated, and restiveness spread to contiguous regions, but the Supreme Government remained blissfully ignorant of what was happening."

Meanwhile, the firm, feeling that it would be safer to obtain the Supreme Government's guarantee for their transactions, instigated Chandulal, to obtain sanction from the Supreme Government for taking a fresh loan of 60 lakhs from the Palmers.

Chandulal applied in 1819 to the Supreme Government to allow him to borrow 60 lakhs from the Palmers so that he might clear "certain debts; advance tacavi loans to cultivators." He also showed that he would improve the administration by curtailing unnecessary expenditure to the extent of 25 lakhs of rupees annually.

This request of Chandulal was duly forwarded to the Supreme Government by Russell. But this proposal created a stir in the Governor-General's Council, and some of the council members headed by James Stuart demanded that details of the Palmer Transactions with the Nizam's Government must be placed before them, and that they should also be informed of the actual rate of interest that the company levied on its loans to the Hyderabad Government.

But the Palmer & Co. objected to this and Rumbold wrote saying that for the firm to reveal the accounts of its constituents would not be consistent with the confidence reposed in the firm by them. The Resident, and the Palmers

now appealed to the Governor-General to "relieve them from the painful state of anxiety in which they were placed."

Lord Hastings sympathised with the position taken by Sir William and his colleagues, but the council differed from the Governor-General and said "that in demanding information respecting a particular measure, sanctioned by the Resident, and submitted by him to the notice of the Government" the Supreme Government was in no way asking the Palmers to infringe the confidence of their constituents.

Stuart, sarcastically remarked on the willingness of the company to show its account to the Resident but not to the executive council, in the following manner, "The faith due to the constituents there, was no impediment to any disclosure to the Resident. It is to be opposed only to the demand of this Government for information".

Thereupon, Rumbold with the active support of the Governor-General, personally attended the Council meeting and tried to convince them of the bona fides of the Palmer & Co. All the members except James Stuart expressed their satisfaction. Stuart, protesting against the attitude adopted by the Governor-General, suggested that the Supreme Government should advance money to the Nizam's Government from its own treasury. He sarcastically remarked that it was a matter of surprise that the two lakhs loan which the firm had originally advanced to the Nizam's Government could not be available from the native bankers.

He also remarked with great acerbity that the British were hardly just in making the Nizam pay for the Contingent troops which for all practical purposes belonged more to the British than to the Nizam. But to this charge the Governor-General replied "Now would it be consonant to wisdom, or to the trust reposed in us by the Honourable Company, that we would sacrifice such a security to a casuistical point of equity?"

Adams, another member of the Council, also supported Stuart's resolution for granting a loan from the British Government's Treasury in the following manner, "I have been struck by a passage in Mr. Russell's letter, *viz.*, that the Minister cannot obtain the requisite funds by any other means than the assistance of Messrs William Palmer & Co., whose circumstances enable them to secure a combination of the

native monied interests. If this be so, I am so far from considering it as a motive for giving the additional strength to such an influence which it would derive from the proposed loan, that it seems to me to form a powerful reason for abstaining from any measure calculated to confirm a monopoly, from which no good can result either to the Nizam's Government, or the commercial interests of the country".

The Accountant-General on being asked to give his opinion on the Palmer transactions also declared them to be dubious.

The Governor-General, finding all this unpalatable, declared, "to implicitly refer to the Accountant-General as a political oracle would be rather an extravagant abandonment of our judgment and our duties"<sup>1</sup>. In saying so Hastings was obviously pointing out that the Accountant-General had no right to give his opinion in political matters, though the council might respect his opinion in legal matters.

After demolishing the opinion of the Accountant-General in the above manner, he also turned down the proposal of his council, for advancing a loan to the Nizam's Government from the State treasury as illegal and making it out that it would amount to interference in the internal administration of the Nizam.

The Council could not reconcile itself to the stand taken by the Governor-General and it decided to put the issue to vote. Hastings at first played the part of offended dignity, and refused to take part in the voting but when he realised that his abstention would not deter the Council from voting he participated in the voting and even used his casting vote in favour of the Palmers. This resulted in the Supreme Government permitting the Palmers to advance the 60 lakhs loan to the Nizam's Government in six yearly instalments at the rate of 18%.

The Court of Directors in England by this time came to know all about the Palmer transactions, and it forbade the Supreme Government from having any dealings with the Palmer Company. They also declared the original sanction given to the Palmer Company by the Supreme Government as illegal saying in their letter of the 28th November, 1821, "if a native of India voluntarily limits his rights by associating himself in trade with British European subjects, he has no

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1. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

ground either in law or equity to complain of a limitation which is the result of his own choice.”<sup>1</sup>.

The Supreme Government was compelled to abide by the orders of the Court of Directors. It accordingly sent instructions to the Resident at Hyderabad not to countenance any financial transactions between the Palmer & Co. and the Nizam’s Government.

Lord Metcalfe, in the meanwhile, succeeded Russell as Resident at Hyderabad in December 1820. Metcalfe on his arrival found the finances of the State at the lowest ebb. He also saw that the people were flying *en masse* to Nagpur across the Wardha border.

Realising the urgent necessity of reorganising the State finances, Metcalfe asked Chandulal, to that Minister’s disgust, to furnish him with a statement showing the income and expenditure of the State. On a careful scrutiny of the accounts submitted by Chandulal, Metcalfe found that many of the evils that prevailed in the State could be traced to the iron grip in which the Palmer & Co. held the country. He realised, that if he were to give relief to the oppressed peasantry, the first thing he should do was to rescue the country from the clutches of the Palmers.

Hence, Metcalfe suggested to the Supreme Government that it should raise a loan at Calcutta at the rate of 6% interest for the Nizam under British guarantee, so that the Nizam’s Government could pay off its debts to the Palmer & Co.

The Palmers found this proposal acutely disagreeable and they decided to foil Metcalfe in his venture. They represented to the Governor-General through Rumbold that the Resident was bent on putting them to a great loss on account of his animosity to them.

Hastings, at once hastened to the help of the Palmers. He not only turned down Metcalfe’s proposal for raising a loan at Calcutta, but even sounded a note of warning to Metcalfe by writing “Any ill-will on your part towards the House of William Palmer & Co. must necessarily be an idle imagination”.

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1. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

Such was the hold that the Palmers had on the Governor-General. No wonder Metcalfe remarked<sup>1</sup> "The Palmers have nothing to fear from me, even if I have the power to injure them, which is very doubtful. I rather apprehend indeed, that I have more to fear from them". But at the same time Metcalfe did not hesitate to write plainly to the Governor-General:—

"I lament the connexion between them and Rajah Chandulal because it tends to draw them quite out of their sphere of merchants and makes them political partisans.... I lament the monopoly established in their favour by the sanction and virtual guarantee of the British Government because it deprives the Nizam's Government of the power of going into the European money market, where with the same sanction, it might borrow money at less than half the rate of interest which it pays to Messrs Palmer & Co."

During the course of these recriminations, Metcalfe discovered that the sixty lakhs loan advanced by the Palmers to the Nizam's Government was nothing but a fiction. Instead of levying 18% interest according to the Supreme Government's instructions the firm levied its usual rate of 24% interest; but what was more alarming was that 9/10ths of the so called 60 lakhs loan was actually made up by the transference of an already existing debt of 40 lakhs, and by further reducing the burden of the new loan amount by another fourteen lakhs in the shape of fictitious bonuses.

Seeing all this, Metcalfe began to entertain suspicions about the Residency officials. The Palmers would not take things lying down. Taking advantage of the Resident's temporary absence from the capital they drew up an affidavit saying that no public functionary was connected with the firm. This affidavit was solemnly affirmed in the presence of Sotheby, the Assistant Resident, and duly forwarded to the Supreme Government. William Palmer sensing trouble from the attitude of the Governor General's Council when the 60 lakhs loan proposal was made, had asked Sotheby to withdraw from the firm. So now, the firm with consummate skill played the part of "much abused martyrs, the victims of Metcalfe's unfounded suspicions."<sup>2</sup> The affidavit produced the desired effect on the Governor-General. His

1. *Life of Metcalfe* by Thompson, p. 213.

2. *Life of Metcalfe* by J. W. Kaye, Vol. II, p. 67.

faith in the bona fides of the Palmer & Co. being strengthened, Lord Hastings got the affidavit to be recorded in the proceedings of the council.

Taking advantage of this, the Palmer & Co. started working against Metcalfe through Maharajah Chandulal, who, seeing that the Governor-General's sympathies were with the firm, and believing that the firm's support was essential for his remaining in office, duly sent reports against Metcalfe. Due to these machinations of the Palmer & Co. the Governor-General was highly incensed against the Resident and even talked of recalling him.<sup>1</sup>

Metcalfe protested against the unconstitutional methods of the Governor-General in receiving reports against the Resident through the channels of a private firm. On Metcalfe charging Chandulal of having worked against him the latter abjectly apologised to Metcalfe and told him that he was coerced by the Palmers to do so, on the threat that they would require him to pay five lakhs if he did not act in their interest.

Metcalfe wrung out more particulars from Chandulal concerning the debts to the Palmer & Co., and by July 1822 he came to know that the total debt to the Company amounted to 83½ lakhs, while the State's other debts to the native bankers amounted to another 17 lakhs. He also made the startling discovery that most of the Residency officials including Russell, the former Resident, and his assistant Sotheby were secret partners in the firm, and had derived immense profits.

Taken aback by this stunning discovery he hesitated to directly report about it to the Governor-General as it would involve the integrity of high Residency officials. However, he informed his friend Adams, who was in the Council, of this and asked him to privately acquaint the Governor-General of the plunder carried on by the firm with the active support of the Residency officials.

The Governor-General was so much taken in by the guile of the Palmers that he took a long time to see the truth. Ultimately, Adams succeeded in making the Governor-General see the real state of affairs, and he at

1. *Life of Metcalfe* by Thompson, p. 216.

last agreed to guarantee a loan to the Nizam's Government on the security of the Peshkash of the Sarkars for twelve years.

At this juncture, Lord Hastings left India in the beginning of the year 1823, and he was succeeded by Adams, the seniormost member in the Council. Adams and his Council cut down the debt to 80 lakhs and paid off the Palmers from the British President's treasury.

The Council disallowed the illegal bonus and the illegal allowances that the members of the firm were getting, along with the interest accrued on them.

They condemned these spurious transactions in the following manner<sup>1</sup> :—

“ You will be pleased to acquaint Messrs William Palmer and Co. that, under the above circumstances, the British Government never could sanction by its countenance so shameful and criminal a misappropriation by the Minister of the Public Funds as the liquidation of the demands of the house on account of the bonus and arrears of allowances, and in the event of Chandoo Lall taking upon himself to satisfy these demands from the coffers of the State, you are authorised and instructed to make a representation to the Nizam himself, demonstrating against such misapplication of the public money.”

In lieu of the British Government having discharged the Palmer debt, the Nizam was made to cede seven lakhs Peshkash of the Northern Sarkars to the British Government, which he surrendered to the British on the 4th of November, 1823 A.D.

Chandoo Lall anxious to absolve himself of his own part in the Palmer dealings made it appear to the Nizam that the cession of these fertile regions was more due to the connection of the Nizam with the British on account of which he had to participate in the Maratha War, than due to the fraudulent Palmer transactions. So in asking the Nizam to cede the Sarkars, Chandoo Lall in his most suave manner explained<sup>2</sup> :—

1. *Papers Relative to Certain Pecuniary Transaction of Messrs William Palmer & Co., with the Government of H.H. the Nizam*, p. 824.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 824.

“ Although I, who am but your Chambardar (shoe-bearer), was obliged by extreme difficulties during the war to contract a debt, yet what I have done has been for the prosperity and stability of your Highness’s Government.”

The Company, anxious to put an end to this painful episode, wrote, “ up to the date of the late treaty there was an excess in the collection of the districts ceded by the Honourable Company to His Highness the Nizam, above those of the districts ceded by the Nizam to the Company, estimated at twenty lacs of rupees. Consequently credit has been taken for the above sum out of the one crore, sixteen lacs, sixty-six thousand, six hundred and sixty-six rupees, given in exchange for the Peshkash. Agreeably to your desire, the sum of seventy-eight lakhs, seventy thousand, six hundred and seventy rupees, nine annas, has been paid to them, from one crore sixteen lakhs, sixty-six thousand, six hundred and sixty-six rupees given in exchange for the Peshkash. No demand on account of the debt to them has ever been made by the Honourable Company, and none ever will be made, *the Honourable Company having no concern whatever in the affair.*”<sup>1</sup>

Within a year of the Nizam discharging his debts this Leviathan firm which very nearly brought about the extinction of the Nizam’s country became bankrupt “ not from any run upon it, but merely from want of funds to meet ordinary demands.”

## CHAPTER VIII.

### REBELLIONS IN BHIR, AURANGABAD AND NANDED DISTRICTS

In 1818 A.D. rebellion broke out in the district of Bhir and was led by one Dharmaji Pratap Rao. The following is the account of this rebellion given by Major R. G. Burton<sup>1</sup> :—

“ On 11th July 1818, the Rissala of Nawab Murtaza Yar Jung, under the command of Lieutenant John Sutherland, was ordered to proceed to Bir for the protection of that part of the country, and was at the same time to be kept in motion throughout the district. Lieutenant Sutherland having received information of the appearance in the district of the formidable rebel Dharmaji Partab Rao, who had troubled the Nizam’s Government for many years, pursued and came up with him on 31st July, 1818. Lieutenant Sutherland gave the following account of this affair, for which he received the thanks of the Resident for the ‘ gallant conduct of the men under his command.’

“ I do myself the honour to inform you that Dhurmajee and his brother are our prisoners. From intelligence received during the march on the night of 30th, I changed the direction from Dyton to Deeby, which place I reached a little after daybreak on the morning of the 31st, and surrounded it with a few men who had come up for some miles at a gallop; the place was afterwards closely invested, and two 30-feet ladders being ready by three o’clock, preparations were made for an escalade. Eighty mounted men were formed into eight parties, and so placed as to prevent escape. Fifty matchlock-men were posted on a hill which overlooked the village to cover our advance, and the remaining I formed into two storming parties, one under 1st Jamadar Shadee Khan, and the other under myself. On a signal given to the hill and repeated to Sahdee Khan we advanced to storm. The garrison threw open the gates to

1. *A History of the Hyderabad Contingent* by R. G. Burton, p. 74,

receive my party and stood to defend it sword in hand. Shadée Khan advanced with a coolness and determination which would have done credit to any troops, planted his ladder, and advanced through the body of the place to meet the other party. I was wounded at the gate and unable to advance, but not before we had made an example to the fellows who so gallantly defended it; the two parties, however, advanced and carried everything before them, drove the garrison from bastion to bastion, and at last came to the one where Dhurmajee had taken post with a few men; they threw down their arms, and here Dhurmajee and his brother were made prisoners. The ghurrie (fort) is of considerable strength, and noted as a receptacle for thieves and vagabonds; it is a square of 150 yards with eight bastions. The garrison were chiefly Bingaris (Banjaras), and fought with the utmost determination, neither giving up their arms nor taking quarter, except Dhurmajee and his party. Our loss is, therefore, I am sorry to say, considerable; a return of it I have the honour to annex.

I cannot conclude without bringing to your notice in the most particular manner the conduct of Nawab Mahomed Azim Khan, who volunteered to accompany me from Beer and to whose intelligence and local knowledge (on a night march of 45 miles, the darkest and most rainy imaginable) I owe everything.

Killed—One Jemadar and eight horsemen.

Wounded—One lieutenant and 22 horsemen.”

Similarly the account of the attack on Ambad in the district of Aurangabad from the same work by Major R. G. Burton is given below<sup>1</sup>:

“ On the 11th October 1818, a party of the Reformed Horse under Captain Wells made an attack on the town of Ambad, in which that officer was severely wounded, but was not supported by his men, owing, apparently, to treachery or cowardice on the part of some of them. Captain Wells, having taken possession of the gates of the town found that his men had not followed him, and was forced to retire. The following is an extract from a letter written by the Resident regarding this affair:—

‘ I regret very much that the party of the Reformed Horse under Captain Wells did not succeed in the first attack on Ambara; the failure evidently originated in a most

1. *Op. cit.*, pp. 75-76.

culpable misconduct on the part of either the Jemadar or Horsemen, and the abandonment of their duties is more surprising and more reprehensible from the spirited example which was given them by Captain Wells. It is difficult indeed to conceive how any men with the feelings of soldiers can have hesitated to follow an officer who led them with so much animation, and so striking a display of personal intrepidity. I request that an immediate enquiry may be instituted to ascertain the real cause of the treachery, and in the meantime I beg that the expression of my cordial thanks and applause may be offered to Captain Wells for his honourable and distinguished conduct on the occasion. I trust that his wounds will not long deprive the public of the benefit of his service. I shall take care that the few brave men who supported Captain Wells are rewarded at the same time that punishment is inflicted upon those with whom the failure may have originated.

“ The Reformed Horse had always been second to none in dash and courage, and had made marches and endured fatigues that could scarcely have been accomplished or borne by the native cavalry of the regular army. So this failure, which is happily isolated, is quite unaccountable.”

#### THE HATKAR NAIK'S REBELLION IN NANDED DISTRICT, (1819 A.D.)

The community of the Hatkars were a nightmare in the district of Nanded, Parbhani and in the country across the river Painganga for more than 20 years led by their brave leader Nowsaji Naik. They had taken possession of a number of strongholds in the district of Nanded and in Berar. After the conclusion of the Maratha War, the Government of Hyderabad took action to deal with their rebellions. The Contingent Forces marched against the stronghold of the Hatkars at Nowah, situated in the Hadgaon Taluk of the Nanded district. Nowsaji Naik put up a stiff resistance. He was also assisted by a number of Arabs, who had recently left Nagpur and were on their way to Hyderabad. The siege of Nowah was a prolonged one. It was started at the end of January with a bloody conflict. The garrison consisted of more than 500 Arabs, of whom more than 80 were dreadfully wounded and nearly 400 were killed. The besieger's loss was 24 killed and 180 wounded. There were 6 European officers among the wounded. So important was the siege of Nowah that the word Nowah was displayed

upon the colours and the badges of the regiments, which took part in the siege, lasting from 8th January 1819 to 31st January 1819.

With the capture of Nowah the rebellion of the Hatkar Naiks which had lasted for 20 years was brought to an end. The following is a detailed account of the siege of Nowah as given in Major R. G. Burton's book *A History of the Hyderabad Contingent* ( pp. 76-78 ) and the official papers extracted from *A Memoir of the Operations of the British Army in India during the Mahratta War of 1817, 1818 and 1819* by Lieut. Colonel Valentine Blacker, published in 1821 (pp. 480-483).

### THE SIEGE OF NOWAH

At the close of the year 1818 a force was ordered to assemble near Umerkhed, between Nanded and Hingoli, and 40 miles south-east of the latter place, for the reduction of some insurgent Naiks who were established in the neighbourhood. This force, under command of Major Pitman, was concentrated in January 1819, and was composed of—

The Russell Brigade—1,780 of all ranks, including 171 artillery.

Berar Infantry—1st Battalion, flank companies, 116 men; 3rd Battalion, 886 men; artillery 81.

Reformed Horse—Three Risalas, amounting to 2,000 men, under Captain Evan Davies.

The most important of the insurgents was the Naik Nowsaji, who had assembled a large number of Arabs, and held the fort of Nowah and Umerkhed. The fort of Nowah consisted of an oblong, having a bastion at each angle, and one on each side of the gateway, with outworks in the form of a faussebraye, covered way, ditch, and glacis. Guns were mounted on an outwork protecting the principal gateway.

The force took up a position before this stronghold on 8th January 1819, and a battery was erected 600 yards from the north face of the fort, an attempted sortie against the working party being driven back by two companies of the Russell Brigade under Captain Hare. The battery, and another one still nearer for 18-pounders, opened fire on the 11th, soon silencing the hostile guns. By evening of the

same day positions were established on the right and left of the batteries within 300 yards of the fort, and a 6-pounder and a mortar-battery were constructed in front of the east face, at a distance of 350 yards from it. On the night of the 13th the enemy made a sortie, and attempted to pass the right post of the besiegers, but was driven back by three companies of the Berar Infantry under Lieutenant George Hampton. During the night of the 14th an 18-pounder battery was advanced to within 250 yards of the fort, and lines of communication were established between the several advanced positions.

On the 15th, the enemy being very troublesome, a few shells were thrown with considerable effect. From this time up to the 18th the besieged attempted no annoyance, seeming not to understand or to care for the operations of the investing force. On the 19th the garrison kept blue lights burning nearly the whole night, and occasionally threw stones from a mortar. At about ten o'clock an attempt was made by the rebel Chief Hawaji (Hansaji?), with a party of horse, to surprise the camp from the rear; but, the sentries being on the alert, the picquets soon turned out, and after a little firing the enemy retired, and was pursued some miles by Lieutenant Sutherland and a party of Reformed Horse, but owing to the darkness of the night he effected a safe retreat.

On the 20th a party from the garrison made a sortie, driving in the working party and destroying a small portion of the works, but the guard of the trenches obliged them to retire. The fire from the garrison was exceedingly hot, and some loss was sustained.

On the 21st, the enemy made a desperate sortie, and, sword in hand, attacked the working party at the head of the sap, but was soon driven back to the fort.

On the 25th the sap had reached the crest of the glacis, where a 6-pounder battery was established and two mortars were brought into it. On that night the engineer commenced his mine, which was completed on the 29th. The day of the 30th was employed in battering, and the breaches were considerably opened out, while shell and grape were thrown into them during the night.

On the 31st, the breaches being reported practicable, orders were issued for the assault and the mine was sprung at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the explosion making an excellent descent which filled up one part of the ditch, over

which the storming party were able to pass. Under cover of a cloud of dust which darkened the air for four or five minutes, Ensign Oliphant rushed forward and planted the ladders, and Captain Hare with the grenadiers, supported by Captain Currie with his light infantry, mounted the breach before the enemy had recovered from their consternation, while Lieutenant George Hampton, bounding so far ahead of his men as to be nearly cut off, carried with his flank companies the enemy's works to the right. Ten minutes after the explosion the inner fort was carried, and in the course of an hour the whole of the works were in the hands of the assailants.

Two hundred of the enemy fled from the gate of the fort, but were immediately attacked by Lieutenant Ivie Campbell, who commanded a party of infantry posted there to intercept them, and nearly at the same time they were charged by Captains Davies and Smith and Lieutenant Sutherland with different detachment of the Reformed Horse, so that not a man escaped.

The enemy, having twice refused to surrender, were mostly put to the sword, losing 439 killed, and 100 prisoners, 80 of whom were badly wounded.

On the attacking side 22 men, including two native officers, were killed, and 6 European officers, 10 native officers, and 171 men were wounded. The wounded officers were—

Captains Currie, Larkin, and Johnston, of the Nizam's Berar Infantry, Lieutenant Kennedy, 68th Regiment, doing duty with the Russell Brigade, and Lieutenant John Sutherland and Burr, Reformed Horse.

Six horses were killed and 40 wounded.

During the siege the following projectiles were expended:—

Shells 8-inch.	..	..	..	213
Shells 5½-inch	..	..	..	1040
Round-shot, 18 per.	..	..	..	1380
Round-shot, 6 per.	..	..	..	462
Grape	..	..	..	69
			Total	3164

## NOWSAJI NAIK'S REBELLION

*The Capture of Nowah.*

## APPENDIX

Official Papers, detailing the Operations of Major Pitman's Detachment against Nowah

To

HENRY RUSSELL, Esq.,  
*Resident at Hyderabad.*

SIR,

I have the honour to report to you, that on the 7th instant, in conformity with your instructions, I assumed the command of the force which had assembled for service against the Naiks, at the village of Tonnah, twenty-four miles north-east of Nandair, and three miles east of Noosahee Naik's Fort of Nowah.

On the following day, the detachment took up a position before Nowah, and I was joined by Lieutenant Sutherland with his *russalah* of reformed horse.

Nowah is a strong mud fort, of the usual construction: A square, with a bastion at each angle, and one on each side of the gateway. The rest of the works consist of a *fausse-braye* extending all round the fort, a covert way, ditch, and glacis. The gateway is protected by an outwork, in which cannon were mounted. The wall of the *fausse-braye* is almost entirely covered by the glacis; and pieces of ordnance, throwing shot of between five and six pounds in weight, were mounted on the different faces.

From the above description it will be evident, that the only mode of reducing the place was by regular approaches. Accordingly, on the 10th instant, a mortar-battery was commenced, about six hundred yards from the north face of the fort, when the enemy advanced and fired upon our working-party. He was immediately driven back into the fort by Captain Hare, with two companies of the Russell Brigade. This battery, and one of our eighteen-pounders, one hundred paces in advance of it, were completed during the night. Both began to ply at sunrise the following day, with considerable effect, silencing the enemy's guns, and knocking off the defences,

On the evening of the 11th, positions were established to the right and left of our batteries, and within three hundred yards of the place; and a six-pounder and a mortar-battery were constructed in front of the east face, distant three hundred and fifty yards.

On the night of the 13th, the enemy made a sortie, and attempted to pass our post on the right. He was quickly driven back by Lieutenant Hampton, with three companies of the Berar infantry. He then attempted to pass our post on the left, but retired after receiving a few shots from the party posted there.

During the night of 14th, an eighteen-pounder battery was advanced to within two hundred and fifty yards of the fort, and lines of communication were formed between our several advanced positions.

On the 16th, a sap was commenced from our post on the right, which this morning reached to within twenty-five yards of the crest of the glacis. If the soil will permit it is intended to form a mine to blow in the counterscarp; otherwise the ditch, which is our principal obstacle, must be filled in some other manner. In either case, I hope to be enabled, in a few days, to report to you the successful termination of our operations against the place. Our loss hitherto has been, five Sepoys and three horses killed, and three European officers and fifty-five Native officers, Sepoys and lascars wounded.

At ten p.m. of the 19th, about two hundred of Now-saghee's horse came suddenly and fired on a small guard in the rear of my camp. They were soon repulsed, and Lieutenant Sutherland with a small party of the reformed horse, pursued them for a few miles; but owing to the darkness of the night, they got clear off.

Having received information that a part of five hundred of Now-saghee's matchlock men had taken possession of Omurkair, which is nine or ten coss distant from Nowah, and is represented to be in a dilapidated state, I determined to attempt to carry it by escalade. I accordingly detached Captain Seyer, last night, with eight companies of infantry, his battalion field-pieces, and six hundred reformed horse, and directed him to make the attempt, should there appear to be a fair prospect of success. He will afterwards take up a position to be ready to check the movements of the enemy,

who has of late been plundering the country in every direction.

I beg leave to inclose copy of my instructions to Captain Sayer, and have the honour to be,

Sir,

Yours, &c.

(Signed)

CAMP BEFORE NOWAH,

January 21, 1819.

ROBERT PITMAN.

*Major Com. Detach.*

List of Officers Wounded before Nowah, to the 21st January, 1819.

Lieutenant Kennedy, H.M. 86th regiment, doing duty with the Russell Brigade, severely. Captains Larkins and Johnston, Nizam's Berar Infantry, slightly.

To

HENRY RUSSELL, Esq.,  
*Resident at Hyderabad.*

Sir,

I have the satisfaction to report to you that the Fort of Nowah was carried by assault this day, at two p.m. The greater part of the garrison was put to the sword.

With reference to my letter to your address under date the 21st instant, I have the honour to acquaint you, that, at nine a.m. of the following day, the enemy made a desperate sortie; and sword in hand attacked our working-party at the head of the sap, but was very soon driven back to the fort.

On the morning of the 24th, a man brought me a letter from the Jemidar Arab Commanding the fort, requesting permission to send two persons to treat for its surrender. No notice was taken of this letter; but the people in the fort ceased firing, and called out to our men to do the same; and an Arab was sent to me with another letter, of the same purport as the former. To this I returned a written answer, offering to allow the garrison to surrender at discretion. The Jemidar replied by claiming their arrears of pay, and permission to leave the fort with their arms and property of all kinds. I answered that, as he had not agreed to the terms

offered, none other would be granted. I have the honour to inclose copies of the notes which passed on this occasion.

On the 25th, our sap had reached the crest of the glacis, where a six-pounder battery was established, and two mortars were brought into it. On that night, the engineer commenced his mine, which was completed on the 29th. The whole of the 30th was employed in battering in a breach with the eighteen-pounder, and in demolishing the Rownee or Porkotah wall with the six-pounder. During the night, shells and grape were thrown into the breach; and it was determined to spring the mine, and make the assault, this day at noon.

At eight a.m. two Arabs were again sent to request permission to treat for terms, but they were told that no other could be granted than that of unconditional surrender.

I beg leave to inclose for your information copies of my orders preparatory to the assault, and after the reduction of the place.

On the mine being sprung, Ensign Oliphant, of the Madras Engineers, rushed forward with Pioneers, and planted ladders against the scarp of the ditch, which were instantaneously ascended by Captain Hare, and the storming party, who in a few minutes had surmounted every obstacle, and were in possession of the upper fort. The Arabs continued to defend themselves for a considerable time between the two walls, with the exception of about two hundred, who fled from the gate of the fort. They were immediately attacked by Lieutenant Campbell, who commanded a party of infantry posted for the purpose of intercepting them; and nearly at the same time they were charged by Captains Davies, Smith, and Lieutenant Sutherland, with different parties of the reformed horse, so that not a man of the enemy escaped.

By the best accounts I have been able to obtain, the garrison consisted of more than five hundred men; of these one hundred are prisoners, more than eighty of them are dreadfully wounded, and upwards of four hundred bodies have already been counted.

The conduct of all troops employed has been exemplary, and I trust will obtain for them the high honour of your approbation.

I beg leave to inclose a return of our killed and wounded during the siege, and have the honour to be

Sir,

Yours, &c.

*Comp Nowah.*

(Signed) ROBERT PITMAN,

*January 31st 1819.*

Com: A. D. N.

Legends have gathered round the heroic figure of Now-saji Naik which are still current in the district of Nanded. The legends bring out the following story of Now-saji Naik.

"The present dilapidated Ghurry was originally constructed as a stronghold by a person of the Kachar Community. This person had amassed much wealth. He had the big Ghurry surrounded by a trench 40 ft. wide and about 25 ft. deep. There is a version which states that the brothers Nowasaghee and Hansghee cast an evil eye on this stronghold and appropriated it for themselves all of a sudden. The legends bring out the following story of Now-saji situated to the north of the Ghurry, there lay buried a large treasure and he who was able to unearth it was to be rewarded with Nawha as a permanent Jagir. This announcement was made by the then Asafjah. Nowasaji and Hansaji succeeded in discovering this treasure and therefore Nawah was granted to them as Jagir. A copper plate regarding the same can be traced at Hyderabad. Both the brothers independently settled themselves in the Ghurry strengthening it in every possible way. They retained 400 Arabs in their service and carried on depredations upto Wardha and Nagpur to maintain them. These brothers enjoyed notoriety for their daring and ruthlessness. People tolerated their high-handedness in the hope that they may build up a Hindu Raj. The brothers began to annex the neighbouring villages to extend their domain. The Asaf Jah was altered but he was not able to put a check on their activities and dislodge them from their stronghold.

The cavalry of the Arabs resided in the hilly area about a mile from the Ghurry. A section of the hill is still called "Ghoda Paga Pahad." On intimation from the Nizam the British contingents marched to Nowah and pitched their camp upon the hill. As the Arabs were dispersed by

Nawsaji within and around the Ghurry for its protection, the contest between the British force and the garrison lasted for a long time. The situation was such that the projectiles discharged from the hill would either descend in the trench or pass beyond the Ghurry leaving it un-hurt. The British were very much annoyed at this. But they were able to purchase a traitor who revealed to them a point in the trench where the water was not much deep. They excavated a secret passage upto that north-western point and blasted the bastion. When Nawsaji observed this, he ordered his gun "Bhivra" to be put into action. The onslaught of the enemy was resolutely resisted and the British troops were compelled to recede. Nawsaji was engaged in prayer when he heard that this brother Hansaji was cut down. Nawsaji ordered his forces to continue the contest and he himself rode to Hyderabad. Gangabai, the wife of Hansaji secured the head of her husband and jumped from an eminence along with it into the trench below and ended her life. Nawsaji's wife Seethabai was quick with a child. She escaped secretly to Isapur, where her parents lived. Isapur is situated in Pusad Taluq near Mulawa. The members of this family live at Chinchod and Zaren in Kalamnuri Taluq of Parbhani District. Manik Rao Naik and Fakir Rao Khandoba Rao Naik, the descendants of this family, are possibly still alive at either of these places.

When Nawsaji presented himself to the Nizam, he could not be convinced of Nawsaji's identity. He therefore, returned towards the south but came to know that a detachment was sent after him to seize him. Towards the south he had to pass through the Pindari camps. They seem to have captured him but on learning the details of the story of his life appear to have given him shelter. But the Nizam's detachment running after Nawsaji seem to have discovered him with the Pindaris. The chief of the Pindaris handed over Nawsaji to the pursuers eliciting a promise that no harm would be done to his life. The leader of the pursuing party was surprised with the handsomeness and dignified personality of Nawsaji. He put him under restraint but treated him with dignity and took him to Hyderabad. He was kept as an internee at Hyderabad where he died of cholera."

The Hyderabad Contingent endeavoured to suppress several rebellions which were led by lawless leaders throughout the State. The British Officers of the Hyedrabad Contingent

had to justify their own existence and therefore they kept themselves quite alert in taking notice of the disquieting activities of local heroes. The British force was well disciplined, sufficiently equipped with up-to-date weapons and infatuated by continuous successes. Heroes like Dharinaji Prataprao and Nawsaji Naik were, no doubt, overpowered and outwitted by the Contingent forces but to condemn them as anti-social and lawless brigands is entirely to misunderstand their spirit. No good administration had reached the heart of a village from mediaeval times and the local Patel or the Patwari was the only benign or autoocratic administrator that they knew. Political administrators at the centre were displaced several times and new ministers came to succeed but the villages were never compelled to take notice of these changes. These village leaders were like Robin Hoods. They tried to control their own units, built strong Gadhis, trained their followers to handle indigenous weapons and kept them contented, persuading them to till their farms and reap their harvest in times of peace. The rigorous administration imposed by the ruler with the help of the British clashed with their own interests. They did not know anything about their new opponents, their superiority in arms and talents. Their rebellions were their last gasping efforts to preserve their status quo.

#### BHIL DISTURBANCES IN THE AURANGABAD DISTRICT

While the Hutkar Naik's rebellion was going on in the district of Nanded from 1798 A.D. onwards a small rebellion was in progress about the same time in the eastern parts of Hyderabad, namely, in the districts of Sironcha and Mahadevpur. This was headed by Konar Rao. This rebellion was brought to an end by Major Pittman at the beginning of 1819 A.D. The following references to the rebellion are interesting<sup>1</sup>:

“ 12. An experiment has been made in that valuable tract of country which lies between Hyderabad, the Godavary, and our own frontier, on the side of Ellore and Masulipatam. Kona Rao, the principal Zemindar, and Sirdeshayee of the greater portion of that range, after being in open rebellions for upwards of thirty years, accepted a cowl and

1. *Papers Relative to Certain Pecuniary Transaction of Messrs William Palmer & Co., with the Government of H. H. the Nizam*, pp. 58-59.

made his submission, on the reduction of his forts by Major Pitman in the beginning of last year. He has since resided principally at the capital, and has made a direct settlement with the Minister: the public Taluqdars have been withdrawn, and the troops on both sides either recalled or discharged. The Minister is thus saved the expense of those with which he was obliged to enforce the authority of Government, and of those who fought on the side of the rebel, many who were natives of the country and have returned to the cultivation of their lands. Kona Rao gave each man thirty-three rupees when he discharged him, which was calculated to provide him with a pair of bullocks and a plough, with grain for seed, and to support him for five months until the season of harvest.

13. As Kona Rao did not submit, or rather as the sincerity of his submission was not relied upon, until he had experienced the impracticability of resisting the Nizam's regular troops, there is every reason to believe that he will now continue steadfast in his obedience. On one hand, he knows from me that as long as he behaves well, he will be protected against the exactions of the Government; and, on the other, he is aware that if he behaves ill, the same troops which have reduced him once, are ready to reduce him again. The only thing to be apprehended is, that his habits of extravagance, which I have in vain endeavoured to correct, may involve him in embarrassments, and either throw him into arrear with the Government, or tempt him to make exactions in his districts."

## CHAPTER IX

### REBELLION IN KOPBAL AND AT OTHER PLACES IN THE STATE.

The territories of Kopbal, in the district of Raichur, had been taken from the Nizam by Tippu Sultan of Mysore in the territorial adjustment that followed the conclusion of the war with Mysore. Kopbal once again became a part of the Hyderabad territory. In 1819 Veerappa, a prominent Zamindar of the area, rose in rebellion and seized the forts of Kopbal and Bahadur Banda. The British troops moved against him both from the Southern Maratha Country and Hyderabad. In May 1819 the fort was stormed and Veerappa was captured. The following extracts are taken from *A History of the Hyderabad Contingent* by R. G. Burton (pp. 82-83), and *Official Papers from Memoir of Operations of the British Army in India during the Maratha War of 1817, 1818 and 1819* by Lieut. Colonel Valentine Blacker, published in 1812 (pp. 488-492).

" On the 3rd May a force under Major Doveton marched from Secunderabad, composed of the Russell Brigade, consisting of the Russell Cavalry 200 strong, under Captain Jones, two battalions of infantry under Captain Hare, with four 6-pounder guns and two 12-pounder howitzers, a detachment of Madras Artillery, and five companies of the 1st Battalion, 21st Madras Infantry. These troops were joined at the Kalachabutra Ghat on the Kistna River by a Risala of the Reformed Horse, 900 strong, under Captain Davies, which co-operated with Brigadier-General Pritzler in the attack and capture of Kopaldrug, and the seizure of the rebel leader Virappa. It is interesting to note that a portion of the Hyderabad Contingent took part in the capture of this same fort during the troublous times forty years later.

## APPENDIX

*Official Papers, detailing the Operations of Brigadier General Pritzler's Field against Copaldoog.*

Headquarters, Field Divisions,  
Camp near Alwundie,  
7th May, 1819.

To

HENRY RUSSEL, Esq.,  
Resident at Hyderabad.

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you that the Division under my command, as per margin,<sup>1</sup> entered the territories of His Highness the Subadar of the Deckan, this morning, and encamped at this place.

I have, &c. &c.  
(Sd.) T. PRITZLER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

Headquarters, Field Division,  
Camp before Copaldoog,  
9th May, 1819.

To

HENRY RUSSELL, Esq.,  
*British Resident.*

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you, that I encamped before Copaldoog yesterday, and employed the morning in reconnoitring the fort. In the evening I moved down with the intention of carrying the petah, and establishing a post for a mortar-battery: but I was met by a man who said he

1. H.M. 2d L.D., three Troops; Detachment 1st N.C., four Troops; Flank Battalion, six Companies; Rifle Corps., eight ditto; 2d Battalion 4th Regiment, five ditto; 2d Battalion 12th Regiment, ten ditto; 2d Battalion Pioneers, three ditto.

Detachment of Artillery ordnance—Iron Guns, eighteen-pounders, four; Howitzers, heavy five-and-a-half-inches, two; Howitzers, light five-and-a-half ditto, two; Brass guns, twelve-pounders, two; Brass ditto, six pounders, attached to H.M. 22d L.D., two; Brass Mortars, eight-inches, eight; Brass ditto, five-and-a-half ditto, one; Dooab Auxiliary Horse, one hundred.

was a brother to Veerapa, and that the fort should be given up. I therefore halted, and directed eight companies to proceed, and take possession of it; but on arrival at the gate, they were refused admittance by the garrison, and returned, accompanied by the man who came out to meet us.

Seeing that there was no prospect of getting possession of the fort, as was proposed, I established a body of troops in the pettah, and occupied the position for the mortar-battery, which was armed, during the night with nine mortars and two howitzers; a bridge of brass twelves, and a brigade of six-pounders was also got into the petta which, with the mortars, opened their fire between two and three O'clock this morning.

Preparations are now making for the formation of a breaching-battery, which I am inclined to think the wall will not long withstand.

Mahomed Edroos Khan arrived last night, and was joined by his troops this morning, which I propose to send against Bahadur Bunda, a hill fort, dependant on Copaldoog, while we are carrying on the siege of the latter place.

I have, &c. &c.,  
 (Signed) THEO PRITZLER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

Headquarters, Field Division,  
 Camp before Copaldoog,  
 11th May, 1819.

To  
 HENRY RUSSELL, Esqr.  
*British Resident.*

SIR,

On reference to the subject of my letter of the 9th instant, I have the honour to acquaint you, that, yesterday morning, a breaching-battery of two eighteen-pounders was opened upon the wall of the lower fort; in the evening a third eighteen-pounder was got into the battery; and I have every reason to hope that the breach will be practicable by sunset this evening.

I have, &c. &c.,  
 (Signed). THEO PRITZLER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

Headquarters, Field Division,  
Camp before Copaldoog,  
12th May, 1819.

To

HENRY RUSSELL, Esqr.,  
*British Resident.*

SIR,

After closing my letter of yesterday, I went to the batteries, with a view to ascertain that the breach was practicable, and that every necessary arrangement had been made for storming the lower fort, which I had directed to take place at day-light this morning, when two men came in to request *cowsl*, which was granted to them, on their giving up the two principal gates, and which were occupied by our troops immediately.

Veerapa, who, with about five hundred men, retired into the upper fort has sent letter to Mohamed Idroos Khan, and if he does not immediately accept the terms which have in consequence been offered to him, I shall prosecute the siege.

I have, &c. &c.,  
(Signed). THEO PRITZLER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

Headquarters, Field Division,  
Camp before Copaldoog,  
14th May, 1819.

To

HENRY RUSSELL, Esqr.,  
*British Resident, Hyderabad.*

SIR,

On reference to the subject of my letter of the 12th instant, I do myself the honour to acquaint you, that all negotiations ceased with the enemy about 10 o'clock yesterday morning and perceiving that nothing but a very strong and decided measure would prevent a long and protracted siege, I determined to carry as many of the lower works by escalade as could be accomplished; for which purpose, the troops specified in the margin<sup>1</sup> were placed in the batteries, and

1. Left Attack—One Company and a half Flank Battalion, one ditto Rifle Corps, one ditto 4th Regiment N. I., One ditto 12th Regiment N. I.

Right Attack—One Company and a half Flank Battalion, one ditto Corps, one ditto 4th Regiment N. I., Two ditto 12th Regiment N. I.

Reserve, Captain Jones—One Company Flank Battalion, one ditto Rifles, one ditto 4th Regiment N. I.

at twelve o'clock, they moved out under the fire of all our guns and mortars, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser, 18th N. I. in two divisions; the first of left attack, under the command of Captain Tew, H.M. 34th regiment—and the second, of right attack, under the command of Captain Cuppidge, H.M. 63d Regiment. These Columns were conducted, the first by Lieutenant Grant, and the second by Ensign Oliphant of the Engineers; and Captain Smithwaite commanded the Pioneers, who carried the ladders.

The left attack moved on without much opposition, till it arrived at the first gate, which was, however, blown open by a galloper gun of H.M. 22d Light Dragoons, under the command of Lieutenant Gregory, to whom much praise is due for having carried it through a heavy fire, and up a road apparently impracticable for any wheel carriages.

The right attack found the wall they were to escalade very high, which rendered the operation slow and tedious. I therefore detached Captain Jones, of H.M. 69th Regiment, with the Reserve, to follow up the left attack, and the whole of the three parties formed a junction at the second gateway; from which they pushed the enemy, who disputed every inch of ground, through two gates, to the very summit of the hill, where they begged for quarter.

Such a service could not be performed without some loss; and when I reflect upon the strength of the enemy's works, and the power they had of throwing down stones, I am astonished that it was so trifling, having only six killed and fifty-one wounded, and which can only be accounted for by the spirited manner in which the officers and men did their duty; and I have to lament the loss of a very promising young officer, Ensign Elliot of the rifle corps, who fell when exerting himself to the utmost, near the second gateway. I have also to lament the loss of the service of Captain Dunn, Assistant Quartermaster-general, and Lieutenant Pringle Taylor, severely wounded, the former employed to explain my orders to the left attack, and the latter, who happened accidentally to be on the spot, was permitted to advance with it; both these officers, as well as Lieutenant Silver of H. M. 58d regiment were wounded, when showing an example of the most determined bravery to the troops. A squadron of H. M. 22d Dragoons, under the command of Captain Mills, was so

placed as to cut off the enemy's retreat in the event of their attempting one, but the attacks were too spirited to give him time to think of it before they were driven up the hill.

Where every officer and soldier employed did their duty to the utmost, it is difficult to point out those who most distinguished themselves, but I feel much indebted to Lieutenant Grant of the Engineers, for the very judicious situation in which he placed the batteries, planned the attacks, and conducted one of them; and he was ably assisted by Ensign Oliphant.

To Major Cleaveland, of the Artillery, much praise is due, for the judgment which he shewed in so well directing the fire from the batteries; and the officers and men of that corps, as well as the Artillery Troops of H.M. 22d Light Dragoons, are entitled to every credit, for the admirable manner in which the guns were served both before and during the attack, and the excellent practice which was made. Nothing could exceed the zeal shewn by Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser, Captains Tew, Cuppidge, and Jones, commanding the different parties, and everything that could be done by men, was accomplished by the troops under their command.

To Captain Smithwaite, and the Pioneers, I feel much indebted for their unwearied exertions, constantly exposed to a very heavy fire; and much praise is due to Dr. Trotter, and the medical officers generally, whose assistance was, upon every occasion, and in every situation, so promptly afforded.

To the Assistant Adjutant-general, Lieutenant Watson, and Assistant Quartermaster-general, Captain O'Donnoghue, I feel much indebted, for their great exertions, and the able assistance they afforded me, as well as to Captain Dunn, Assistant Quartermaster-general, and to my Aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Brown, of H. M. 25th Light Dragoons.

I inclose a Return of Killed and Wounded, and Ordnance captured.

I have &c. &c.

(Signed) THEO PRITZLER,  
*Brigadier-general.*

## APPENDIX.

*Return of Ordnance captured at Copuldroog.*

Guns				Serviceable	Unserviceable
<b>Iron</b>					
<b>11 Pounder</b>	..	..	..	..	<b>1</b>
<b>12 ditto</b>	..	..	..	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>9 do</b>	..	..	..	<b>1</b>	..
<b>6 do</b>	..	..	..	<b>4</b>	..
<b>4 do</b>	..	..	..	<b>1</b>	..
<b>3 do</b>	..	..	..	<b>2</b>	..
<b>2 do</b>	..	..	..	<b>2</b>	..
<b>42 Brass do</b>	..	..	..	<b>1</b>	..
<b>8 do</b>	..	..	..	<b>1</b>	..
<b>2 do</b>	..	..	..	<b>1</b>	..

(Signed) SAMUEL CLEAVELAND,  
*Major Commanding Artillery, F.D.*

Return of Killed and Wounded in the Field Division under the command of Brigadier-General Pritzler, C.B., during the Operations against the Fort of Copaldoog.

H.M. 22d Light Dragoons—Wounded: 1 Lieutenant and 1 Private.

Artillery—Wounded: 1 Sergeant, 1 Corporal, 4 Privates, 4 Privates Natives, and Gun-Lascar since dead.

H. M. Flank Battalion—Killed; 1 Sergeant, 3 Privates, Wounded: 1 Lieutenant, 2 Corporals, and 11 Privates.

Rifle Corps—Killed: 1 Ensign. Wounded: 1 Havildar and 4 Privates.

2d Battalion 4th Regiment N.I.—Wounded: 1 Jemadar, 1 Puokally and 4 Privates.

2d Battalion 12th Regiment N.I.—Wounded: 1 Subdar and 5 Privates.

2d Battalion Pioneers—Killed: 1 Private. Wounded: 7 Privates, 1 since dead.

Division staff—Wounded: 1 Captain.

Name of Officer Killed: Ensign Elliot, Rifle Corps.

Names of Officers Wounded: Captain Dunn, Assistant Quartermaster-general; Lieutenant Taylor, H. M. 22d Light Dragoons; Lieutenant Silver, H. M. Regiment, Flank Battalion.

Camp at Copaldoog,  
14th May, 1819.

(Signed). J. WATSON,  
*Assistant Adjutant-general.*

#### THE DESHMUKH REBELLION IN UDGIR IN THE BIDAR DISTRICT.

In the year 1820 A.D. widespread insurrections took place in the district of Bidar. The leaders of these outbreaks were Shivalingappa, Tirumal Rao and Meghasham. The following is the account of these rebellions from *A History of the Hyderabab Contingent* by Major R. G. Burton, (pp. 85-87).

“In December 1820 a detachment of the Reformed Horse, 170 strong, was stationed at Udgir, and Lieutenant J. Sutherland was ordered to take command and reduce the district to order. On arriving at that place on the 22nd December it was found that the Deshmukh had taken forcible possession of the fort which belonged to the Taluqdar, had fortified it and filled it with armed men, and taken to a life of lawlessness.

Lieutenant Sutherland at once despatched a letter requesting the Deshmukh to come into camp, but as this was returned unanswered, he marched to Suliali on the morning of 24th, when he was fired on by a party of advanced skirmishers, and encamped there. He then sent a message to the Deshmukh Siulingaya informing him that the detachment had not come to punish him for what was past, but to restore to him whatever rights he might have been deprived of by the local officers of the Government, that the Talookdar must be placed in possession of the gurrie, and that his men must lay down their arms.”

The threat was of no avail, Sutherland reports:—

“The horsemen had orders not to return the enemy’s fire, and in the afternoon their skirmishers came out into the

plain in the direction of the camp. At 4 p.m. I fell in with a hundred men, and after making a considerable detour with them, descended unseen by the garrison into a deep and thickly-wooded ravine which opened into the plain in the direction of the għurrie. Having formed the men into the best order that the situation would admit of, we charged down and cut off the whole of their skirmishers. This was all that, at the time, I intended to accomplish, but a party of matchlock men having come out to their support, we went about and charged back on them. The people inside shut their gates, and they were left at our mercy. The horsemen swept close round the bottom of the għurrie wall, and several of the enemy were pistolled on the tops of the bastions. The height of the parapets, I afterwards discovered, prevented those inside from levelling their firearms at us, all their shots going over our heads. Having accomplished this I drew off the horsemen, and the ladders which had before been prepared not having reached me, I was under the necessity of desisting from any further attack. Both the skirmishers and the party that came out to their support did not exceed 80 men. I have since understood that a considerable number of the former effected their escape into a deep ravine, which lay between the għurrie and my camp, and that many of the latter found cover in some houses near the works. From the number of men, however, that I saw speared and sabred, their loss must have been considerable, and amongst the number was Maljee Kolke, one of the most notorious characters in this part of the country. Nothing could have been finer than the spirit with which the party of Reformed Horse charged back on the matchlockmen, and round the bottom of the għurrie walls."

Sivlingayya evacuated the place during the night, and took refuge with Megasham, headman of Gaojegaon, a notorious robber, in a strong fort with high walls. Having no guns or infantry, Lieutenant Sutherland was unable to attack the place, and the enemy made good their escape during the night. Other places were visited, a few forts were destroyed, and some semblance of order was established throughout the district.

For these services, Lieutenant Sutherland received an acknowledgment from the Resident in a letter, dated 11th January 1821, in which he was directed to continue, as far as the means placed at his disposal would allow, to reduce to

subjection all persons within his reach who were not obedient to the Nizam's Government, to suppress robberies, to prevent oppression on the part of the Nizam's Government, and to secure to everyone the enjoyment of his just rights and the sanctity of engagements entered into by officers of Government, for which purpose he was authorised on all proper occasion to give his own guarantee and to pledge that of the Resident.

These instructions indicate the varied and onerous duties which had to be undertaken by the officers of the Hyderabad Contingent when employed in maintaining internal order in the State. They also show that, while the Nizam's subjects were turbulent and unruly, his Government or his officials were in some degree responsible for the State of anarchy prevailing in his dominions.

Lieutenant Sutherland next proceeded to Bidar, where he was reinforced by five companies of infantry, with a 12-pounder gun and a howitzer, from Bolarum. Leaving Bidar on the 10th of January 1821, he advanced against Kishnapur, where the Deshmukh Tirmal Rao had for three years been committing depredations and had refused to pay the revenues due to Government. On the arrival of the detachment at Kishnapur on the morning of the 12th Lieutenant Sutherland rode up to the gate, and interviewed the Deshmukh, assuring him of the satisfaction of his claims and the protection of the Government if he paid up the revenues due; otherwise the threat was held out that the batteries would open fire at daybreak. But the Deshmukh had no confidence in the promises of the Nizam's officials, and preferred to abandon the place under cover of darkness rather than serve under the Taluqdar of the district, against whom he had many complaints. He had been driven by the oppression of former Taluqdars to seek independence in opposition to their unjust measures, and he told Lieutenant Sutherland that he had on one occasion paid a lakh of rupees for something like a permission to plunder his neighbours. The detachment next marched to Bhawanipeth for operations against Lachman Reddi Desai, who surrendered himself, but his men evacuated the fort during the night after a short resistance. Other places were similarly reduced without opposition, and Lieutenant Sutherland, having completed these operations, marched to Bolarum with his detachment.

Trouble broke out in the Bidar district again in 1852 A.D. when one Lingupphah rose in rebellion. A number of

places had been captured by the insurgents in the district. The Contingent troops marched against the insurgents and were in action against them from 19th March to 24th March 1852 A.D. The rebellion was put down and the forts of Sawergaum, Lowlee, Kookulgung, Boortee, Juleote, Daplea, and Huludnerana were captured and destroyed.

**BHIL DISTURBANCES IN THE AURANGABAD DISTRICT  
FROM 1822-1857 A.D.**

With the conclusion of the war with the Marathas in 1818 A.D. control of the territories of Kannad and Vaizapur in the district of Aurangabad was transferred from the Marathas to Hyderabad. These taluqs along with the Ajanta range of hills in the taluqs of Bhokardan and Silod were the strongholds of the Bhils. From 1822 up to 1857 the Bhils were constantly rising against the Government. The Contingent Troops stationed at Aurangabad and Kannad were continuously employed against them during this period.

At times the activities of the Bhils amounted to well-organized rebellions. The following is an account of the activities of the Bhils gleaned from Major R. G. Burton's book *A History of the Hyderabad Contingent* and from *A Gazetteer of Aurangabad* :—

**AN EXTRACT FROM *A History of the Hyderabad Contingent* BY MAJOR R. G. BURTON,**

*Statement showing the disturbances in the Aurangabad District from 1822-1860 A.D.*

Years	Field Services
1822 A.D.	A party of Captain Clarke's Risala (58 sabres) in pursuit of Bhils on 8th February, of whom 10 were killed and a number captured. During the month of February, May and July, detachments from the Aurangabad Division were engaged with parties of Bhils at the following places—Kanam, Despur, Ajanta, and Nandara,

**1823 A.D.** The 1st Battalion, Irregular Brigade, and a detachment of Regular Infantry from Aurangabad was employed during the dry season in rooting out the Bhils from the Byzapoor, Kandalla, Kanam, and Nagapur Parganas.

**1827 A.D.** Fifty men under Lieutenant Kelly marched from Kanarh on 12th July in pursuit of a body of Bhils, who were committing depredations in the vicinity of Byzapur.

**1834 A.D.** A troop 3rd Cavalry marched from Aurangabad on 18th January for the protection of the Amber Pargana against the incursion of the Bhils.

**1835 A.D.** A squadron 1st Cavalry from Mominabad proceeded to Jalna, thence to Jafferabad and Dhar to act against the Bhils, 21st January, after which it accompanied a detachment of two companies of infantry under Lieutenant Morrison on 8th February to Jalna to quell a disturbance created at that place by the Bhils.

**1836 A.D.** From June to September the garrison battalion under Captain Johnston was employed in hunting down the Bhils in the Aurangabad District.

**1841 A.D.** A troop 3rd Cavalry and a company of 7th Infantry from Aurangabad were employed under Captain Flower from 19th January to 27th February 1841 in pursuit of a party of Bhils 100 strong, who had attacked and robbed the Treasury at Pimpalner; nine of the gang were killed and a number captured.

**1843 A.D.** The Hill Ranger Company, under Captain Johnston, reinforced by 1½ troops 3rd Cavalry, two companies infantry from Aurangabad, and two companies Infantry from Ellichpur, were employed from 13th April to 16th August in pursuit of a large body of Bhils from Khandesh,

1859-60. A detachment of 130 men 2nd Infantry, 30 men 3rd Cavalry, and three guns 4th company artillery under Lieutenant Pedler, engaged with a party of Bhils, 400 strong, at Waka on 20th November; the enemy was defeated with a loss of 40 or 50 killed, and as many wounded, Lieutenant Pedler having one killed and eight wounded.

An extract from *A Gazetteer of Aurangabad*, published under the orders of His Highness the Nizam's Government in 1884 A.D.<sup>1</sup> :—

Operations were next directed against the Bhils in the Ajanta and Gaotala range, where they had greatly increased in numbers, and were under thirty-two leaders, the chief of whom in 1819 was Chil Naik. Detachments were sent among the hills, and the fort of Baitalwadi and other strongholds were captured. Chil Naik was taken and hanged; but the Bhils were far from being subdued, and two new leaders, Jandhula and Jakira, fiercely ravaged the plains to avenge the loss of Chil Naik. A military cordon was drawn at the base of the Ajanta hills for about a hundred miles, and Jandhula, Jakira, and 1,200 of their followers surrendered in 1821. After a few months' quiet, there was another outbreak in 1822, headed by the famous Hiria. The low country was harassed for some time; but as force had failed, it was determined in 1825 to try kind measures. The Bhils had been promised a living if they would come down to the plains, but they refused, and attempts were now made to encourage them to enlist and form a Bhil corps. An agency was established near Chalisgaon, and Major Ovans and Lieutenant Graham induced many of the "Ajanta Bhils" to form settlements and engage in agriculture. The Bhils were still troublesome, and those at Kanhar recommenced their depredations about 1830. The Gaotala hill, seven miles north of Kanhar, became noted as one of their strongholds; and a body of the Contingent troops was ordered up from Aurangabad, to hunt them out of the hills and reopen the ghat roads. The troops were encamped at Gaotala for six months, and the hills were scoured. It was about this time that the Outramghat was constructed by the British Officer of that name, while he was engaged in conciliating the wild hillmen of the "Ajanta

and Gaotala" range. A force was afterwards cantoned at Kanhar for several years, and a British officer was stationed there as Bhil Agent. The troops were withdrawn about 1840, and the Bhil Agency was abolished a few years later.

In February 1822 a detachment of Captain Clarke's Risala stationed at Kingaon, consisting of 57 horsemen under Jemadar Sher Ali Khan, pursued a party of Bhils, and coming up with them after a rapid march of 20 miles, killed 8 and captured 36, the Jemadar having 3 men wounded. On the 13th a detachment at Kanhar also engaged a party of Bhils, killing the leader, wounding a few others, and themselves having several men wounded. Other actions with Bhils took place during the same year.

During 1823 detachments from Aurangabad and Ellichpur were constantly employed against the Bhils, who were committing depredations within the Nizam's border and with whom many desultory actions took place. In April 1824, Duffadar Nizam Ulla Khan having heard that a party of fifty Bhils had assembled in the neighbourhood of his post, mounted the few men who were immediately at hand, only eight in number, and went after them, the remainder of his party being ordered to follow. Coming up with the Bhils in some strong ground the horsemen rode at them, and forced them into the bastion of a deserted village. Dismounting, they then attacked the Bhils with sabre, and wounded and captured their leaders. The Duffadar and five of his men were wounded.

#### MUTINY IN THE CONTINGENT AT Mominabad AND MINOR DISTURBANCES AT OTHER PLACES

Disturbances continued in other parts of the State in 1822-1823. The fort of Mahur in the district of Adilabad had been captured by the rebels in February 1822 A.D. The Hyderabad Contingent troops marched against the fort and captured it. The Zamindars of Sironcha and Mahadapur were in rebellion for decades. "On 12th January 1823 a force consisting of a battalion of the Russell Brigade, two 12-pounder and two 6-pounder guns, and two howitzers, and a party of Pioneers, marched from Bolarum under command of Major Hare, and on arrival at Elgandal was reinforced by 500 Berar Infantry and 200 Reformed Horse from Hingoli. This detachment captured the forts of Mahadapur and Sironcha, made them over

to the Nizam's Government, receiving the approbation of the Resident for the services."

In 1827 A.D. detachments of the Hyderabad Contingent were employed in the pacification of the districts of Gulbarga and Raichur. The condition of the State at this period has been described by Major R. G. Burton in the following words:—"There long existed a constant state of petty warfare. The wild nature of the country, the numerous strongholds, both natural and artificial, and the apathy or collusion of the civil officials favoured the bands of marauders who still roamed the country, and resistance was continually offered to the Hyderabad Government and to the oppression of their myrmidons."

In the year 1827 A.D. mutiny broke out at Mominabad in the Hyderabad Contingent as a result of which Col. Davies was shot dead by the infuriated soldiers. The reason for this mutiny appears to have been the introduction of innovations in the army which were carried out without any consideration for the feelings of the soldiers. The details of the mutiny are given below:—

"In May 1827 a lamentable event occurred at Mominabad when Lieutenant-Colonel Evan Davies was assassinated by some of the men of the 3rd Cavalry. It appears that various changes and innovations in uniform and other matters had caused considerable dissatisfaction, which culminated when on the 5th of May 1827, one of the junior officers caused two men to be forcibly shaved. This violent and outrageous measure resulted in a number of men assembling next morning on the general parade ground, where they erected a standard and took up a position with loaded arms. Colonel Davies at once rode to the spot to try and pacify the men, when he was shot down by a fusillade from the mutineers and then cut to pieces. Some of the assassins were killed on the spot by their comrades; others were subsequently tried by Court-Martial and punished. The officer whose outrageous action had been the immediate cause of the *emeute* was removed from the service."

## CHAPTER X

### THE REORGANIZED HYDERABAD CONTINGENT

The Hyderabad Contingent had now become a well-organized army due to its reorganization in 1826 A.D. The corps was formed into one army and the Regiments and the battalions under the artillery were numbered according to the periods at which they had been raised. The old designations of Risaldars were changed. The Hyderabad Contingent army now consisted of forces as follows:—

1. The First All-Hyderabad Division with headquarters at Bolarum consisting of 2 regiments of infantry, a corps of engineers and a company of artillery. It also furnished a detachment of 5 companies of infantry under an European Officer at Mahadevpur in the Karimnagar district and another company in the district of Medak. There was also a Reformed Horse attached to it.

2. The Second or Aurangabad Division consisted of 2 battalions of infantry, a company of artillery and 2 irregular batteries. This division furnished a number of detachments for the protection of the frontiers. The headquarters of the Cavalry Regiment was at Aurangabad, but a greater part of it was posted at Kannad, Jafrahd and at other places.

3. The Hingoli Brigade consisted of 2 battalions of infantry, a company of artillery and a detachment of cavalry.

4. The Ellichpur Brigade consisted of one regiment of cavalry, 2 batteries of artillery and 2 battalions of infantry. The cavalry brigade was reduced in strength to 4 regiments.

From 1828 A.D. recruitment of local officers to this army was stopped and their place was taken by the Company's officers.

It was this army under the supreme control of the Resident with its detachments posted in various parts of the State which did the work of putting down the rebellions against the Nizam which were occurring in every part of the State continuously.

The nature of this contingent force and the role which it played is brought out in the minute of Sir Charles Metcaife dated 1st March 1832 A.D. :—

“ The Contingent furnished by the Nizam being found inefficient we gradually assumed the management of it, until we finally established a Force in lieu of it, completely under our own control.

“ This we were enabled to do by the subserviency of the Minister, who was the creature of our ascendancy, but who also saw in the existence of this Force the means of maintaining his own power against rival nobles as well as refractory subjects.

“ This is the footing on which this Force stands at present. It is the personal interest of the Minister to maintain it, and it is therefore maintained. Were it otherwise we should have long ago had applications for its abolition, as in the case of our interference in civil matters, which was contrary to his sense of personal interests, and therefore always unpalatable.

“ Since the formation of the Force exclusively under our orders, neither the late nor the present Nizam has taken cognisance of it.

“ They have both left it like other matters of their Government to the management of their Minister, being either unwilling or unable to interfere with his uncontrolled administration of their affairs. It is in reality a joint concern between Raja Chandoo Lal (the Minister) and us, in which the Nizam himself takes as little interest as in other affairs of his dominions, being completely excluded from all share in his Government, either by actual disinclination for business, or by hopelessness of success in any attempt to assume the power properly belonging to him, but now, and for the last thirty years, almost entirely exercised by the Minister.

“ If the Nizam were formally to require of us the abolition of this Force, we should be found, I conceive, to comply with the requisition, as there is nothing, I believe,

*in our Treaties with him which would entitle us to resist it. But we should have to consider what rights the Treaties do give us regarding his auxiliary Contingent, and might act accordingly. It will probably be found that the present Force is not larger or more expensive than what the Nizam is bound to furnish in time of war: but how far he is bound to furnish any in time of peace can only be settled by reference to the Treaties.*

“At present, in discussing questions regarding this Force the Nizam personally may be considered as nearly out of the question, and any reduction of the expense of this Force which is to be attended by a diminution of its efficiency may be viewed both as it would affect our strength, and as it would benefit or injure the administration of the Nizam’s territories.

“It is a Force so much under our command that any diminution of its efficiency would in the same proportion detract from our power. In the same degree it would impair the strength of the Nizam’s internal Government, which is mainly supported by this Force, and no benefit would result to the Nizam’s finances from any reduction of the expense of its maintenance.

“This opinion is founded on actual experience, and on the incorrigible character of the Minister, Chandoo Lal. When I was Resident at Hyderabad I made several attempts to reduce the expense of this Force, a Regiment of Regular Cavalry was discharged, the rest of the Cavalry were reduced in numbers, some staff appointments were abolished, but this was all to no purpose as to any relief that it afforded to the State finances. The Minister squandered the amount thus saved in some other manner, and so he will do with respect to any reduction of expense that can be effected. This is the bane of his administration. To meet this propensity he extorts recklessly, and nothing stops his wastefulness but the impossibility of raising funds.

“With these sentiments strongly impressed on my mind from personal acquaintance, I can only regard a reduction of expense, attended with diminution of efficiency, as so much loss to our own strength, and the service of the Nizam’s Government, without any corresponding benefit of any description.”

The Nizam in 1834 for some time thought of abolishing the Hyderabad Contingent but when it appeared that

this abolition was likely to create troubles he allowed it to continue undisturbed. It was not difficult for Raja Chandoo Lal, to convince the Nizam that the Hyderabad Contingent was the only force which was a guarantee for the continued existence of the State, chronically maladministered as it was.

## CHAPTER XI

### MUBARIZ-UD-DOWLA

Secunder Jah's son Mir Gohar Ali Khan was called Mubarez-ud-Dowlah. He was born in 1800 A.D. He had a good education in Persian and Arabic, and his grounding in religious lore was also quite sound. He had developed an independent spirit from his boyhood.

Even during the reign of his father he had shown a rebellious spirit and he had to suffer imprisonment for five years on account of it. The incident which caused Mubarez-ud-Dowlah's imprisonment is significant of the prevailing state of things at the time. In 1815 A.D. a servant of Mubarez-ud-Dowlah by name Sheereen had a quarrel with a tailor who lived in the Residency Bazar. The conflict became serious and Sheereen's life was threatened. He took refuge with Mubarez-ud-Dowlah. Mubarez-ud-Dowlah got the tailor arrested and brought to his Dewani. As the tailor lived in the Residency area Russel, the Resident, took interest in the case. He asked the Nizam what step he intended to take in the matter. Muneer-ul-Mulk, the Diwan, promised to investigate the matter but the Resident desired to take the case personally into his own hand. A native force of one thousand with two canons, was ordered to besiege the house of Mubarez-ud-Dowlah. Mubarez-ud-Dowlah's men resisted the attack and in a scuffle one Englishman was killed by an arrow discharged by Mubarez-ud-Dowlah. The attacking mob was infuriated and the onslaught became severe. An African Soldier of the Nawab is said to have worked a gun with such effect that enemies of Mubarez-ud-Dowlah had to retreat. The retreating force was pursued by the men of Mumtaz-ud-Dowlah, brother-in-law of Mubarez-ud-Dowlah. The Resident was displeased at the whole affair. He ordered 800 soldiers from Secunderabad to punish the wrongdoer. But Maharaja Chandulal hushed the case by diplomacy and bribe. Mubarez-ud-Dowlah, along with Mumtaz-ud-Dowlah and Samsam-ud-Dowlah were kept in detention for five years in Golkonda. These incidents took place in the months of August and September of 1815.

Thus for the first time due to his animosity against Englishmen a royal prince was imprisoned by his own father.

Mubarez-ud-Dowlah had another misfortune in 1829. Shortly after his release he returned to his place in the City. He was the focal point of anti-British sentiments in Hyderabad. At this time he collected a number of Arabs and Afghans, strengthened his house in the City and started an insurrection. The Contingent troops under Col. Stewart marched into the City and the prince was arrested and confined in the fortress of Goleconda on 19th April, 1830 A.D. At the fort he tried to tamper with the loyalty of the garrison and even threatened to carry off the Nizam's treasures. He could not succeed in this as a detachment of troops marched from Bolarum to Golkonda. After some time Mubarez-ud-Dowlah was reconciled to his life in the barracks and again returned to the City. The details of this incident which will be found in Col. Meadows Taylor's *The Story of My Life* are given below:—

" Shortly after this the Nizam's brother, Mubarez-ud-Dowlah collected a number of Arabs and Afghans, strengthened his house in the City, and proceeded to press claims against his brother which could not be for one moment entertained. The case becoming serious, and disturbances being imminent Col. Stewart was called upon to repress the disorder by sending in a force from Bolarum. I was still in charge of my regiment, and, preceded by two guns, we marched into the city. Had there been any fighting we should have fared badly in those narrow streets lined with terraced houses all covered with armed men; but happily not a shot was fired, though the guns at the palace gates were unlimbered. The officer commanding the brigade had preceded us and induced the rebel to proceed according to orders to Golkonda, and to trust to his brother's generosity to settle all disputed claims; and so, for a time, there was a hollow peace patched up.

Mubarez-ud-Dowlah, however, could not rest content, and the Minister had overlooked the fact that in his personal retainers he possessed the means of doing much mischief. The treasury at the fort of Golkonda is one of the most ancient in the State, and at this time contained 100 lakhs, or a million sterling; and the Nizam, wishing to remove some of the money, sent his treasurer, with a small guard for the purpose. Mubarez-ud-Dowlah refused admittance, and

the others, being too weak to fight, placed a guard at the entrance. There was great consternation at Hyderabad. Five thousand Arabs, Rohillas, Sikhs and other foreign levies, including some of the old French "Lines" were marched out to Golkonda and took up a position in the outer *enceinte*; but they made no impression on the Prince, and indeed were supposed to be well affected towards him. After days of useless negotiations, the Minister, on the part of the Nizam, requested the assistance of the Bolarum Contingent; so we all marched out on the 6th January 1831, and encamped opposite the North or Delhi gate, on the plain on which stand the noble mausoleums of the Kootub Shahy Kings. It was an obscure state of affairs. The interior was held by the rebel Prince, the outer *enceinte* by the Nizam's levies, who also treated us as enemies, not only refusing to allow us to enter, but threatening to fire on us, and training the fort guns on the wall so as to command our camp. I rode to the edge of the counter-scrap one morning, but was warned off. However, I managed to have a look at the ditch, and saw that it was wide and deep, and by dint of exchanging good-humoured "chaff" with the men escaped unharned.

We remained inactive until the 15th February, when we were suddenly ordered into the fort, and the Nizam's troops at the same time ordered to leave it. We took up a position not far from the Prince's Palace, between it and the treasury, and pickets were immediately posted. I held the advanced pickets with two guns and four companies. I had my guns loaded with a double charge of grape each, and as the Prince's men were watching us very closely they must have seen that we were in earnest.

The Nizam's people began removing the treasure, but it was slow work, and for four days and nights I had not even time to change my clothes; the weather, too, was very hot. I believe mine was the post of honour, as it would have been of danger had any fighting occurred. But it was annoying to be kept there perpetually on the stretch, with constant alarms that the Arabs were coming to attack us, and with the sound of their peculiar drum and their war-songs constantly in our ears.

I was not sorry when on the fifth morning one of the staff rode up and told me I might withdraw my men, for the Prince had agreed to send away his levies and keep only his immediate retainers.

The force was to return to cantonments, but the request of the Nizam was complied with that six companies should remain in charge of the Fort, and I was appointed to take command. I was to see that no levies joined the Prince, and I was to be the medium of communication between the Prince and the Resident. "You can read Persian," the Resident said to me, as he gave me my orders, "and you are to open and read all letters the Prince sends you, whether to the Nizam, the Minister, or me; what he had hitherto written are so insolent in tone that if the others are like them you need not forward them. If you can make up this quarrel between the brothers do so, and I shall be obliged to you; but on no account make it worse".

So I remained at my post, and for a few days no notice was taken. I sent for my boat, and used to sail about on the fine tank which washed the walls of the fort, and see the Prince spying at me through a telescope. At length his Moonshee came out, and I offered him a sail one evening. In return, dishes arrived for breakfast and dinner, delightfully cooked, and I reported this friendly intercourse to the Resident. At last letters were sent—one to the Resident, another to the Nizam, very violent in tone, which I returned. Others followed daily for more than a fortnight, gradually improving in tone, but not right yet. "You have hooked your fish, Taylor" said the Resident, laughing, "but he is too strong to land yet, I'll not help you or interfere at all" and I was very glad he did not.

By-and-by my friend grew sulky, but this did not last long; and one evening the Moonshee arrived with some extra good dishes for me, and food for the whole detachment. "Would I be pleased to draft a letter that would satisfy all parties—his honour was in my hands," this was the message delivered by the Moonshee. I did draft a letter and the Prince flew into a violent rage over it, and abused me for having so small an idea of his dignity. We wrangled over it for a week, and he ended by placing his case unreservedly in my hands, and writing what I directed. I made the draft in English so as to be sure of my meaning, and it was afterwards translated by me into Urdu with my own hand, to assure the Prince that it was really mine. The letters were brought to me the next afternoon; and as the Moonshee and I sailed about the Prince waved a white flag by way of salute, which we answered from the "Zeera" with twelve shots from her little pieces.

I took the letters next morning to the Residency. That to the Nizam was forwarded at once, and was pronounced very satisfactory. He would send his mother directly to Golconda with his assurances and would make proper arrangements for his brother's return. When I returned to Golconda I found the old Begum Sahib had already arrived, and two female servants were sent to my tent to report that she and her son had fallen on each other's necks and wept much; and in a day or two Mubariz-ud-Dowla was escorted to the city with all possible respect.

I received the thanks of the Nizam for having for the second time rendered a service to his family."

## CHAPTER XII

### MUBARIZ-UD-DOWLA AND THE WAHABI MOVEMENT

The Nizam Sikandar Jah died in 1829 A.D. and was succeeded by his son Nasir-ud-Dowlah. In 1838 General Fraser was appointed as the Resident in Hyderabad. Soon after his arrival there occurred what is known as the Wahabi Conspiracy in Hyderabad. This was a part of the great movement for social reform and political advancement among the Muslims in Northern India initiated by Syed Ahmed Brailvi. By about 1820 the movement spread from Bengal to the North-West Frontier Province and from the United Provinces to Madras. Efforts were first directed towards the Sikh Rule in the Punjab by Syed Ahmed and his followers, who were not Wahabis in the strict sense of the term but their doctrines were similar to Wahabism. Their main stronghold was Patna. From this place a continuous stream of Wahabi preachers from Bengal and Bihar was kept up towards the Frontier Province. Syed Ahmed and his followers fought a number of battles against the then Sikh Rule in the Punjab. Syed Ahmed was himself in correspondence with a number of chiefs in India and outside including the Nizam, Sikandar Jah (1803 to 1829 A.D.).

Brailvi's letter to the Nizam, Sikandar Jah, "reminds him of his family traditions, praises his own religious ardour, points out the transitory nature of the world and the obligation on all, particularly the chiefs and rulers, to defend the faith and wage war upon the oppressive infidels, and says that since some years past, the predominance of the Indian and the European (Ferangi) infidels over the territories of several people of honour and reputation has spoilt their dignity and grandeur, as also the glory and prosperity of men of learning and integrity. It assures the addressee that the writer had no other wish from all these wars and conflicts than to preach the truths of God and liberate the realms of the faithful and he had no desire to establish his power or acquire territories and treasures or to usurp the kingdom of others or to win a distinction for himself over

others. In the event of the addressee finding it difficult to participate actively in the affair, he should contribute towards its success by including soldiers, nobles, learned men, etc. of his army to join the 'Mujahids' and setting aside something of his treasure for the purpose."<sup>1</sup>

Syed Ahmed died in the year 1831 A.D. but his followers kept up the anti-British agitation throughout India for a number of years. Two of the followers of Syed Ahmed viz. Moulavi Vilayat Ali and Salim came to the Deccan in 1838. A number of their agents were working in places like Madras, Bangalore, Kurnool, and Bombay. In Hyderabad Mubariz-ud-Dowlah, the brother of the Nizam Nasir-ud-Dowlah, soon became the centre of these insurrections. Mubarez-ud-Dowlah entered into correspondence with the Nawab of Kurnool and other chiefs in the country. The activities of the Wahabis increased at this time, when it was widely believed that the Russians were advancing from Central Asia towards India. Since General Fraser came to know the conspiracy he took steps to proceed against the Nawab of Kurnool and the conspirators in Hyderabad. The operations against the Nawab of Kurnool took place in October 1839. After a short and sharp struggle Kurnool surrendered and the Nawab was taken prisoner. In Hyderabad Mubariz-ud-Dowlah and his associates were detained and tried by a Commission of Enquiry.

As much original material regarding the trial of Mubariz-ud-Dowlah has come to hand, it is now possible to give a connected account of the whole proceeding based on the original correspondence between the Resident and the Government of India.

It was about the middle of March in 1839 that the Resident informed the Supreme Government as follows: "That a confederacy does exist having for its object the fulfilment of the schemes intended to be injurious in some way or another to our interests cannot, I think, admit of doubt but as to the precise nature of the designs on foot, the specific point to which they tend and the degree of maturity they have attained, it appears to me that we have as yet acquired no evidence approaching even to proof." After reporting the matter in this

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1. "Political Significance of the Movement of Syed Ahmed Brailvi" (based on his correspondence) by Syed Husan Askari, Prof. of History, Patna College, Patna, published in the *Indian Historical Records Commission's Proceedings*, Volume XXXI, Part II, Mysore, January 1955, p. 180,

guarded way it is further disclosed that the intention of the Resident was to be observant of all that was passing at Hyderabad and to keep a strict watch over the proceedings of Mubariz-ud-Dowlah. He writes, "To betray suspicion prematurely would be injurious. Such an attempt may put an end to all further discovery and unnecessarily give rise to further troubles and similar designs imparting courage and strength to the disaffected."

The Resident further informed that if the developments became so palpable that they could be placed before the Nizam, he would invite his attention in his private capacity and would report the Nizam's reactions. The Resident adds that as he himself was so vague in reporting the matter, he would not solicit any instructions on the point but that he would be extremely cautious and restrained in taking every step. In the circumstances, he had no hesitation to propose to the Nizam that Mubariz-ud-Dowlah be apprehended and sent under a strong guard out of the country. Later it was possible for the Resident to discover a seal of Mubarez-ud-Dowlah which revealed that he had assumed the title of *Ra'isul Muslimin*. Mubariz-ud-Dowlah was carrying on a vigorous correspondence with several persons in and out of the State. He himself professed Wahabism and encouraged people to accept its principles. The Resident could not interfere with religious matters, the Nizam being the best judge in such matters. But this evidence of the seal compelled the Resident to seek an interview with the Nizam and to explain to him the potential danger to the State. It seems that neither the minister nor the Nizam had received any information on the point. But the Minister agreed to appoint a close guard of 500 Arabs to control Mubariz-ud-Dowlah's activities. The suggestion made by the Resident that endeavours should be made to seize the papers of Mubarez-ud-Dowlah was not acceptable to the Nizam as it might cause clashes and personal bickerings and even the very life of his brother might be in danger. The Nizam felt that he would become notorious as a tyrant if he was instrumental in doing some harm to the person of Mubariz-ud-Dowla. The Resident had tried to impress upon the Nizam the necessity of confining Mubariz-ud-Dowlah and sending him at least to the fort of Golconda. Otherwise there was a possibility of being compelled to face an organized opposition of 20,000 Wahabis from the city. Some of the Moulavis like Salim were already put under arrest. The Resident further informed the

Nizam through a memorandum that enquiries in Madras had revealed that the disaffected chiefs of Hindustan were trying to amass their forces against the English and acknowledge the suzerainty of the Shah of Persia, who would appoint Mubariz-ud-Dowla as the Subedar of Deccan, who through Lall Khan and Fakir Mohammad was carrying on negotiations with these chiefs. The emissaries of Mubariz-ud-Dowlah were discovered at Lahore, Sindh, Gwalior, Bombay, Madras and Sholapur. The legend of the seal discovered on the letters in the correspondence was in some cases as follows: 'Umar Bin Abdul Aziz, the second chief of the Musalmans, commonly called as Mubariz-ud-Dowlah, Naib of the Martyred Syed Ahmed.'

Moulavi Salim was repeatedly referred to as a person exercising mesmeric influence on the mind of Mubariz-ud-Dowlah. Though substantial evidence which could convince the judicial authorities could not be secured yet, the Resident adds, the following things could be gathered:

1. "That the sect of Wahabees are extremely numerous in India, and that for a considerable time past the strongest efforts have been made to extend and disseminate their doctrines, one of which is the extermination of all who reject their tenets, or who profess other modes of faith.
2. "That Moobari-ood-dowla is affiliated to the sect, and that he has been selected and acknowledged as their leader in the designs, of whatever nature they may be, which they have in view."
3. "That in reference to his contemplated assumption of a sovereign power, spiritual and temporal, he has caused two seals to be engraved with the following titles upon them. On one "OOMER BIN ABDOOL AZEEZ the 2nd, the chief of the Mussulman, commonly called Mubariz-oo-Dowlah, Naib of the martyred Syed Ahmed" and on the other "The Protector of the Established Religion, the Defender of the Faith and of Mussulman, Mubariz-ud-Dowlah."

4. "That active and persevering communications have for a considerable time past been going on between Mubariz-ud-Dowlah and other persons in different parts of India, the whole of the communications appearing to have centered in Mubariz-ud-Dowlah, and the confederacy and purposes to which they related to have been directed and guided by him,

or at least in his name, and with his full knowledge and concurrence, and all the support which his fortune and the influence of his station and rank could give.

5. "That Moobriz-oo-Dowlah has not only entertained treasonable designs against his sovereign the Nizam, and hazardous in general to the peace of India, but also hostile intentions more specifically directed against the British Government as manifested by the extraordinary pains which his agents have taken to gain over to the Wahabee cause the Troops from Native Army, especially at Secunderabad and Nagpore.

6. "That under these circumstances although absolute and legal proof might still be wanting the period had arrived, which could not be further postponed without danger, to communicate to the Nizam all the above particulars of his brother's conduct, and to justify H.H. in the resolution, he has adopted, of confining Mubariz-ul-Dowlah as a State prisoner in the Fort of Golconda."

Repeated interviews with the Minister had convinced the Resident about the designs of Mubariz-ud-Dowlah to supersede his elder brother. The Resident had issued instructions that Fakirs and Moulavis who loitered near about the barracks of the Subsidiary Force should be expelled and disallowed to establish contact with the sepoys. The Resident feared that he had planned to suddenly get out of his palae, and to raise the standard of revolt depending upon some of the disaffected sepoys from the Subsidiary force to support him. The Minister after putting the guard had some talk with Mubarizudowlah when Mubarizudowlah is reported to have said that none of his associates had done anything culpable or seditious and that if something could be proved against them he had no hesitation in punishing them. What he resented most was the harassment of innocent persons. The Minister had suggested that Sunder Pandit and Pokharmal were the servants of Mubarizud-Dowlah and that their account books may be checked. Whenever messengers were sent by the Nizam to Mubariz-ud-Dowlah, Mubariz-ud-Dowlah convinced them that he would not go to Golconda unless something substantial was proved against him. In case his guilt was established Mubariz-ud-Dowlah was willing to go to the fort of Golconda on foot. A man like Pir Mohammad was prepared to swear by the holy Quran and to locate some responsibility on Mubariz-ud-Dowlah but some quibbling or other was advanced in a frivolous manner to shake off

the responsibility. The Nizam gave orders for the arrest of Mubariz-ud-Dowlah publicly in Durbar. Wahid-ud-Dowlah and Sharfuddin had gone to Mubariz-ud-Dowlah on behalf of the Nizam to persuade the prince to stay at Golconda. But Mubariz-ud-Dowlah said that the climate of the fort of Golconda did not agree with him. Mubariz-ud-Dowlah added that he only required twelve servants for himself and did not mind the number of soldiers kept on guard around him. The Nizam stated that his step-mothers (like Jahan Parwar Begum) with whom Mubariz-ud-Dowlah was in close touch were importuning the Nizam to desist from transferring him to Golconda. The Resident also appreciated the anxiety of the Nizam to avoid any personal harm to his brother. After the trial of several excuses by which the actual arrest and his transference to the fort could be evaded, a day arrived when specific orders were given by the Minister under instructions from the Nizam. The Minister said that Mubariz-ud-Dowlah should be arrested under orders from both the Sarkars to which the Resident objected by correcting the Minister that, that particular order was exclusively issued by the Nizam in the interest of the safety and welfare of the State. The Resident's report reveals that ". . . . . Moobariz-ud-Dowla's house was afterwards surrounded by numerous Troops, Arab and Patan, and after breaking down one or two gateways, in the course of which a fire was opened from within, and two or three Arabs wounded, the place was entered, and Mubariz-ud-Dowlah found in the courtyard, armed and surrounded by his attendants. He demanded quarter, which was of course granted to him, and he was sent off this morning under a strong guard to the Fort of Golconda."

When the Resident interviewed the Nizam and explained to him how Mubariz-ud-Dowlah was being transferred to the fort, the Nizam quietly observed, after a few minutes' silence, that he would have cared little for his brother's hostile acts against himself personally, if they were not dangerous also to the Sarkar. "To both the Sarkars" he immediately added and remarked that the two Sarkars were one— "Donon Sarkar Wahid."

The Resident was able to arrest several Moulavis and other persons about whose arrest he was solicitous in consequence of their having been denounced to him even by members of their own party as most treacherous and dangerous

intriguers. Of course it was unfortunate that two important ones had escaped and 46 were arrested. The Resident's anxiety now was to institute a judicial enquiry in the matter on behalf of the representatives of both the Governments, because the persons involved were the subjects of both the States and the offence was directed towards both the Sarkars. The Resident further added that to disarm every suspicion in the minds of the Musalmans that only pro-Wahabist or anti-Wahabist tendencies alone prejudiced the case, a representation of British members on the Commission was essential. The Resident further added that a harmonious collaboration of the officers of both the states would be helpful in understanding each others' view-point and thus arrive at truth. The following remarks culled out from the correspondence are very significant and may be quoted down verbatim:—

11. "The whole transaction will contribute in its further progress and termination, as its antecedent proceedings have already done in no inconsiderable degree, to produce a more familiar acquaintance between the Nizam and the Resident, and to facilitate any intercourse which may be requisite with H.H. for objects connected with the future improvement of the country.

12. "Points of a religious nature, especially as connected with the distinction that now prevails between the Mahometan religion and the reformed or Wahabee faith, will necessarily be brought to the notice of the Committee, and in this respect it will be attended with much and obvious advantage, that the Mahometans of this country generally, who hear of these proceedings, should know that they have been submitted to persons of their own tribe, conjointly with British officers, and not to the latter exclusively.

13. "Proof will be given to the country at large that we not only acknowledge a community of interests between this state and the British Government, but we shall exhibit upon a small scale, what I think it is highly desirable we should begin to do on a more extensive one, a wish to see brought prominently forward and employed, in honourable offices, and united with us in our councils and deliberations, men of rank and respectability among the Mahometans, while we manifest on the other hand an equal determination to punish the vicious and ill-disposed of this race who presume to set themselves in opposition to our Government.

14. "If it be doubted whether inquiry was at all necessary, and whether it might not have been more politic to refrain from agitating the matter, to assume the appearance of insensibility to any danger that may have existed, and to liberate the individuals who are in custody, I must beg with deference to state that I can by no means concur in the view of the case.

15. "I apprehend that disaffection to our Government prevails to a considerable extent among the Mahometans of India, and that pains have been taken to introduce it into our Army, more especially perhaps among the Sepoys of the Madras Establishment.

16. "This affection is derived from no accidental or transitory cause, nor is it inspired by means that may exist today, but for which no ground may be found on the morrow. The sources of the evil I apprehend are more deeply rooted; and the seeds of disloyalty and dislike to the British Government once sown in the heart of the Mahometans, and nurtured by fanaticism and the sedulous inculcation of an intolerant religion, are more likely to receive added strength and extension, than to be weakened by the lapse of time.

17. "Many years must pass away before the Mahometan character is changed, and the professors of this faith become quiet and orderly subjects."

The Resident nominated Major Armstrong to be the President of the Commission and Captain Hutton and Malcolm as the other members representing his Government. The evil designs of seditious and disaffected persons will be found to have culminated only in drawing closer the bonds of friendship which subsisted between the British Government and H.H. the Nizam. It was very unfortunate that the brother of the Nizam should have been the ring-leader in this matter and the Nizam should have felt the cruel necessity of subordinating his natural affections for his brother to his public duty as a sovereign. The Nizam's Government nominated three Muslim gentlemen of high rank and character on the Commission. They were (1) Aijaz-ud-Dowlah, (2) Khurshid Jung, and (3) Benazir Jung.

The Commission sat from 28th June, 1839 A.D. and continued up to March, 1840. The Commission came to the conclusion that Mubariz-ud-Dowlah had been engaged in a conspiracy with the Nawab of Kurnool and had tried to

correspond with the Nawab of Tonk, the Nawab of Rampur and other chiefs with the intention of overthrowing the British Rule. It was the intention of the conspirators to dethrone the Nizam, place Mubariz-ud-Dowlah on the throne, declare him the leader of the Muslims and the successor of the martyr Syed Ahmed. Mubariz-ud-Dowlah and his associates also tried to spread sedition among the Muslim sepoys of the Madras troops stationed in Secunderabad.

The proceedings of the Commission of Enquiry were forwarded by the Resident to the Government of India in May 1840 with the recommendation that Mubariz-ud-Dowlah and ten of his associates be detained. Mubariz-ud-Dowlah was accordingly imprisoned in the fort of Golconda where he remained till his death in 1851 A.D. The following of his associates were kept in custody for long periods:—

1. Moulavi Salim.
2. Lal Khan nicknamed Abdul Hadi.
3. Syed Abbas.
4. Qazi Mohammad Asif.
5. Elahi Bakhsh nicknamed Afzal Ali Khan.
6. Abdur Razak.
7. Pir Mohammad Maulana.
8. Mohammad Faizullah.
9. Munshi Fatlruddin nicknamed Abdur Rahman Khan.
10. Syed Qasim.

The nature of the conspiracy and the course it took can best be analysed by a summary of the proceedings of the Commission of Enquiry given below:—

### *Section 1*

We were ordered to make investigations and inquiries into the case, through a letter dated the 20th of June, 1839, which was compiled in Persian and in English.

### *Section 2*

Our enquiry took a very long time. There are some reasons for this delay. There was a difficulty in finding the facts, and there were many other things which we did not know before. That is why it was necessary to stay the proceedings of the case for some time.

### Section 3

The trial began on the 20th of June, 1839, and continued till the 4th of August, 1839. In this period a short breach in the sittings occurred due to the absence of Major Armstrong who went with his regiment to Kurnool, and the sittings had to be postponed *sine die*. The delay in Major Armstrong's return was due to the fact that he was busy with Captain Malcolm, in Kurnool, in investigating the papers which were discovered there, and many of those papers were in connection with this trial.

The sittings of the Commission again took place on the 21st of January, 1840, but the proceedings had to be stayed up to the 19th of March, 1840, due to the late arrival of the witnesses from Kurnool.

We pardoned some of the people to get information from them but we were not successful. However, there were several reasons connected with the delay in the judgement.

### Section 8

We had lots of discussion with the people verbally as well as through the papers, and several papers came in our perusal. There were official and non-official papers, but the most important was the paper which was sent by Mr. Stones. It showed that these people had evil intentions against the British Government. It also showed that there was a man belonging to Sikh community, who was arrested at Nellore in November, 1838. In the beginning he seemed to be a poor beggar, but later on the police came to know his identity and he was arrested. His name was Dhumdas. He belonged to Sikh community and was a resident of Fateh Gunj. The police identified him very tactfully. He was sent to a trusted person, who, during his conversation blamed the English and thus took him into his confidence. In the meantime this Sikh also disclosed his position. He said, "I have come from the Maharajah of Jodhpur and our intention is to unite all the princes of India and to rebel against the British. Raja Mansingh of Jodhpur is the first among those who have joined us so far. The second comes Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowla, the brother of the Nizam, and before coming to Nellore I had an opportunity to meet him." He placed Raja of Satara in the third position and gave an account of his talks with him. Fourth Gaekwar,

fifth Nawab of Banda, sixth a prince of Afghan origin and a resident of Rohilkhand and seventh was Mansingh, the name of whose State he did not remember; eighth, the prince of Sagar, ninth Raja of Patiala and tenth was the Nawab of Bhopal.

### *Section 12*

The Sikh said that originally Raja Ranjit Singh had no intention of uniting these princes. The delay in his plans was due to the fact that he was waiting for the Russian and the Persian armies to cross the river Indus, and on the arrival of this help he wanted all the princes to attack simultaneously upon the British. Raja of Jodhpur and Nawab of Banda were expected to join Ranjit Singh's army and with the help of the French Regular Forces they were to capture the British fort. The Raja of Satara was to attack Nagpur and Mubariz-ud-Dowlah was to create disturbances inside the State of Hyderabad. Gaekwar according to the plans was to remain dormant in his place. The materialization of this plan was dependent on the arrival of the Russian and the Persian troops on the bank of the river Indus.

The delay in this plan was caused by two reasons: Firstly there was no one capable and trustworthy at Chinnapatnam (Madras); and secondly Mubariz-ud-Dowlah had no standing army.

These were the facts which Mr. Stones collected through the information received from the Sikh. We are all well informed of the duties on which Lal Khan and Faqir Sahib were sent to Bombay. These things show that Mubariz-ud-Dowlah gave an interview to the Sikh, and Mubariz-ud-Dowlah himself committed that this was correct. Other associates of Mubariz-ud-Dowlah committed that Lal Khan was sent to Bombay to ask for military aid from the neighbouring princes.

### *Section 12-A*

The Sikh said that those princes mentioned above were extremely against the British Government, but they had no spirit and power to fight against them. So they were waiting for the Russian and Persian armies on the borders of India to come for their rescue. Mubariz-ud-Dowlah wanted to sit on the throne of Deccan in place of his brother and Raja of Satara wanted to become Peshwa.

### Section 13

Mr. Stones's letter dated the 15th of December, 1839 showed that some more facts relating to the Sikh's statement had come to light. It seemed that Ranjit Singh wanted to capture Nanded from the British. He had sent his agent, Chanda Singh, to the Nizam with an amount of money to get possession over Nanded. But it was learnt that he returned unsuccessful, though still the correspondence continued. It was hoped that when the fight would take place against the British this matter would be settled too.

### Section 15

The Sikh's revelations showed his confession that he had been sent by the Raja of Jodhpur to the princes of Chinnapatn (Madras), and his other companions were roaming about in the country in the garb of devotees. They also had the papers of the same contents which the Sikh had in his possession.

### Section 16

Other spies were busy in the same task. They used to meet often and acquaint each other of the latest developments. Some persons were posted near the river Krishna who used to get the correspondence and compared it with each other. After carefully attesting the real facts it was sent to Mubariz-ud-Dowlah. Later on Mubariz-ud-Dowlah used to communicate these facts to Bombay and Madras. For ascertaining this communication Moulavi Lal Khan and an unknown Moulavi and his son, the residents of Bombay, were sent to Raja of Mysore and Nawab of Chinnapatn (Madras). Mubarez-ud-Dowla had a Moulavi whom he could send anywhere at the time of emergency. Mubariz-ud-Dowlah always used to consult him.

Mr. Stones gave the information about the spies in his letter dated December, 1838, that Mubariz-ud-Dowlah had sent one of his spies Moulavi Lal Khan to Bombay who went to Lahore from there. The other spy Munshi Faqir came back to Hyderabad from Bombay. The people of this place knew him very well. His wife and children were in Hyderabad. He had written a letter to his father-in-law, in which it was written that Nawab Mubariz-ud-Dowlah had sent him to Bombay to preach Jehad. This thing testified the statement of the Sikh. The Sikh said that those spies had got

steel rings on which some words were engraved. The Sikh himself possessed such a ring and some of them were discovered from the Muslims of Bhopal.

### *Section 17*

The person who came from Bhopal was under the employment of the Nawab of Bhopal. According to a letter from Mr. Stones that person had been arrested under the suspicion of being a spy, and an inquiry about him was going on with his master.

### *Section 18*

There was no controversy regarding the statements of Imam Khan and of the Sikh about inviting the princes. The statement of Imam Khan showed that there was great friendship between Mubariz-ud-Dowlah and the Nawab of Kurnool. He was thoroughly decided that when the Russian and the Persian troops would reach India, Bhopal troops would attack the Residency and kill the British. Two regiments of Scindhia were ready to capture Mau, and the princes of Bundelkhand were ready to capture Saugar Cantonment. At this stage Ranjit Singh, Mansingh of Jodhpur, Shah of Persia and Dost Mohammed Khan—all of them were to get well united.

### *Section 20*

There was slight difference between the statements of the spy of the Deccan Imam Khan and of the Sikh. However, both of them reveal that he was dressed in the garb of a devotee and was roaming about in different cities. He used to collect all the news and information, and used to send them to his agent, who, after verifying it by the mark and sign of the letter used to send them to the messengers at Tungabhadra and Krishna, and from there it was sent to Mubariz-ud-Dowlah. From Hyderabad the other messengers used to communicate the news to Nanded, Bhopal and Jodhpur. Whenever these spies were in need of money they used to approach certain people for allotted articles. This was also a peculiar method. They had steel rings and bangles. They used to show them to each other and through them used to get their allotted articles. Imam Khan also says that there was great friendship and unity between his master the Nawab of Bhopal and Mubariz-ud-Dowlah.

### Section 21

There were some more facts in Mr. Stones's letter dated the 20th of January, 1839, which came to be known through Imam Khan. They showed that Mubariz-ud-Dowlah through the 'Kotwal' of Hussainsagar, whose name was not known, used to incite the sepoys of the British Army. Imam Khan said that the Kotwal used to come to Mubariz-ud-Dowla only in this connection.

### Section 22

Imam Khan said that the Nawab of Bhopal also adopted the same attitude and was inciting the sepoys of the British Army for rebellion. There were some people appointed merely for the purpose of raising the sepoys of the Cantonment of Kopkudha against the British.

### Section 23

The third spy was Shaikh Abdullah who had been sent to Nellore from Hyderabad. Some letters were confiscated from him which were addressed to the people of Chanapatam (Madras). Though the letters were brief they indicated a danger of disturbance.

The alliance of Mohammad Saeed, the Naval Captain and the Nawab of Bhopal was sought to have contact with the people of Bombay and Jodhpur. A letter was received from Bombay by Mubariz-ud-Dowlah. All the preparations were complete in Hyderabad, but at Chanapatam no one was ready. It was due to the reason that there was no trusted person to keep contact between Hyderabad and Chanapatam. Some people were sent, but they preferred the fort of Udgir and collected arms and grains to be sufficient for a period of one year. The grain for the next year was going to be purchased.

Shaikh Abdullah also explained why the Persians refrained from their objectives and did not help the Indian Princes. It was presumed that the British Government would send its army against Afghanistan through Kashmir, and it would be the best opportunity for the people of Jodhpur, Bhopal and Bombay to rebel and to send the army to Hyderabad *via* Nanded so that some more people might join it. After conquering Hyderabad they had planned to

proceed to Chanapatan. That was why lot of grain was stored in the fort of Udgir. It was a strong huge fort and the Muslims of that place were well united and the jagirdar of that place was also of their views. The other employees of Shaikh Abdullah who used to bring letters from Hyderabad were Imam Khan and Mohammad Bhai. According to the statement of Shaikh Abdullah, Mubariz-ud-Dowlah had sent a sum of rupees one lakh to the Governor of the Fort of Udgir to store grains, arms and ammunition.

### Section 27

The statement of Jamal Khan did not give any information. This person was arrested in the month of February, 1839. Therefore, here we give the statements of Abdullah and Abdul Razaq who were also arrested in February, 1839. Mohammad Abdullah's statement showed that he knew Salim Khan in Hyderabad who was a trusted person and used to live at Mubariz-ud-Dowlah's palace. With the assistance of the 'Kotwal' Husain Sagar he used to incite the sepoys of the British Army. He knew Mohammad Yasin of Bombay. Mohamed Abdullah's statement also showed that there was a Captain in Bombay who was an arch-rebel.

### Section 28

The other person who was arrested was Abdur Razaq who was a companion of Mohammad Abdullah. He possessed a letter of the Sharif of Mecca addressed to the Nawab of Kurnool. When he was coming to Nellore via Udgir he went to Kurnool, but did not give the letter to the Nawab of Kurnool. Stones thought that though the letter was addressed to the Nawab of Kurnool, it was not meant only for him but for all the Muslims to join this movement and to become well-united.

### Section 29

When Abdur Razaq was arrested at Nellore, two more letters of Maulavi Shujauddin were discovered from his possession, which were addressed to the Nawab of Kurnool and to the Governor of fort Udgir. The contents of the letter were the same as that of the Sharif of Mecca.

### Section 30

After going through the letters so far discovered and inspections of other papers and files the facts which impressed upon one's mind were that these people had no scheme

of sudden rebellion. It was quite evident that the letters which were discovered from Mohammad Abdullah were simply terrifying, and after going through them one is bound to accuse the bearer for treachery. The letters which Abdur Razaq did not hand over in Kurnool had perhaps been kept back by him after showing them to the Nawab to show his own importance to the people. It is also quite clear that everyone knew how important a task he had undertaken.

Maulavi Shujauddin was a most trusted person. In the beginning it was supposed that he joined Mubariz-ud-Dowlah, but the letters show that he was a great admirer of the Nawab of Kurnool. It turns the doubt into certainty that apparently majority of the people seemed to side the British, but secretly they were helping the rebels. Helping the Nawab of Kurnool also came under the same category.

### *Section 31*

In the letter dated the 3rd March, 1839, there was some more information which came to the light through the statement of Shaikh Abullah. It came to be known through Aminuddin that Shah Shuja was also of their views and joined them. Mubariz-ud-Dowlah had correspondence with him. Furthermore, the Nizam and the Minister were angry with General Feroz on some matters. They agreed that when the Persian Army would arrive near the frontier the rebellion should be started. Some noblemen like Nawab Azimuddin Khan and Sirajud-Dowla, son of Munirul Mulk, and other noblemen joined together for this purpose and wanted the permission of Raja Chandulal. Some of them gathered at Chandulal's palace and consulted each other in this connection.

### *Section 32*

The facts mentioned in the above sections clearly show the existing conditions of those days. They also show that the intention of those people was that they should not co-operate with the persons who were loyal to the British Government.

### *Section 33*

The statement of Rahman Beg is as follows:—Rahman Beg left the service of the artillery in the East India Company. He said that within six months Ranjit Singh sent

more than one thousand troops to Mubariz-ud-Dowlah and everyday one or two of them entered the city. There were one thousand Arabs employed by Mubariz-ud-Dowlah. In the city there was a cavalry consisting of about forty thousand soldiers and an infantry consisting of the same number. Mubariz-ud-Dowlah planned to attack the British immediately, but Nasir-ud-Dowlah wanted to wait for some time till Iran, Ispahan, Kabul, Qandhar, Herrat, Rome, Russia, Zamindars of Bhadrachalam, Paloncha and some more Indian rulers might also join up. Mubariz-ud-Dowlah had correspondence with them, and he had an intention of starting a revolution immediately. That was the point on which both of them disagreed. The Eighth Regiment of Alwal in the Nizam's territory was on the side of Mubariz-ud-Dowlah. Rahman Beg had thorough knowledge of these facts because he was an employee in the palace of the Nizam.

### *Section 35*

Among those spies who were arrested at Nellore there is one Ghulam Ahmed, son of Sultan Bakhsh. Formerly he was a servant in the house of Palmer. Later on he became the servant of Mubarez-ud-Dowla. His statement showed that he was sent to Karnatak by Mubarez-ud-Dowla to incite the people against the British Government. Ghulam Ahmed said that Mubarez-ud-Dowla had employed him for this purpose three years ago. He also said that when he reached Hyderabad from Kurnool everything was settled and well-planned, but suddenly the landlord of Udgir informed that some spies had been arrested. Ghulam Ahmed further said that Mubarez-ud-Dowla had sent him to Bombay, Jodhpur, Gwalior, Bhopal, Calcutta, Madras and Kurnool for his own purpose, to create disturbance over there. He had talks with responsible people of those places and many of them joined him.

Here we put in a few sentences from his statement and conclude this part. Ghulam Ahmed said that the landlord of Udgir was a pious Musalman, who loved Mubariz-ud-Dowla very much. Mubarez-ud-Dowla had given him one lac of rupees to store grains. Everyone in Hyderabad had been strictly ordered to keep quiet and not to mention this to anybody. Furthermore, Mubarez-ud-Dowla had an army of about one lac troops but it was not in the city of Hyderabad.

After going through the written facts of Mr. Stones and statements of the witnesses some points became quite clear. There were certain facts which need no particular attention. Dhumdas, the Sikh, and Ghulam Ahmed were arrested. The fact was proved that there was some strong master and officer under whose instructions they were working. They possessed the same sort of Persian papers and steel rings. Though after the discovery of these articles there might be a suspicion of some facts, but when this coincidence occurred it provided full proof that they were concerned with the same personality. Moreover, the papers which were discovered from Mubarez-ud-Dowla also certified the facts because the method of identification proved to be the same. Two witnesses said that the spies of Mubarez-ud-Dowla had a particular thing for identification, and for communications the identity was absolutely necessary.

The witness number one Haji Ismail gave the information about the rings. He belonged to Madras and was a servant of Mubarez-ud-Dowla since last twelve years. He said that Mubarez-ud-Dowla supplied rings to his army to distinguish it from the British East India Company's army. One more witness was Haider Saheb Hakim, a resident of Secunderabad Cantonment, who often used to go to Mubarez-ud-Dowla's palace to meet Lal Khan surnamed Abdul Hadi. He usually found him writing letters and many Wahabis used to gather there. Every Wahabi used to wear a ring, made of steel, in his left hand, and kept a figured paper as an armlet.

Shaikh Abdullah's statement also clarified the fact that Mubarez-ud-Dowla had two servants, Shaikh Imam and Mohamed Bhai, whose duty was to bring letters to Mubarez-ud-Dowla.

There was a description of a general petition relating to the facts of Mubarez-ud-Dowla and the landlord of Udgir. One thing to be considered is that Mr. Stones's statement did not prove whether the armlets and rings discovered from the possession of Shaikh Abdullah, Ghulam Ahmed and Dhumdas were also discovered from the possession of any person of Nellore.

Apart from this we were certain in our minds that there was a master of these people for whom they used to

work. When the spies of Nellore were arrested a great event took place in Afghanistan and many papers published a false report that Russian and Iranian troops reached Herat. This shows that this sort of a report could not be baseless.

It was quite likely that all the princes mentioned here might not be involved in this conspiracy, but the appointment of the spies could not be wrong and the person who employed them was present.

It was absolutely incorrect that the Nizam and the Minister were involved in this conspiracy and there were any preparations going on to fight against the British.

Though the real motive in appointing the people for this task and for sending the spies all around was to be discovered, yet it was proved that it was some high dignitary who organised the scheme and posted the spies. This high dignitary was no one except Mubarez-ud-Dowla. All the spies had direct contact with him and all the Muslims jointly with the help of the Russians and the Persians wanted to annihilate the British from India.

Particularly this point could not be ignored that the news published in the newspapers about the Russian and the Persian troops were exactly those which we could gather from the statements of the spies. The letters which were confiscated also bore the accounts of these facts. Accordingly in the letter dated December, 1839, written by Atiqullah Faqir who was formerly a servant of the Nawab of Kurnool, it was stated that the troops of the Shah of Persia and that of Russia had jointly defeated the British and they had retreated up to Kabul. After that there was no news for a month. Later on Atiqullah wrote to the Nawab of Kurnool that the British wanted Hyderabadi troops to be sent to Kabul, but the Nizam refused.

There was also an account of a plan which was discovered after the arrest of Mubarez-ud-Dowla. It was in the possession of Faizullah, the seal-bearer. It was mentioned in the plan that Mohamed Shah had captured the fort of Brat, which was formerly occupied by Shah Kamaran, and at that time Mohamed Shah held an army of about one lac soldiers at Brat. The Russian army consisting of about forty thousand

men with an artillery was at a distance of about ten miles from the Indian frontier.

These facts were mentioned here to show that the Persian and the Russian troops were ready to penetrate into India. The statement by the businessmen of the Carnatic also supported these accounts. The letters of these businessmen showed that due to the great disturbance many difficulties had arisen in trade. 1

After going through all those facts we came to the conclusion that the trial should be divided into two categories. The first should be the statements of the witnesses which were connected with the activities and attitude of Mubarez-ud-Dowla, and the second the activities and plans which deal with the Maulavis and other people. They were the persons whose list was received and there were some persons who were arrested during the trial. It was essential to consider those statements of the witnesses one by one which dealt with the activities of Mubarez-ud-Dowla. So that when put together we might be able to judge whether the charges put on Prince Mubarez-ud-Dowla were correct or not.

The verdict should be pronounced after examining the case from the following points:—

- (i) The correspondence of Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowla with the princes of India;
- (ii) Mubarez-ud-Dowla's conspiracy to incite the sepoys of the British Army to rebellion;
- (iii) His efforts to unite all the Wahabis; and
- (iv) The Wahabis' insurrection.

### *Section 61*

The statement of the prisoners showed that Mubarez-ud-Dowla had direct correspondence with the princes of India; and the trusted servants of the Nawab, Lal Khan nicknamed Abdul, Faqir Mohamed, etc., were sent to Bombay and other places and the princes had sent the letters promising their assistance. The Nawab of Bhopal, the Nawab of Kurnool, the Raja of Satara were the outstanding ones among them, and it was proved that all of them along with Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowla were actively working against the British Government. There was no written proof of these facts and the proof regarding correspondence of Mubarez-ud-Dowla with other princes was an oral

one and not a written one. Only his correspondence with the Nawab of Udgir, Khan Alam, a relative of the ruler of Chanapatan, the Nawab of Tonk and the Nawab of Kurnool was proved in black and white.

The attitude of a landlord Abbas Ali Khan in regard to the incitement of the sepoys of the British Army and the means adopted to release Shaikh Abdullah show that the sepoys were incited to rebel against the British Government. The strong fort of Udgir was selected for this purpose because this place was a bit far and for creating disturbance in the Carnatic it was very well situated. This place was very good from a strategic point of view as well.

Further inquiries showed that the fort of Udgir was very suitable for keeping arms and ammunitions, and the statements of the witnesses showed that the charges framed against the landlord of Udgir were well proved. On these grounds we decided that the whole estate of Abbas Ali Khan, the landlord of Udgir, should be confiscated by the British Government and Abbas Ali Khan should be deported to some other place.

\* \* \*

After it there was an account of that correspondence that took place between Abbas Ali Khan and Mubarez-ud-Dowla. It had been proved that the charges framed against Abbas Ali Khan were correct and he deserved punishment. Later on Rahmatullah Khan, the landlord of "Annamasamudram" was also charged of being in support of Mubarez-ud-Dowla and the offence was proved. But he was pardoned as he promised to submit some more correspondence which took place between other landlords and Mubarez-ud-Dowla.

Here it was interesting to note that formerly there was enmity between Rahmatullah Khan and Abbas Ali Khan (the landlord of Udgir), but due to the efforts of Maulavi Mehdi both of them forgot their old animosity and co-operated with each other. Dirty tricks were played to gain the Carnatic. Rahmatullah Khan also said that Udgir was selected as a most suitable place to hoard grains to be utilized at the time of disturbances, and when the whole country was captured Arcot was to be handed over to Mubarez-ud-Dowla.

There was great co-operation between Rahmatullah Khan and Abbas Ali Khan. Rahmatullah Khan was also informed that Mubarez-ud-Dowla was going to send him a sum of rupees one or two lacs, but this amount of money was to be sent secretly but the plan did not materialize.

Rahmatullah Khan's statement showed that in the beginning the armies were to be collected at Kurnool and Mubariz-ud-Dowla himself was to command them. In his opinion Mubarez-ud-Dowla was strongly anti-British and all these schemes were made to create disturbance.

The evidence of Rahmatullah was of great significance as he was himself a member of the insurgents and the whole scheme of Mubariz-ud-Dowla was against the British.

In the preamble there was no space to describe all the facts in detail which were connected with this trial, as it was proved that nearly every person in Hyderabad was either openly or secretly involved in these disturbances and conspiracies.

One more point which bears testimony to the charges put on Mubariz-ud-Dowla is that two servants of his, one of whom was Shaikh Abdullah, used to carry letters from Hyderabad.

It was already proved that correspondence was going on. This showed that Mubarez-ud-Dowla had organized a machinery for secret correspondence and it showed that Shaikh Abdullah was working under his directions.

As we wanted that all the facts and charges put upon Mubarez-ud-Dowla should be described in detail, we described all the correspondence which was carried on with different persons.

In the beginning Jan Alam came. Then the letters were received after two months from Khan Alam Khan of Chinapatan (Madras), Vilayat Ali of Calcutta, Abdul Hakim and Qazi Yusuf of Bombay, Moulavi Mohammed Ali of Allahabad and Moulavi Ishaq of Delhi. In Hyderabad the letters were written by Moulavi Salim, Abdul Hadi Abdul Razaq and Syed Abbas and were despatched through Waliuddin, a teacher at Chaderghat. In the previous month of Moharram, Ahmed Khan who was a trusted messenger, brought a letter of Khan Alam Khan to

Maulavi Salim. It gave the description of disturbances created at Chinnapatnam.

\* \* \*

After it there was a description of some more letters of Khan Alam Khan. It was proved by the statements of Ahmed Khan and Maulavi Faizullah, the seal-bearer, that there was an agreement between Mubariz-ud-Dowla and Khan Alam Khan for creating disturbance.

### Section 87

In our first sitting Haji Ismail had said that Maulavi Salim introduced Abdul Hadi, who was a newcomer, to Mubariz-ud-Dowla. Abdul Hadi had said to Maulavi Salim, "Everything is ready in Tonk and Nawab of Kurnool's support had also been gained. You are delaying just for nothing". Maulavi Salim replied, "Nawab Mubariz-ud-Dowla cannot be prepared to carry on the scheme so soon. The matter should be dealt with calmly."

Mohamed Ali was one of the other witnesses who gave the details of the negotiations which went on with Wazir Mohamed Khan, the ruler of Tonk, and Maulavi Naseeruddin etc. and were connected with "Jihad." A Maulavi was sent by Mubarez-ud-Dowla to Sind because Mohamed Ali Jawed said that the Nawab of Kurnool had also joined this conspiracy and unless the Maulavi reached Sind no one could be aware of it.

The third witness was Fakruddin who said, "Syed Abbas Ali Khan had spoken to the Nawab of Tonk about the pecuniary side of the affair and said that he was a follower of Syed Ahmed and had given financial assistance to Naseeruddin." In our file we have got a statement that Mubarez-ud-Dowla had sent some messengers to Sind. There was a likelihood that Abdul Azim had been sent to Sind. He was a trusted servant of the Nawab of Tonk. In the beginning he approached Naseeruddin as a messenger of the Nawab of Tonk and later came to Mubariz-ud-Dowla.

When Mubarez-ud-Dowla sent Qazi Asif and Pir Mohamed to Sind, they met Abdul Azim on the way and sent all the letters through him to Mubarez-ud-Dowla in Hyderabad. These letters were valuable documents relat-

ing to the correspondence of the Nawab of Tonk and Mubarez-ud-Dowla. There was a letter in which the Nawab of Tonk suggested to Mubarez-ud-Dowla to accept the title of "Raisul Muslimin," and to raise the banner of "Jihad", and to preach Wahabism to the Muslims of India.

### *Section 90*

There is a letter without any date which is supposed to be written by Abdul Azim in Bombay and probably was sent from Sind in those days. He writes that he met Abdul Hadi and Pir Mohammed. This indicates that probably this letter was written in the beginning of 1838. The letter also says that Maulavi Salim came safely to Naseeruddin from the camp of the rebels (Mujahidins). Maulavi Hafiz Abdul Azim, a resident of Rampur, safely delivered the letters of Maulana Hazrat Naseeruddin to Nawab Wazir-ud-Dowla Bahadur and to other princes of India. The reply of these letters had not been received till that time. It suggests that a private interview should be arranged with Raisul Muslimin and he should be informed about the facts. It was necessary for the person concerned to talk to Nawab Sahib and to continue the correspondence. He would be extremely glad to know the news about Mujahidins. All the Muslims of India were praying day and night. By the grace of the Almighty the Emperor of Delhi and his heir-apparent had also joined this group. Thank God that the preaching and the propaganda were carried on successfully, and the representatives of the Imam were taking oaths of allegiance in his name. In every place and village Khalifas were appointed and they were busy in carrying on their work. The numbers of the followers were increasing day by day and there was every hope that Muslims would be victorious.

The letter also gives some reference to the letters of the Nawab of Tonk. Probably they were the same letters which were mentioned previously.

There is also a letter addressed to Mubarez-ud-Dowla which bears no date but it refers to "Risalat Jihad" which was published in the month of Shawwal, 1253 A.H. (1848 A.D.) by the nephew of Maulavi Halim.

There are some letters of the same category which contain some information about the Nawab of Tonk and Abdul

Azim etc. They also give some facts about Qazi Asif and Abdul Halim.

The statement of Mohamed Mukhdoom showed that Abdul Azim came to Hyderabad in June, 1839, and through Syed Abbas had an opportunity of meeting Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowlah. It showed that Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowlah was master and certainly he nursed a spirit of rebellion against the British Government.

### *Section 96*

The inquiries made during the case and the evidence procured reveal that there was no doubt that Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowlah and the Nawab of Kurnool were united, and the arms and ammunitions which the Nawab had collected clearly indicated that some very high post was going to be allotted to him.

The witness Haji Ismail said that Maulavi Salim used to receive letters from the Nawab of Kurnool regularly. Maulavi Salim was a representative of Mubarez-ud-Dowla. Once in the presence of the witness Maulavi Salim told Mubarez-ud-Dowla that such and such letter had been received from Ghulam Rasool Khan (the Nawab of Kurnool) and asked what reply should be sent to him. Mubarez-ud-Dowla told him to write, "I will also come out within a fortnight. He need not worry." After that Maulavi Salim wrote a letter and handed it to the messenger who had come from Kurnool and whose name was perhaps Abdul Qadir.

Another statement showed that one day Maulavi Salim and Abdul Hadi were walking in a garden and Abdul Hadi said to Maulavi Salim, "The Nawab of Tonk and the Nawab of Kurnool, both of them are ready. Mubarez-ud-Dowla is delaying the matter just for nothing." Maulavi Salim replied, "Mubarez-ud-Dowla is not a whimsical person. He does everything after considering it seriously. That is why this delay has occurred." This person did not give any further information regarding the co-operation of the Nawab of Kurnool and Mubarez-ud-Dowla, but he said Syed Abbas had come from Sind and Maulavi Salim had told him that after sending a reply to the Nawab of Kurnool a reply to the Nawab of Tonk would be sent.

The witness Ellahi Buksh said that under the instructions from Mubarez-ud-Dowla he went in disguise to Kurnool, Mysore and Srirangapatnam to incite the sepoys of the British Army to create disturbances.

Another witness named Chanda Sahib of Secunderabad had said that he saw a person named Imam Khan at the palace of Mubarez-ud-Dowla who had kept letters in his turban. When he asked him from where he had come, he replied that he had come from Kurnool and also confessed that he had letters in his turban.

Though we tried to get written evidence about the unity and co-operation of Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowla and the Nawab of Kurnool we could not get any. So far only oral evidence was available, and that was through a letter which was supposed to be of the Nawab of Kurnool addressed to Mubarez-ud-Dowla. But there was no convincing proof about it.

The facts mentioned by the Resident about the Nawab of Kurnool on the 23rd August, 1839, certified the fact that the letter was not an original one. Here we briefly express our views.

### *Section 103*

It is regrettable that when brother of the Nawab of Kurnool brought the copy of this letter to the Resident, his statement was not taken, though he himself received the letter from the bearer. In this trial the Resident has referred to the letter of the Nawab of Kurnool's brother. Here an account of that is given.

### *Section 104*

The facts related by the brother of the Nawab of Kurnool to the Resident and in our presence differ greatly in dates. At one place it is May, 1839, and at the other some other date is given about the siege of Mubariz-ud-Dowla's palace. This difference in dates is quite significant. In this connection the facts relating to the siege of Mubariz-ud-Dowla's palace are also given which occurred on the same dates, *e.g.*, the illness of Mubarez-ud-Dowlah at Mustaid-pura; arrival of an old woman at Mustaidpura after her illness and about her death. In all these incidents there is great controversy about dates.

### Section 106

In this trial there is a description of this old woman and her armlet. We have found the armlet but we could not get any details of her interviews.

It is said that the armlet was fastened on the old woman's hand, and she seemed to be terribly worried about it. In spite of much persuasion the old woman did not say anything about it. The amulet was shown to the jewellers. They said that the amulet should be put in fire and its composition would be discovered by the change of colour. So it was examined by that method but the colour did not change. When the amulet was found, its colour was black and this shows that it was in the possession of the old woman from a long time and could not be a new one.

### Section 109

The seal on the documents contained the word "Allah Al Nasir." On the seal of Alaf Khan, the father of Ghulam Rasool Khan (the Ruler of Kurnool), the same words were engraved. Ghulam Rasool Khan got this seal and probably used it for his own papers.

### Section 110

There is every likelihood that the seal of Alaf Khan may be in the possession of Ghulam Rasool Khan. It could be possible, as father's seal could be kept by his son. Consequently, Syed Ali Khan who was the wisest among the three brothers agreed with this point. We think that the seal was a forged one. When the members of the Commission enquired about the seal, Syed Ali Khan replied that the father's seal should be with his son.

To find out if the seal was an original one or just an imitation we procured the services of three experts of this profession. We asked them only about the seal without entering into other facts. They said that it was not an original one but a forged one. When further inquiries were made through them, they said that the impressions of an imitated seal disappear very early whereas the marks of an original one remain for a longer time. So we and the Commissioners of Kurnool think that the seal was made of "Kaddu" and was a forged one. Consequently the written testimony of this letter which had been submitted proved to be a forged one because of the forged seal. These false documents seem

to be an outcome of the machinations of the brother of the Nawab of Kurnool, Pirzada and Mahdi Ali Khan. When no written proof had been obtained but only oral statements, it became doubtful whether there was any correspondence between Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowlah and the Nawab of Kurnool.

After excluding it the only statement which is quite clear is that of Haji Ismail. It is concerned with Maulavi Salim and Mubariz-ud-Dowla. But considering the fact that Haji Ismail gave that statement due to the compulsion of the brothers of the Nawab of Kurnool and Mehdī Ali Khan, no further importance can be given to it.

### *Section 115*

We have no doubt about the statement of Haider Sahib except about the part which says that Imam Khan went to the palace of Mubarez-ud-Dowla and brought a letter from Kurnool. It does not show clearly whose letter was sent to whom. Whether Imam Khan was a spy of Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowlah or of Kurnool is also not clear.

### *Section 116*

Due to all these reasons, which we have mentioned above, and after further investigation and inquiries, we have come to the conclusion that the Nawab of Kurnool possessed arms and ammunitions. There is no doubt that the witnesses had given statements of co-operation between the Nawab of Kurnool and Mubarez-ud-Dowla, but all of them are without written proofs.

### *Section 117*

There was a charge against Mubarez-ud-Dowla that he was in direct correspondence with some landlords of Udgir, Khan Alam of Channapatna and the Nawab of Tonk, but there were no documents available on this point. Still the agreements which had been put in this regard certified the facts and there remained no ground for any doubt.

### *Section 118.*

The negotiations which were going on between Mubarez-ud-Dowla and other princes and landlords were so clear

that they required no further evidence or proof. It was proved that letters used to come and were handed over to Maulavi Salim. Maulavi Salim was no employee of Mubarez-ud-Dowla. He used to meet him every day and talked to him. Therefore it could never be believed that Mubarez-ud-Dowla was ignorant of all these things

### *Section 119*

The account of the Nawab of Tonk's letters has already been given, especially of that letter which was sent through Maulavi Halim, and was brought by Abdul Azim to Hyderabad. This showed clearly that negotiations were going on much earlier, and both of them were in direct correspondence with each other. In one of the letters it was written that a certain person had been appointed as messenger in some other place, and used to get his salary from Mubarez-ud-Dowla at that time. When Abdul Azim had come to Hyderabad Mubarez-ud-Dowla had permitted him to stay in his palace. This fact certified that a correspondence was going on between the Nawab of Tonk and Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowla.

### *Section 120*

In the light of all the evidence mentioned under clause I of the charge sheet, the charges which were put upon Mubarez-ud-Dowlah that he had correspondence with other people seemed to be true. The abovementioned facts definitely prove that Mubarez-ud-Dowla had correspondence with the landlords of Udgir and Khan Alam of Channapatna. He had similar correspondence with the Nawab of Tonk. In our first sittings we have declared that this was treasonable correspondence against the British Government. Therefore the charge rests upon Mubarez-ud-Dowla that he had treasonable correspondence with Khan Alam, the Nawab of Tonk and the landlord of Udgir against the British Government. There is no doubt about it and further proof is not at all necessary.

### *Section 121*

Though we could not get the full proof of the fact that Mubarez-ud-Dowla was in direct correspondence with the Nawab of Kurnool, and it is still a subject of doubt, we cannot ignore the fact that there was an armoury at Kurnool

which was set up according to the wishes of Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowla, and arms were accumulated there. Therefore there is a possibility of an amity between Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowla and the Nawab of Kurnool.

Now we come to the third charge put upon Mubarez-ud-Dowla which claims that he tried to create a spirit of hatred against the British Government among the sepoys of the British Army.

### *Section 122*

We have already dealt with the fact that incitement was created among the troops against the British by the spies who were arrested at Nellore. In our previous sittings we have already given an account of the methods which were used by the spies for inciting the troops against the British Government. After going through the statements of these spies we came to the conclusion that some people fanatically, in spite of their miserable condition, tried to spread hatred among the sepoys of the British Army in Secunderabad, but failed in their efforts.

The statements show that Mubarez-ul-Dowla through the Kotwal of Hussain Sagar tried to raise the army against the British and appointed Maulavis who gave sermons in the mosques where the soldiers used to say their prayers. In the sermons they used to say that it was blasphemy to serve the British, and tried to incite them by different means. Mohamad Abbas even informed Mubarez-ud-Dowla that the troops were ready and were waiting for his orders. Mohamad Sulaiman's statement shows that Maulavis used to come to the mosques, held religious discussions with the people there, and rebuked those who were serving under the British. They were told that to serve under the infidels was a great sin. They used to recite a long poem for inciting the people for "Jihad". It is as follows:—

1. With the praise of God and the Holy prophet this pamphlet is written for inciting people to the cause of "Jihad" (the holy war).
2. This war is meant for the sake of religion and not for conquering the cities; and this kind of war is called "Jihad" by the Muslims.
3. Here we are telling you about the blessings of "Jihad" which are mentioned in the Quran and the Hadith and you should remember them well.

4. **Oh Ye Muslims!** It's your duty to fight against the infidels. Be prepared for "Jihad" if you are devoted to your faith.
5. **He whose feet are smeared with the dust of the field of battle is exempted from the fire of hell.**
6. **The Muslim who fights for a moment for the cause of truth is promised an abode in Paradise.**
7. **Oh! my brother in Faith! Heed to this Hadith of the Prophet, that "the Gardens of Paradise are under the shadows of the swords."**
8. **If any one donates a hundred for this cause with a genuine heart, his reward will be seven times greater on the day of resurrection.**
9. **He who gives provisions to a Mujahid (a holy warrior) will win an equal reward from God.**
10. **He who gives donations for "Jihad" and fights personally on the field of battle will get a reward seven thousand times greater than his efforts.**
11. **He who neither gives money nor takes part in the battle will receive a punishment from the Almighty.**
12. **A martyr never dies but is blessed with eternal life and rejoices in the Gardens of Heaven.**
13. **All the sins of a martyr are forgiven because he is slain in the service of God.**
14. **A martyr is exempted from the agonies of the grave and the tortures of the resurrection.**
15. **God loves the holy warriors who stand firm in a field of battle like a wall.**
16. **O Muslims! Now you have heard the blessing of "Jihad"! Rush towards it and give up the considerations of your homes and families.**
17. **Get rid of the love of wealth and children and proceed happily towards the way of God.**
18. **The wealth or your offsprings are of no use after death and they cannot extricate you from the miseries of hell.**
19. **If you return alive from "Jihad" then you will regain the pleasure of the company of your family, otherwise you will enjoy the blessings of Heaven.**
20. **Islam is losing its strength and is going to be subdued by the faithless.**

21. Islam always remained predominant due to the power of the sword; and you will be blamed if it loses its grip over the world.
22. How long will you lead the life of a worthless man? Alas you will get no return for your idleness except a perpetual sorrow.
23. Now be brave; give up this cowardly behaviour; follow the example of your leader and kill the faithless.
24. Oh Muslims! thank God that after twelve hundred years you are getting the chance to take part in a holy war.
25. So long the Muslims were worried about not having a good leader. Now they are fortunate to have a leader who is a descendant of the Holy Prophet.
26. Listen my friends, I am giving you a good advice; this is the time when you should make use of your swords and kill the infidels.
27. Even the priests should deposit their books and should rush to the field of battle with sword.
28. This is the time when you should offer your lives in the way of God; pedantic speeches are no good. So you should think of nothing but of your swords.
29. You are a religious leader. You should be the first to march forward. There will be many others who will be guided to this path in your leadership.
30. Oh Saints! Who teach self-sacrifice to others, "Jihad" is the best form of sacrifice.
31. Oh Preacher! Don't hesitate to fight, like an ailing woman. Give up your prayers in seclusion and proceed for "Jihad".
32. Oh Young men, who possess the strength of world renowned wrestlers attack like a lion. When will your bravery be of any use, if not now?
33. If you are slain or if you slay some one, in either case you are the winner.
34. If you killed your enemy then the victory is yours; and if you are killed then you are sure to become a martyr.
35. One day or the other you will have to face death, and your soul will depart from your body.

36. When death is inevitable, it is much better to die for a holy cause.
37. Many return alive from the field of battle and many die in their homes.
38. When the time for death is fixed, Oh wise men where is the wisdom in being afraid of death.
39. No one dies before the time of his death, and when death comes he will not be spared even in his own home.
40. If you are brave then you should not be afraid of the hardship of a journey and should have no regard for worldly pleasures and comforts.
41. A man with a strong will power can do the greatest things he intends to do and can give up all worldly considerations.
42. You see thousands of people give their lives for worldly avarice and not feel sorry at all to do so.
- 43-44. It is a surprise that you are called Muslims and yet you hesitate to fight for God. You are sunk in worldly pleasures and have forgotten your Creator in the love of your wife and children.
45. How long are you going to hide in the corners of your houses due to the love of your family and how long can you escape death acting like this?
46. If you fight in the way of God to-day, then tomorrow the eternal bliss of Heaven will be yours.
47. If you will give up the pleasures of life for the sake of God you will rejoice in Heaven forever.
48. Is it better to die at home in all sorts of ailments and sufferings or to sacrifice life in the way of God?
49. If you will hesitate to die for this noble and holy cause you will have to be ashamed of yourself before the Holy Prophet.
50. There is only one condition that you should obey your leader wholly and solely, otherwise even taking the sword will not be of any use.
51. The efforts of one who takes part in "Jihad" for his selfish gains are absolutely futile and his sacrifices worthless.
52. Those who really obey God and the Prophet always obey the orders of their leader.

53. Oh Valla (the Poet)! for a wise person only so many words are enough. Now you should conclude your message with a prayer to God.
54. Oh Lord of the Heaven and the Earth, enable the Muslims to fight in thy way.
55. Give thy help to the Muslims and make them strong and give thy assurance for victory.
56. Islam may flourish so much in India that no voice except thy name may be heard on its soil.

\*       \*       \*

In this connection we herewith submit the statement of Mohammed Osman, the butcher, about Maulavi Mohammad Abbas and Syed Abbas. He says, "Maulavis gave a wrong impression of religion and tried to compel the congregations for "Jihad". They asked them to fight against Ranjit Singh and other infidels, and said that Kamaran Shah and Dost Mohammad Khan were helping the "Mujahidins". One day some army people were also with me in the congregation at a mosque. Syed Ahmed said that it was a simple act to serve the infidels. He asked the people to join the army of "Mujahidins" and declared that in that condition God would help them and would provide for their needs. Mohammad Osman also said that he came to know about the resignation of all the soldiers of the 37th Regiment and narrated Syed Ahmed's statement which he had given in a mosque. That statement was:—"It is sinful to work under the infidels and it is binding on every Muslim to join the army of Mujahidins." The same things were said in the mosque of Buddan Sahib and a magazine called "Jihad" which was published in Bombay was circulated among the congregation by a Maulavi. In this magazine it was written that Mubarez-ud-Dowla was a nobleman, and every one should help him. Every Muslim should help Islam and the security of the religion and the world could only be maintained through the sword etc., etc. There was also an account of the statements of some of the people who said that stipendiary employees of Mubariz-ud-Dowla used to preach and propagate "Jehad." Maulavi Abdur Razaq who was a Secretary of Mubarez-ud-Dowla and some others used to speak about Wahabism in their sermons and forced the gatherings to follow it. In this connection a person named Mohammad Jaffar, who was a seal-bearer of Shums-ul-Umra, Amir-e-Kabir, (who was a

great nobleman of Hyderabad), came to Mubarez-ud-Dowlah and said that five hundred of the people of the British Army were ready to obey him. Mohammad Akbar who was a brother-in-law of Mubarez-ud-Dowla said that there were only two hundred, and a report from Amberpet of the same kind declared that there were six or eleven hundred people.

### *Section 137*

However, these were all rumours as mentioned above. Mohammad Ismail was also induced for this sort of a statement.

• We wanted to get some report from the army men who were present at that time in the mosque. For this we called many of the army men and enquired from them, but they said that they had no knowledge of any disturbance or inducement.

We asked about the way in which people were induced and Muslim soldiers were persuaded for "Jihad." It seems impossible that the soldiers who went for prayers in the mosque were so ignorant of all these facts. Their attitude showed that they adhered to these preachings and proved themselves disloyal to the Government.

The statements showed that Muslims were forcefully persuaded to join this sect; their religious fervour was invoked; they were persuaded to stop serving the infidels.

These were the lines which the Wahabis had adopted and there was no doubt that Mubarez-ud-Dowla had joined this movement. Other Muslims were also induced to join this sect.

### *Section 141*

It is difficult to find when Mubarez-ud-Dowla joined this movement, but it is clear that he associated himself with this movement from the past few years; and the persons who joined this movement used to get a monthly allowance between Rs. 12/- to Rs. 100/-.

It came to be known that in those years some Maulavis went for a tour. While they were going

they pretended that they were going for a pilgrimage to Mecca and returned after a long time. In fact they went to Sind and other parts of India and carried letters with them secretly and had secret meetings with the people concerned. All the statements of this kind are just oral and no written proofs of them are so far available.

Thrice the people from Mubarez-ud-Dowla's palace went for pilgrimage. They got permission and money from him, but there is no written proof of his orders or permission. Once a party of about forty to fifty "Mujahidins" lead by a paid Maulavi left for a tour. This party left Hyderabad at the expense of Mubarez-ud-Dowlah. They reached Sholapur and preached in the villages and persuaded people to take oath and follow their creed. From Sholapur they reached Bombay and stayed there. Mubarez-ud-Dowla used to bear all the expenditure. From Bombay they reached Karachi by ship and went from there to Hyderabad (Sind). They had an interview with the responsible people of that place and from there went by ship to . . . . . They took along with them a sealed and signed letter of Maulavi Naseeruddin which was concerned with fighting against the Sikhs.

### Section 146

In this connection it is absolutely wrong to say that they were fighting the Sikhs just to help Naseeruddin. But it came to be known that they met Naseeruddin on behalf of Mubarez-ud-Dowla, and after giving him one thousand rupees some of them returned to Hyderabad. It is possible that some of them might have gone there just for their personal benefit. Therefore the trial has nothing to do with the point whether they went there to fight against the Sikhs.

It is correct that Mubarez-ud-Dowla had sent a letter with a sum of one thousand rupees to Naseeruddin. The bearer of this letter was Lal Khan, a trusted servant of Mubarez-ud-Dowla.

We do not know the contents of the letter sent to Naseeruddin or the number of letters sent to the people of Iran and Sind. In Abdul Azim's statement it was mentioned that he brought a letter from the Nawab of Tonk and he made it a point for his own arguments that Lal Khan stayed at Mubarez-ud-Dowla's palace on his return from Sind,

and brought some secret letters. But during the siege of Mubarez-ud-Dowla's palace we could not discover such letters. It is possible that this rumour might have been spread for creating an excitement but there is no documentary proof of it.

### *Section 159*

The main point that Mubarez-ud-Dowla was involved in the Wahabi Movement has already been proved not only orally but in writing. His policy was to oppose the British rule for the welfare of his motherland, and to form a Wahabi Government in India headed by himself. In this connection there were some letters of the Maulavis. Though the point has not been fully clarified yet some light is thrown on it. However the theme of the letters is to oppose the Sikhs and to declare that India had become 'Darul Harb', and 'Jihad' had become obligatory for the Muslims.

### *Section 163*

When Mohammad Ali nicknamed Ali Jan reached Hyderabad he was admitted in a school inside the palace of Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowla through Abdul Hadi nicknamed Lal Khan. Abdul Hadi asked him to accompany him to Sind. The letter which Mohammad Ali (Ali Jan) had written from Sind differed in contents from the letter addressed to Maulavi Nurul Huda Padri. In it he had written that there were many associates of Naseeruddin who were busy in the war against the British and the Sikhs. Ali Jan laid great emphasis on the point that a Muslim must fight against atheists and infidels. In his opinion it is more pleasing to God than the performance of other religious duties like prayers, fasting, pilgrimage to Mecca or the payment of religious cesses etc. In his letter he had promised great rewards in order to incite the people for 'Jihad'.

### *Section 166*

We are sorry that Mr. Stones could not procure the other letters of Ali Jan in which he had induced the Muslims of Nellore to rise against the British and had lamented their ignorance and laziness.

The letters of Qazi Asif and Abdur Rahman Beg were also of the same nature. Vilayat Ali had also written letters from Bengal, and had expressed his desire to forward them to Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowlah.

### *Section 167*

These letters show that the Wahabis wanted to inform Mubarez-ud-Dowlah about their success, and wanted to tell him that in Calcutta, Burdavan etc. thousands of people had joined the Wahabi movement.

### *Section 168*

Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowlah had been requested to follow in the footsteps of the Holy Prophet (Mohammad) so that God might bestow upon him the highest rewards.

### *Section 169*

We, herewith, copy a letter of Maulavi Halim in which he induced Mubarez-ud-Dowlah to propagate the Wahabi movement. It showed that Mubarez-ud-Dowlah was to be given the title "Hami-e-Deen-e-Mobin Raisul Musalmin" and Mubarez-ud-Dowla had a seal with this title engraved upon it. The seal which was prepared for him a few weeks before his arrest bore the following titles:—

"Hami-e-Deen Shara Mobin-ud Islam-wal-Musalmin  
Abdul Aziz Mubariz-ud-Dowlah—1255 A.H."

### *Section 171*

This is to show that the joining of Mubarez-ud-Dowla to this movement was supposed to strengthen it very much. Therefore the Wahabis tried their best and succeeded in making Mubarez-ud-Dowlah an ardent member of their movement. Now we give an account of the other charges about Mubarez-ud-Dowlah.

### *Section 172*

The papers which we have so far received and the statements and the evidence of the witnesses show that Mubarez-ud-Dowlah sincerely desired that the British rule in India

should be seriously objected to. He considered that the opposition against the British was essential for the welfare of India. To carry on his plans he was waiting for the time and opportunity, and considered the Wahabi movement a very useful weapon for this purpose.

### *Section 173*

Some incidents of Mubarez-ud-Dowla's life clearly indicate the causes which compelled him to join the Wahabi movement, and also show what was his aim in life. Therefore a short account of his life is given below.

### *Section 174*

Mubarez-ud-Dowla was born in the year 1210 A. H. He was the son of Sikandar Jah, the Nizam III. It is said that in his childhood he did not receive proper education and training, but he excelled in the art of warfare. He was very obstinate; had a rebellious spirit, and strong will-power. At the age of 25 he became a headache to his father, brother and the British Government. In the year 1226 A.H. (1845) his father Sikander Jah interned him in the Golconda fort due to his having caused a disturbance. It is said that once his father desired that a sentry of the British Army might be appointed as a guard at his palace. He replied that he would prefer to die rather than to see a British guard at his palace gate. That is why Mr. Russell had written that Mubarez-ud-Dowla was an anti-British. When Mubarez-ud-Dowla was released from the fort of Golconda and came to his palace in the city he was also ordered like other princes to refrain from correspondence with any one and he was not allowed to move out of his palace.

It seems that the punishment given to the prisoners did not prove fruitful and their way of life and attitude did not change at all.

It also came to be known that in the year 1829 Mubarez-ud-Dowla was involved in the case of the kidnapping of a soldier from Secunderabad. Some landlords were his accomplices and their aim was to overthrow the British Government, to dethrone the Nizam, to kill Chandulal and to obtain the throne. This scheme was disclosed by a

faithful officer and their object could not be achieved. He was again interned in the fort of Golconda and he came back to the city after an internment of about two and a half years. He was given an allowance of six thousand rupees a month and lived at his palace in the city.

We have already stated the fact briefly that since the British Government was busy in an important affair at Kabul and Kandhar many Indian princes thought that it was an excellent opportunity for them to overthrow the British. Mubarez-ud-Dowla knew too that he failed twice due to the interference of the British Government, and this was a good opportunity. The people around him found this the best chance to associate Mubarez-ud-Dowla with the Wahabi movement. A rumour was spread about the arrival of the Iranian and Russian troops and with the assistance of Mubarez-ud-Dowla a disturbance was created with the full hope of success.

### Section 180

The collection of arms and ammunitions by the Nawab of Kurnool, the accumulation of military stores for the warfare by the landlord of Udgir and receiving the documents from Nellore, all these are the proofs that Mubarez-ud-Dowla wanted to organise a pre-planned rebellion. If these things had not been disclosed previously the rebellion was sure to burst up. Even if we overlook these facts it is certain that Mubarez-ud-Dowla joined the Wahabi movement and through it he tried to mislead the British army. His joining this movement was a great support to the Wahabis. The religious fanaticism combined with an ambition for kingship did not allow him to realise his mistake and he could not keep himself away from taking part in the disturbance.

### Section 181.

Hashim Khan in his statement gave an account of his interview with Ellahi Buksh which took place after the siege of Mubarez-ud-Dowla's palace. He induced Shah Wali Khan Jamedar (who was later killed in an action at Zehrapur and was previously an employee of Mubarez-ud-Dowla) to send his army to Hyderabad so that the country might be relieved of this menace. This shows the temperament of Mubarez-ud-Dowla, and here we conclude our judgement with the statement of Hashim Khan.

*Section 182.*

Hashim Khan stated that Ellahi Buksh told him that he started serving Mubarez-ud-Dowla when he was relieved of his services to Maharajah Chandulal. He came to know that Mubarez-ud-Dowla always consulted Maulavi Salim and he used to get letters from Sardar Dost Mohammad Khan, Mahbub Khan and Naseeruddin of Sind. When Chandulal came to know of the activities of Mubarez-ud-Dowla, the latter tried to carry them on secretly. Mubarez-ud-Dowla told him that he got the news of the victory at Kabul and he had won lots of Zamindars of the Deccan to his side. It was decided that when he would get the news of the victory of the persons who were arrested in Sind Mubarez-ud-Dowla would call them up. It seemed that the intention of the Nawab was to create a rising in Hyderabad, because many people in Hyderabad were with him. Hazrath Akber Jah, Sulaiman Jah, Mir Taffuzul Ali Khan, Syed Abdullah Khan and Raja Rao Rambha were with him. It was planned that when the news of the defeat of the British would come there would be a great disturbance in Hyderabad. Nasir-ud-Dowla would be arrested, Chandulal assassinated and Mubarez-ud-Dowla would be enthroned.

*Section 184.*

This statement need not be very lengthy. As the high class Maulavis were in prison and Nawab Mubariz-ud-Dowla's plans were already stated in details, there was no need of clarifying the statements of the witnesses. Therefore, here we would state the charge sheet of everyone separately.

*Section 185*

As the Government troops had arrested 46 Maulavis at the palace of Nawab Mubariz-ud-Dowla and till then it was not decided who were really the associates of Mubariz-ud-Dowla, all of them were imprisoned, and inquiries and investigation in this connection were also entrusted to this Commission.

*Section 186*

The facts relating to many of them had been known and orders had been issued for the release of some of them on bail and some were released without bail and their activities were carefully watched.

After this only the following ten persons would remain prisoners because their charges were severe:—(1) Moulavi Salim; (2) Lal Khan nicknamed Abdul Hadi; (3) Syed Abbas; (4) Qazi Mohammad Asif; (5) Ellahi Buksh nicknamed Afzal Ali Khan; (6) Abdur Razak; (7) Pir Mohammad Maulana; (8) Mohammad Faizullah; (9) Munshi Fakhruddin nicknamed Abdur Rahman Khan; (10) Syed Qasim.

### *Section 188.*

From the beginning of this sitting we are describing the activities of Maulavi Salim. He was a counsellor of Mubariz-ud-Dowla, and was considered to be a very trustworthy person. He was a very able and learned man. He played an outstanding part in spreading the Wahabi Movement and had full influence over Mubariz-ud-Dowla. He played a great part in inducing the sepoys of the British Army to rise against the British. We think that Maulavi Salim was a great tool in strengthening the Wahabi Movement. It is extremely necessary that he should be watched very carefully and should never be released from prison.

### *Section 189.*

The second person is Lal Khan nicknamed Abdul Hadi who belonged to Ankol in the British territory. After coming to Hyderabad he gained lot of influence over Mubariz-ud-Dowla and went to Sind as his envoy. He brought letters from there and was sent there again. He stayed at Husain Sagar to mislead the army. When he was turned out from there he stayed with Mubariz-ud-Dowla. In the month of May he was again sent as a messenger. An account has been given of his letter which was read in the mosque at Nellore, and Mr. Stones has also mentioned it in his statement.

### *Section 190*

Syed Abbas belonged to Kandhar which is a part of the British territory. He stayed with Mubariz-ud-Dowla for a long time as a teacher. He was sent by Mubariz-ud-Dowla as a messenger. Among the Wahabis he was regarded a trustworthy person and Mubariz-ud-Dowla also trusted him. Though he was not as important as Maulavi Salim or Abdul Hadi, in our opinion, we had to be very careful about him so that he might not create any disturbance.

### Section 191

Qazi Mohammad Asif was a Qazi at Indore. He spread Wahabism there and created disturbance. Consequently he was dismissed from the post of a Qazi. He came to Hyderabad and joined the service of Mubariz-ud-Dowla and was sent by him as a messenger to Sind. He came back from there in May 1839, and stayed at the Cantonment.

Qazi Mohammad Asif's uncle was Maulavi Abbas who was accused of misleading the army at Secunderabad. Later on he decamped. Due to Qazi Mohammad Asif the Wahabis had a great influence at Mubariz-ud-Dowla's palace, but as he was an old man a remission would be made in his punishment as far as possible. We hope that he will not be treated harshly.

### Section 192

Ellahi Buksh nicknamed Afzal Ali Khan belonged to Thana adjacent to Sarangpur. There is no doubt about it that he was employed by Mubariz-ud-Dowla on secret service. He was responsible for contacting Shah Wali Khan, Jamedar of Kurnool. While he was going on tour Mubariz-ud-Dowla gave him one thousand rupees. The purpose for which it was given is not known. But it shows that he was a very able and shrewd man and was very cunning in carrying out his duties.

His hostile acts against the British Government can be divided under two categories. The first is that in order to mislead the Muslim subjects against the British, he threw a pig in the Kudpa mosque and tried to create a riot. Secondly he tried to associate Shah Wali Khan with Mubariz-ud-Dowla.

These were charges for which the Government might give any punishment it liked.

Abdur Razak, a resident of Hyderabad, had been an employee of Mubariz-ud-Dowla since a very long time and was placed among the Maulavis. He used to get twenty rupees per month. He was a close relative of Qazi Asif and Maulavi Abbas. He was appointed to give discourses on the Wahabi Movement to the sepoys of the British Army and often he used to preach in the mosque there. Abdur Razak wrote a letter which was presented before us. In that letter it was written that three thousand people had come

from Berar to join the Wahabi Movement. As a number of people used to come to Mubariz-ud-Dowla in connection with joining the Wahabi movement we cannot frame a serious charge against Abdur Razak as we have done against other persons before. Therefore, he should be given a milder punishment.

### *Section 194*

Pir Mohammad Maulana belonged to Hyderabad and was a servant of Mubariz-ud-Dowla. He was a very strong and an extremely prejudiced sort of man. When people came to arrest him he wounded many of them. Pir Mohammad was one of those who went to Sind with Qazi Asif and brought letters from there to Hyderabad. We cannot say that Pir Mohammad was sent by Mubariz-ud-Dowla, but it is clear that he was not a servant of any other person. This person should be given lesser punishment than that to be given to the five persons mentioned above.

### *Section 195*

Mohammad Faiz, the seal-bearer, belonged to Hyderabad. He was one of the servants of Mubariz-ud-Dowla. The severest charge upon him was that he engraved the seal of Mubariz-ud-Dowla's titles. As this thing was against the Government he could be punished appropriately.

### *Section 196*

Munshi Fakhruddin belonged to Nellore in the British territory. He was in Mubariz-ud-Dowla's service for a few days. As Dhoondas, the Sikh, told Mr. Stones, he went to Bombay with Lal Khan nicknamed Abdul Hadi and came back to Hyderabad with some letters. He should be imprisoned till further orders are issued because it seems as if this person was Mubariz-ud-Dowla's agent and had the style of a Maulavi. As there was no offence proved against him, in our opinion, he can be released on security.

### *Section 197*

Syed Qasim Hakim was a servant of Mubariz-ud-Dowla. The facts regarding him are the same as those about Fakhruddin. He went with Qazi Asif to Sind and while returning he was arrested at Sholapur. He might also be released on bail.

### *Section 198*

Our report became quite a lengthy one and we could not avoid it. As the reproduction of these papers was impossible we had to give a detailed account of all the events and of every bit of evidence. If we had not done it our report would have been incomplete and useless. As a thorough perusal of files was also very difficult it was extremely necessary to state at least the essential facts.

### *Section 199*

Considering the vast amount of information which we received this report was a brief one. The great work of investigation and inquiry entrusted to us, required us to go into the details of every fact and to scrutinize everything. The Government had appointed us for the inquiry of this important case. Therefore, after a painstaking examination and thorough scrutiny of the facts we have expressed our views.

\* \* \*

### **SUPPLEMENT TO THE WAHABI MEMORANDUM**

The first thing to be noted in this period of two years was the letters received from Khan Alam Khan of Channapatam (Madras), Vilayat Ali of Calcutta, Abdul Hakim and Qazi Yusuf of Bombay, Maulavi Mohammad Ali Khan of Allahabad and Maulavi Ishaq of Delhi. These letters were usually addressed to Maulavi Salim, Abdul Hadi, Abdur Razak and usually came by post through Waliuddin who was residing at Chaderghat. In the month of Moharram Ahmed Khan of Kurnool brought an important letter of Khan Alam Khan to Maulavi Salim. In that letter there was an account of an insurrection in Channapatam. It said that a clerk was killed for writing a seditious letter. There was also an account of the affairs in Hyderabad in Khan Alam's letter. Ahmed Khan stayed in Hyderabad for four or five days and carried back a written reply from Abdur Razak.

### **F. (81)**

There years ago, Ahmed Khan of Channapatam joined the service of Mubarez-ud-Dowla, and went to Bombay with Syed Abbas who was also a servant of Mubarez-ud-Dowla. After returning from there he stayed at Mubarez-ud-Dowla's place. Mubarez-ud-Dowla used to bear all

*his expenses. Then he went to Kurnool and from there to Channapatam. It seemed that he came from Channapatam several times and sometimes Mohammad Bhai and Shaikh Imam, (the account of them has been given above), also accompanied him.* Mohammad Mukhdoom's statement showed that Syed Abbas wanted to find out if there was any progress in matters (at Bombay) and had asked Khan Alam to let him know the conditions there.

The members of the Commission asked Mohammad Mukhdoom to tell them the situation inside the palace when the letter of Khan Alam Khan was received. His reply did not yield any useful information.

#### *F. (82)*

Mohammad Faizullah, the seal-bearer, who was a servant of Mubarez-ud-Dowla, in reply to a question, completely denied the report about Khan Alam Khan's letter, but, when pressed confessed that one day Mehdi Ali Khan told him that Khan Alam Khan had written a sealed letter to Mubarez-ud-Dowla, and Ellahi Buksh had brought that letter.

#### *F. (83)*

The Commission called Mohammad Mukhdoom on the 29th of June 1839, and compared his statement with that of Abdur Razak. Abdur Razak gave all the details about the letters of Khan Alam Khan and the messages sent to him. Mohammad Mukhdoom repeated his previous statements. Abdur Razak also received letters from Vilayat Ali and Khan Alam Khan. In one of the letter there was mention of the names of three or four Maulavis.

#### *F. (84)*

Abdul Hadi's statement already showed that there was correspondence between Mubarez-ud-Dowla and Khan Alam Khan. He said that Maulavi Salim used to receive Khan Alam Khan's letters by post. These were the events of one and a half or two years. He was acquainted with Khan Alam before that and Maulavi Salim received a letter from him three years before. In that letter Khan Alam Khan praised Maulavi Salim. Maulavi Salim had written three or four letters to Khan Alam Khan, the replies of

which also he had received. Abdul Hadi also admitted that Abdul Hakim had written two or three letters to Khan Alam Khan from Bombay. Abdul Hadi also said that Mohammad Ali Khan's anti-Wahabi activities and his visits to Naseeruddin displeased Khan Alam Khan.

**F. (85)**

There was also much material relating to Khan Alam Khan's letter in the file. Mohammad Saleh who was a brother-in-law of Abdul Hadi gave a statement on the 7th of July, 1839. Mohammad Saleh was a resident of Wangol in the British territory and got a stipend from Mubarez-ud-Dowla. He said that he knew Ahmed Khan who used to bring Khan Alam Khan's letters. He also added that Abdul Hadi came back from Sind in the month of Safar, 1255 A.H. and went to Kotlah (Mubarez-ud-Dowla's palace). Mohammad Saleh on seeing him asked, "where were you?" He replied, "I have brought a letter of Khan Alam Khan addressed to Maulavi Salim; and I have come from Channapatam."

**F. (86)**

In the beginning of our memorandum we have stated the fact that there was correspondence between Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowla and the Nawab of Tonk (Nawab Wazirud-Dowlah and that the latter was involved in the Wahabi Movement. This was sufficiently proved by the witnesses. Also the letters which the Bombay Government received from the house of Abdul Hakim certified the fact that Abdul Hakim was the Maulavi who was living in Bombay and he used to get his salary from Nawab Mubarez-ud-Dowla (for propagating the wahabi creed).

As a result of this enquiry conducted by the Commission as set forth above, Mubarez-ud-Dowla was detained as a state prisoner in the Fort of Golconda and his associates were also detained in custody. Their position in Jails was none too happy. They petitioned for their release but this was of no avail. The condition of these prisoners attracted attention in the press. The composition of the

Commission, the procedure adopted in the enquiry and the recommendations of the Commission were alike brought into question in 1841 and 1848. The following are a few extracts from *Hyderabad Affairs* containing the criticism made by the papers of the day and asking that injustice done in their cases should be set right.

(*'Examiner', February 11, 1841*)

“THE IMPRISONED WAHABEES AT HYDERABAD

“ We have lately heard some particulars connected with the case of the Wahabees tried at Hyderabad some time since, and as we are of opinion that much injustice is being done under a mistaken idea of the views and wishes of the British authorities, we are particularly anxious to bring the case to the notice of the Supreme Government, as the parties themselves are too poor and their friends too timid to do so directly by way of memorial.

“ It is obvious that no injustice was or could have been intended by the Resident, but late events have fully satisfied us that he does not understand the Court of Hyderabad, and that consequently his measures do not provide against the injustice which the Native Government perpetrates from mistaken impressions regarding his views.

“ The Hyderabad Wahabees were tried by three Commissioners—Messrs Armstrong, Malcolm, and Hutton,—and three native gentlemen of the Durbar, the three latter being of course mere ciphers, as well from their inferior ability as from their want of independence, and their perfect knowledge that should they incur the displeasure of any British functionaries the Minister (as in his constant policy) would be sure to manifest his concurrence in that displeasure; and his manifestations on such occasions are very cogent. The above named three officers, as officers and gentlemen, are of course beyond any suspicion of wilful injustice, or even severity, in such a case; but still we think that the prisoners might very fairly have objected to being tried by the two first, being the same persons who, in their capacity of police officers had procured or collected the information on which the Wahabees were tried, and who may therefore possibly have had a feeling of *esprit de corps*, influencing them to maintain the correctness of their information, or their own vigilance or that of their subordinates. At all events they undeniably had first heard only

the unfavourable side of the story,—a circumstance self-evidently calculated to create an unfavourable impression,—and on this ground alone any English prisoner would certainly have objected to such judges.

“ The result was that the British Commissioners desired the release of some 30 or 40 of the prisoners as innocent, saying nothing as to the others, and consequently leaving it to be inferred that they were guilty.

“ We will conclude that there were strong grounds for considering them guilty, for otherwise we are sure that no British gentlemen would, even by implication, have lent themselves to their conviction. What strikes us as the main blot in the proceedings is this, that while English officers took a prominent part in the trial, no sentence was pronounced against any of the prisoners, either by these English officers or even by the natives associated with them. All that was done was to send the proceedings to the Minister (which, we are assured for a fact, he has never looked at), and to leave him impressed with the opinion that some ten or twelve persons, now confined in irons, were convicted by English gentlemen of endeavouring to raise a rebellion against the English Government, and that the best incense he can offer to that Government, and the best proof he can give of his devotion to its interests, is to show no lenity to the prisoners.

“ The consequence is that they will be allowed to remain in Jail, fettered as they now are, for the rest of their lives, unless the Supreme Government should be pleased to notice the case, and direct that some specific sentence should be passed upon them—not by the native Government, but by the Commissioners who tried them.

“ As more than two years, we believe, have now elapsed since they were first confined, we would venture to suggest that the demands of justice have been pretty nearly satisfied already. The best course would probably be to submit the whole proceedings to the Advocate-General for his opinion, in which case, we think, a remission of all further punishment would be the most probable result. Let it be recollected that of nearly 300 Thugs tried by Colonel Stewart at Hyderabad, though all were found guilty, not one was executed—a circumstance attributed at the time to the judges of the Supreme Court having decided that the proceedings did not warrant a legal conviction.

“ Neither Thugs nor Wahabees, even if innocent, would have known how to defend themselves in a Court constituted according to English forms, and we have no reason to suppose that any of their judges acted as counsel for any of the prisoners on either occasion.

“ Of the Minister’s implicit deference to the *supposed* wishes of a Resident, in cases like the present, we cannot give a better proof than by relating (we speak only from recollection) a circumstance which occurred during the Residency of Mr. Russel. A native had slain another either in absolute self-defence or under circumstances of the very greatest provocation. He surrendered himself to an English gentleman, and the Resident ultimately sent him to the Minister to be tried. The Cazee, on hearing the case, acquitted him, but the Minister sent back the prisoner, saying, “ What do you mean by not executing him? the Resident sent him to be punished.” The Cazee, or Court, remonstrated, but the Minister sent to tell them, they must at least sentence him to lose an arm. Fortunately the Resident heard what was going on, and sent to tell the Minister that, so far from wishing for the man’s execution, he thought the Court quite right in acquitting him. He was released immediately.

*Ex Uno Discit Omnes*

“ In conclusion, we will only once more to express our hope that the Supreme Government will look into this case, and either lay the proceedings before their Advocate-General, or call upon the British Commissioners who tried the unfortunate prisoners to pass some specific sentence upon them.”<sup>1</sup>

(‘*The Englishman*’, October 31, 1848)

“ We have another letter from Hyderabad, from which we make the following extracts:—

“ The case of certain Wahabees who were committed about ten years ago to the utmost horror of all horrors, the Nizam’s prison, is very deplorable. They were charged either with a conspiracy to overthrow the Nizam’s Government, and to place his brother Moobariz-ud-dowla on the musnud, or to subvert the English Government. It is a curious feature belonging to this place that even charges

1. *Hyderabad Affairs*, Vol. V, pp. 4-6.

against persons who have been brought to trial and sentenced to punishment are not distinctly known nor to the convicted parties the sentence awarded. At least the Wahabees profess ignorance in respect to the sentence passed upon them.

“ They were tried by a commission of three gentlemen, officers of the Company, and three native noblemen; of the former, two of the commissioners were the parties, police officers, upon whose information principally they were brought to trial. The Court was held within the Residency.

“ In common with all other matters it is not understood whether the officers of the Company formed part of the commission to try the prisoners, or whether they were prosecutors, or assessors—not to pass or direct a sentence, but to regulate the trial.

“ I do not think them to have formed part of the commission, for nothing can be more invalid, more cruel, or possess more of the character of barbarism, than to make men judges of their own charges, but I shall even believe this, irregular and cruel as it is, to be put secondary to the reason for their not being commissioners, namely, that English gentlemen would not have pronounced an indefinite sentence, nor punished with such extreme severity, especially as similar offences tried at the time in the Company’s dominions by their Courts, I believe, were never visited upon conviction with more than two year’s imprisonment.

“ It was a disadvantage to the prisoners that the English gentlemen did not form part of the commission, and were there in any other capacity, a circumstance which necessarily marked a more than common interest adverse to the prisoners in the proceeding; it might have saved the innocent, the palpably innocent, but upon the guilty it was equally certain to bring down measured punishment, for the conspiracy was to subvert the British Government. The Mussulman judges, who desired such a consummation in no less degree than the persons they tried, would have had a motive, beyond a mere compliment to their English co-adjudicators, to express by the punishment they inflicted a more than common aversion for the crime, and indeed a question being incautiously asked by one of the English party of a Moulvee (Saleem, I believe), then on his trial, as to

whether the Koran did not enjoin the overthrow of infidel governments, received the appropriate answer that 'that point could be equally well explained to him by his fellow judges, the Mussulmans.' With this feeling severity was left to them as the only alternative.

" Men who have been confined for ten years, you may suppose, did not neglect to make supplications all around them. From Raja Chandoo Lal the invariable reply was that they could not be released without the sanction of the Resident, from the Resident that he had nothing to say to the matter. I have recently been shown a copy of an endorsement to the petition of one of the prisoners, given under Acting Assistant Resident's hand, that as they have been confined by the orders of the Governments (Sirkarein) the Resident cannot interfere. This is hardly logical, but the acknowledgment that the British Government (it is hardly possible that, soliciting aid, the Wahabees would use forgery) is a party to their imprisonment makes it a case for the consideration of that Government. If it ever knew mercy—and where does mercy exist if not in the minds of liberal English gentlemen?—this is a case for the exercise of it. Its own judges and laws do not inflict misery so heavily. Let the punishment of the Wahabees be of equal measure with the punishment their Courts have inflicted upon Wahabees similarly situated, and let it be borne in mind that their prison-houses are paradise to the prisons of the Mussulmans of Hyderabad, and that Wahabees have sustained the further misery of all that consignment to the imprisonment of Hussun Ali Khan, a man cruel by nature and a bigoted Sheeah, the cause of the disturbances in the last Mohurum by his bigotry could add to their sufferings. "<sup>1</sup>

The Wahabee prisoners seemed to have been released sometime before 1854. Mubariz-ud-Dowla, however languished in prison till his death in 1854.

The Wahabee conspiracy in Hyderabad is an important landmark in the history of the Freedom Struggle. That it was a part of the wide-spread conspiracy and insurrection which the followers of Syed Ahmed launched through the length and breadth of India will be apparent to the students of the history of that period. The sympathy which the fate

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1. *Hyderabad Affairs*, Vol. V, pp. 86-87.

of Mubarez-ud-Dowla attracted in Hyderabad shows how deep were the anti-British feelings existing in the Deccan at that time. The Nizam and his Ministers being completely submissive to the British, Mubarez-ud-Dowla with his violent anti-British feelings became the centre of a group of people who planned these insurrections. In the history of Hyderabad between 1800 and 1857 the names of Raja Mahipat Ram and Mubarez-ud-Dowla stand out as leading participants in the country-wide Struggle for Freedom.

#### APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XII

A few letters and notes of relevance to this Chapter are reproduced below.

The following communication from the Resident to the Supreme Government reports the death of Mubariz-ud-Dowla<sup>1</sup>:

“To . . .

G. F. EDMONSTONE ESQUIRE,  
*Secretary to the Government of India,  
 Foreign Department,  
 Fort William.*

*Dated, Hyderabad, 26th June 1854*

SIR,

I beg to acquaint you for the information of the most noble the Governor-General of India in Council, that Mubariz-ud-Dowlah died last night in the Fort of Golcondah.

2. This person was the third illegitimate son of the late Nizam Secunder Jah, and consequently a brother of the present Nizam. He was confined as a state prisoner in the Fort of Golcondah in 1840, for having been engaged in a plot with the Wahabees, against the British Government and that of His Highness the Nizam.

I have, etc.

HYDERABAD RESIDENCY,  
 26th June 1854.

Sd/- G. A. BUSHBY,  
*Resident.*

\* \* \*

1. The Hyderabad Residency Records, Vol. 98 (1854-1857).

Shah Wali Khan, a Rohilla chief in the service of the Nawab of Kurnool, who was killed in an action, had before his death entrusted to one Hussain Khan the following petition to be delivered to Mubariz-ud-Dowla. However, the petition remained undelivered and was later on traced by the agents of the Nizam's Minister on the suggestion of Major Armstrong<sup>1</sup> :—

“ Translation of a petition addressed to the Hoozoor Poornoor (the resplendent presence) by Shah Walee Khan.

After compliments.

It is represented that your slave is at present residing at Kurnool, and that 300 Rohillas, his personal followers, are with your slave. As in this country there is no other protector (but yourself) may the great God keep your presence in peace and comfort till the day of Judgement. Your slave now represents that by the favour of God, that exalted personage is a discriminator of worth and that your slave is desirous of advancement. Another matter is this. A Mansubdar came to this place and made your slave acquainted with the affairs of the circar replete with bounty and that your slave should come quickly with whatever Rohillas might be in readiness to the number of one or two thousand. Your slave was making arrangements for providing these men when it was reported that the “ Hoozoor Poornoor ” had proceeded to the Fort “ Golcondah.” Your slave could make no reply. If the orders of my lord are now issued your slave will bring with him followers and attend on you, or if you order your slave, he will in some way or other present himself in the presence. May its exalted shadow endure for ever. Your slave is in expectation of a reply. Pardon whatever fault your slave may have committed.

Verses

Although I am distant from the shrine,  
I nevertheless prostrate myself.  
I can perform my prostrations to a distance.  
Adoration may be offered,  
Whether the Kabah be near or remote.

I am your slave with the ring in my ear.  
 You have the power to exalt me or to sell me.  
 Everyone has a protector, I have none.  
 I have none with the exception of that  
 exalted presence."

\* \* \*

While in prison, Mubariz-ud-Dowla addressed a letter to the Resident. This letter and the connected notes which passed between the Resident and the Nizam's Minister at the time are reproduced below<sup>1</sup>:

"Translation of letter addressed by Major-General Fraser Officiating Resident at Hyderabad to H.H. the Nizam's Minister dated the 9th November 1839.

After compliments. I have now the pleasure to return the note; as it is written in this note; that H.H. had observed to Moobariz-ood-Dowlah as follows: "You have committed no fault against me; I am helpless; the Feringees have confined you," I therefore write to inform you that although on reading the above I could not for an instant imagine that H.H. even made such an observation, yet as you in returning the note did not allude to this statement, I have thought it necessary to ask you if any grounds exist for what Moobariz-ood-Dowlah has stated in his note.

Translation of a note addressed to Major-General Fraser officiating Resident at Hyderabad by Moobariz-ood-Dowlah.

O my brother the Sahib Aleeshan, may the peace of God be with you. Do me justice, seeing that during a period of five days I have been suffering from a pain in my throat and back and have tasted neither food nor water. I have caused a representation to be made to H.H. to the effect that as I had arrived at this state he would have compassion on my condition. The (following) is H.H. reply "You have committed no fault against me. I am helpless. The Feringee has confined you." In consequence of this I now turn myself towards the Saibi Aleeshan in order that he may

1. The Hyderabad Residency Records, Vol. 75 (1839-1840).

send a respectable officer in the Company's service to me to see my condition with his own eyes and observe what strength is left to me. In this place (I experience) an excessive degree of misery which cannot be described in writing. May God not award such a fate to any one. Saib Bahadur have compassion on my condition and solicit H.H. to release me from imprisonment.

Verse

What is difficult is made easy by your favour  
 What is easy made difficult by your forgetfulness.

Translation of a note addressed by the Minister to the officiating Resident.

After compliments. The disaffection of Moobarizoo-Dowlah is known to the World. There is no necessity for recapitulating all that was written in the numerous notes I have been favoured with from you, or what you stated in the interview with H.H. and the observation which H.H. made during the above interview.

What assertions has Moobarizz-Dowla ever made approaching or near to the Truth that there should be any grounds of truth in what he has now written. The note is returned enclosed for your perusal."

## CHAPTER XIII

### REBELLION IN THE RAICHUR DISTRICT

#### THE BADAMI OUTBREAK

In May 1841 General Fraser received reports from Captain Jackson of the Contingent stationed at Makthal that bodies of insurgents were gathering in the district of Raichur at Deodurg under an Arab known as Koharan. The Nizam's Government ordered troops against them but it appears that instead of marching against the insurgents the Hyderabad troops placed themselves in friendly communication with them.

The following letter from the Resident to Lord Elphinstone of June 11, 1841 gives in detail the nature of the proceedings in this case<sup>1</sup>.

"We have, just now, had another proof here of the volcanic character of the soil on which we tread. About six weeks ago, vague reports reached me that some Arabs and other vagabonds were assembling in the Nizam's country, at or near a place called Deodurg, in the district of Shapore; and, almost day by day, their numbers were said to have increased, though no one knew under whose orders they were acting, or with what ulterior designs.

"the Minister ordered down some of the Government Troops to seize or disperse them; but the detachment, far from executing the prescribed duty, placed themselves in friendly communication with the insurgents. At length, an inroad upon the Company's territory began to be spoken of; and, determining therefore to defer no longer, I ordered the 4th Regiment N. I. to march immediately from Muktul, and the undermentioned forces to move forthwith from Bolarum:—

6th Regiment Nizam's Infantry.	2 6-pounder guns. 81 in. mortar.
3 Troops N. Cavalry.	2 5½ in. do.
2 5½ in. Howitzers.	A small party of Pioneers.

1. General Fraser's *Memoirs*, pp. 115-117.

“With this force I was going down myself, and within four and twenty hours should have been *en route*, when I received an express from the Political Agent in the Southern Maharatta country, apprising me that the insurgents had suddenly entered the Company’s territory, seized upon the unoccupied fort of Badamee, plundered the town, and murdered many of the inhabitants. He added that a large military force had been ordered against them.

“Now, it was no business of mine to go in quest of adventures on the Company’s territory. I therefore countermanded the movement of the Bolarum force, and confined myself to sending one of the Nizam’s N.I. to the frontier, for the purpose of co-operating with the Company’s authorities in any measure that might be deemed expedient against the insurgents. At the same time I ordered the troops of the Nizam’s Cavalry which I had at Bolarum, with four troops, or half a Risalah, from Mominabad, to move down immediately, by forced marches, to join the 4th N. I. I also ordered more Cavalry, to the extent of a complete Risalah, or eight troops, to be held in readiness to move from Mominabad on a requisition of the Collector of Sholapore.

“I have further offered the Political Agent in the Southern Maharatta country any aid he may require from me in Artillery or any other arm. The Collector of Sholapore has availed himself of the power vested in him, and has written to Brigadier Blair to send half a Risalah of horse for the protection of this district.

“Here matters are in suspense; and I am daily in expectation of hearing that hostilities have commenced. Badamee is an extremely strong place, and I hope that the military authorities in the Southern Mahratta country have sent thither a considerable force, especially of guns. The Nizam’s Cavalry, if they arrive in time, will be the most useful arm when the insurgents shall have been driven out of Badamee.

“It is supposed, but not certain, that the insurgents are acting under the orders of an emissary from the ex-Rajah of Sattara, although the Resident there has not yet been able to obtain any authentic information on the subject.

“The insurgents have plenty of money; and the leaders (an Arab Jemadar named Kohran, and a Brahmin) pay their followers very high rates. The estimates of

their number vary from 500 to 5,000. Of these fellows there is, of course, no real fear; but I should be somewhat apprehensive of the insurrectionary spirit spreading, and gaining over the other Mohammedans. These gentlemen I distrust; and I therefore regard it as highly important that this seditious movement should be immediately quelled, before gaining further head.

“ I have again suggested to the Supreme Government to remove all the foreign mercenary troops, especially the Arabs, from India, assured that they are most dangerous to the peace and tranquillity of the country. There are perhaps, 5,000 Arabs in the Nizam’s territory alone, of whom probably 3,000 are collected at Hyderabad. The whole of this race are banded together in strict union; and I received the other day, a report that, had I moved down with the Bolarum force, 600 Arabs from the city had determined to instantly join and reinforce their insurgent brethren in arms. Orders are now given to put to death any Arab who shall attempt to leave the city for the purpose of proceeding to the scene of disturbance; and every measure of precaution that I can devise has been taken to seize any of the rebel force endeavouring to escape, after expulsion from Badamee, into the Nizam’s country. ”

In reply to this letter Lord Elphinstone wrote as follows<sup>1</sup> :—

“ Madras, June 22, 1841

“ My Dear General,—Your kind letter has been most acceptable, for I had no other information of the disturbances beyond the Toombuddra, except the reports which reached the Collector of Bellary, and led him to detach parties of Cavalry for the protection of our frontier. I hope that this singular outbreak may now be considered at an end, and that I may congratulate you upon the fall of Badamee and the capture of its garrison. Walter Elliot, who is just returned from sea, knows the place, and describes it as a most formidable position,—once invested, however, there was no escape, according to him, for those who had trusted to its inaccessibility; they must have been caught, as in a trap.

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1. *Ibid.*

"What was the motive of this attempt at insurrection? Was it a remnant of the ostensibly Wahabee movement? Or was it instigated by some petty chief who had his own cause of discontent, and no very precise idea of how he could show his teeth? At all events, your plan of expelling all the Arabs and foreign mercenaries of every nation from India, is a sound and politic measure, and I trust it will be adopted. Equally so appears to me your idea of stationing a portion of the Nizam's Regular Force in the South-West angle of his dominions. It would cut off in times of disturbance the Maharatta Chiefs from the disaffected in the Nizam's country, and thus prevent a dangerous combination and it would protect the districts in which it is located, as well as those south of the Tungbudra, from the raids and forays to which they are now occasionally exposed. I hope that the Kurnool Sowars will in time become a useful body of troops for this purpose, in patrolling the southern bank of the river."

On the 16th of June General Fraser in his letters to the Governor-General's Private Secretary and to Lord Elphinstone reported the re-capture of the fort of Badami. The insurgents were led by the Arab named Koharan and Narsing Rao. These along with 100 Arabs were taken prisoners by the Contingent troops. It was not possible to find out who was the real originator of this insurrection. It was rumoured that the conspiracy was fomented by the partisans of Pratap Sing the deposed Raja of Satara but no real proof for the rumour was forthcoming.

After the re-capture of the fort of Badami the Contingent forces were divided into several detachments, which were in pursuit of the insurgents until the end of December 1841. Brigadier Blair then returned to Bolarum with the Sixth Infantry, 4 guns, the first Company of Artillery and half a troop of Cavalry to Lingsugur.

Here is another letter from General Fraser, the Resident, to Lord Elphinstone dealing with this insurrection<sup>1</sup>:-

Hyderabad, 25th July 1841.

"I have now no more certain knowledge than I had two months ago who was the real originator of this criminal enterprise; and it appears by a private letter which I

1. General Fraser's *Memoirs*, pp. 117-118.

received last night from the Political Agent in the Southern Mahratta country, that though he has possession of both the Brahmin Narsing Rao, and the Arab Jemadar Kohran, he yet labours under just the same ignorance as myself. I do not think the Minister Chundoo Lall possesses any real information either. He has several times mentioned the name of the Rajah of Sattara, and upon one occasion distinctly stated that he was the author of the mischief. But the ridiculous and insufficient grounds on which he made this assertion will be seen in the translations of three notes that passed between us on the 13th and 14th instant."

After the Badami outbreak General Fraser proposed to the Government of India that he should be allowed to request the Nizam's Government to destroy the hill forts in the country so that they could no longer be used by free-booters and insurgents. To this the Government of India replied in October 1841, as follows<sup>1</sup> :—

" Under present circumstances it was not the Governor-General's desire that he should authorise any measures for that purpose. Where the stronghold of a free-booter or a rebel, against whom it had been found necessary to employ troops commanded by British officers, had been occupied, it might be right to destroy it, and to take precautions against its being reconstructed, but no more general proceedings were contemplated, or could be sanctioned by the Governor-General."

" When, indeed," continued the despatch, " circumstances may call for our direct interference in the management of the country it will then be perfectly warrantable and expedient to insist on the disuse of means of defence against an authority, the just use of which will be within our own control."

" You will be sensible from the whole tenor of the policy of the Government in connection with the Hyderabad Residency, that it is not intended to force on any change of our position with respect to the Nizam's dominions, but only to watch the course of events, and to provide for the exigencies which may occur, as the actual state of facts and a just regard to all claims may render necessary."

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 121-122.

On this despatch General Fraser remarks as follows<sup>1</sup> :—

“ Such was the general conception of a dignified and enlightened Imperial policy when Lord Auckland was Governor-General and Mr. (afterwards Sir Herbert) Maddock Secretary to Government in the Foreign and Political Department; and this was very little, if at all, modified during the whole period that General Fraser occupied the post of Resident at Hyderabad. It really amounted, if properly analysed, to nothing more than this, —that the great duty of the Resident was to see that the Contingent was regularly paid, or was, at any rate, not more than four months in arrears; and that every precaution being taken, and every advantage seized, to secure the pay and permanence of the Contingent. All the diseased places in the Nizam’s territory, even those that were dangerous to the general health of the Empire, might be left to fester and to inflame, until some pretext was afforded for our ‘direct interference in the management of the country’. Then, and not till then, it would be ‘warrantable and expedient’ to use the ‘authority’ that would be ‘within our own control’ for the reform of abuses and the redress of grievances ”.

It will thus be seen that the Government of India was not so much interested in reforming the abuses in Hyderabad as in securing the permanence of the Contingent.

1. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

## CHAPTER XIV

### DISAFFECTION IN THE SUBSIDIARY FORCES

In 1842 alterations were made in the scale of pay of the subsidiary forces stationed at Secunderabad. The Madras Sepoys of the subsidiary forces stationed at Secunderabad refused to take their pay without the additional allowance called 'Batta' which was issued to them hitherto and which was stopped unfairly and arbitrarily. This disaffection became wide-spread throughout south India. General Fraser was of the view that this stoppage of the 'Batta' was unfair. He took steps to deal with the disaffection among the soldiers. He insisted that Government orders for acceptance of pay as authorised should be carried out and that there should be no obstruction in the performance of military duties. The regiments were separately tackled by him with the help of the European soldiers and artillery and Nizam's cavalry on the 7th, 8th, and 9th February, 1842. Discipline was soon restored. The ring leaders of several regiments, however, refused to accept the orders of the Resident to take their pay and return to duty. These were disarmed and imprisoned by the European troops to be tried later by Court Martial. The serious view taken of the disaffection is brought out in the following letter of Lord Elphinstone to the Resident, dated 2nd February, 1842.<sup>1</sup>

"In the meantime, if you apprehend combination, I should not hesitate to break up the Force, at all events, detach any Regiments which are supposed to be determined to resist. You can never be at a loss for pretexts in the Nizam's country. While in the field the troops will of course be entitled to batta, at the end of the campaign, it will be open to the Supreme Government to deal with the question as it likes. I am sorry that the 1st Europeans should be so ineffective—500 men for duty out of 1000 (which is the exact strength given in the returns of the 1st of January) is a very inadequate proportion."

The Mutiny was thus suppressed. In his letter of 13th February, 1842 General Fraser remarks as follows<sup>2</sup>:—

1. General Fraser's *Memoirs*, p. 134.  
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 187-188.

" We are well out of the scrape in which this batta question had involved us; and it will be a lesson to the Court of Directors not to be making any further reductions in the pay of their Native Army. I do not now anticipate the slightest renewal of any commotion here, and some of the Native officers of the 7th and 10th N.I., who have been with me today, have expressed to me their full assurance that the men of their respective Regiments will take their pay without the slightest murmur when tendered to them at the beginning of the next month. The whole of the Native troops here are, in fact, quite subdued; and even if they were not so, we have abundant force to do what we please with them, now that we have got rid of the violent 4th Cavalry, and the insubordinate portions of the 32nd and 48th. "

General Fraser received credit for the measures he had efficiently undertaken to deal with the disturbances among the natives of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Forces. His views that the grievances of the soldiers should be enquired into were not appreciated and General Fraser received a mild rebuff from the Government of India.

The Contingent forces were employed at the end of 1841 in dealing with disturbances in Berar, where Appa Sahib, the pretender to the Nagpur throne, had started a rebellion. There was a general rising near Jalgaon. The insurgents captured the fort of Jamod and established fourteen *thanas* in several forts of Berar. The insurrection was suppressed by 30th December, 1841.

In 1841 trouble broke out at Shorapur in the district of Gulbarga, where the Arab employees of the Raja of Shorapur had created trouble. Their leader, Hannappa Naik had broken out into rebellion. The Contingent troops marched against the rebels on 20th January, 1842. The troops were so placed as to prevent the insurgents from crossing the Bhima river. In the action that followed Hannappa Naik along with his followers fled on the 4th February 1842 but he was pursued and captured in the village of Itkal on the 14th. Thus ended the insurrection in Shorapur.

The rebellion raised by the pretender Appa Sahib in the country continued throughout 1842. This had its effect in the district of Nanded, where the insurgents had occupied the fort of Sawargaon on 25th February 1842. Troops marched out of Hingoli against the Insurgents. On the

2nd of March the fort of Sawargaon was taken. The pursuit of the insurgents continued until 13th of March by which time the rebellion was suppressed.

In the same year insurrections broke out in the district of Gulbarga. Captain Inglis with his second cavalry was engaged in dealing with these insurrections. A fight took place between the Third Cavalry and the insurgents at Takhtal in August 1842 and the insurgents were dispersed.

Disaffection in the Raichur and Mahboobnagar districts persisted throughout these years up to 1845, keeping the Second Cavalry and the Second Infantry from Makhtal busy in restoring order. In 1845 Koilkonda in the district of Mahboobnagar was captured by the rebels; troops marched out against them and the stronghold was recaptured on 29th of August 1845. The rebellion ended with the capture of a number of the insurgents.

Kandhar in the district of Nanded was the seat of a Jagir bestowed on the family of Raja Gopal Singh, who played a prominent part in the Nizam-Maratha relations of the 18th century and died fighting on behalf of the Nizam and against the Marathas in the battle of Rakshas Bhawan in the year 1763 A.D. This Jagir had descended to Hira Singh in about 1844 A.D. As Hira Singh was considered to be an illegitimate son of Raja Jai Singh, the deceased Jagirdar, the conferment of the Jagir on him was resented by the other branches of this family led by Hanumanth Singh, the Jagirdar of the village Dabka. He gathered a sufficient force and attacking Kandhar dispossessed Hira Singh and seized the jagir. It was against Hanumanth Singh that the Contingent troops marched in the year 1857. These troops consisted of the Left Wing Second Cavalry, 5 guns, the Third Company Artillery, and Seventh Infantry. These were placed under the command of Captain Hampton. The troops arrived before Kandhar on the morning of 25th January 1847. Raja Hanumanth Singh refused to surrender; the fire was opened on the Fort on the 26th, when Hanumanth Singh was forced to surrender and the Jagir was restored to Raja Hira Singh.

In 1818 trouble broke out in the Shorapur area again when Rani Ishwaramma headed the conspiracy to cust Captain Meadows Taylor from that place. On his requisition, troops were marched out and Rani Ishwaramma together with 25 leaders of the conspiracy were removed from Shorapur.

Action against Appa Sahib continued in Berar throughout the year 1849.

In the same year rebellion broke out in Bhadrachelam. The Warangal detachment marched against the insurgents on 3rd June 1849 and attacked them on the 10th of June as will be apparent from the following<sup>1</sup>:

"The Warangal detachment under Captain Haworth, consisting of a troop 3rd Cavalry and a Wing 3rd Infantry, marched on the 3rd June against a rebellious Zemadar and his Rohilla adherents. Arriving at Bhadrachelam on the 10th June, Captain Haworth invested the place, giving the rebels one hour to lay down their arms. He then attacked them, and after a few hours' contest in which he lost 3 killed and 6 wounded, the enemy lay down their arms. Captain Haworth died next day of heat apoplexy. The Resident acknowledged this service in the following despatch, dated the 15th June 1849:—

'The Resident begs to return his thanks and acknowledgments to Captain Haworth and the officers and men of the field force under his command, for the manner in which they have executed the important duty of seizing a zemadar, reported by the Nizam's Government to be in a state of rebellion, together with the Rohillas and other adherents attached to him. The locality of the Pagoda of Buddrachellum is such that nothing but a decided and rapid movement of cavalry could have succeeded in preventing the garrison of that place from escaping into the adjoining forests or across the Godavery to its right bank, where their subsequent capture would have been almost equally difficult. But this evil was effectually guarded against by the judicious measures taken by Captain Haworth, and ultimate success was ensured by the excellent and steady conduct of the whole force, cavalry and infantry. Captain Haworth's proceedings in this affair have the Resident's entire approbation, and he begs that he will communicate the expression of the same sentiment to the whole of the force employed under his command on the occasion, especially to Lieutenant and Adjutant Griffin of the 3rd Nizam's Infantry. The Resident's thanks and commendation are equally due to Lieutenants William and Magrath of the Madras Artillery, who, being accidentally on leave of absence at Warangul from the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force to which they belong, joined the field force of the Contingent

1. *A History of the Hyderabad Contingent* by R. G. Burton, pp. 134-135,

on its march to Buddrachellum, and by their spirit and gallantry afforded invaluable aid to Captain Haworth in every department of the service on which the troops under his command are engaged.'"

Notice has already been taken of the trouble in the Bidar district which broke out in March 1852 when the rebellion of Lingappa occurred. This rebellion was put down in the month of April and a number of forts in the district were destroyed. A similar rebellion by Krishna ji Deshmukh of Nangaon or Nandapur in the Parbhani district was suppressed in August 1852.

At the end of the year 1852 the rebellion of Narsing Rao occurred at Ballegaon. Detachments were moved from Mominabad, Hingoli and Gulbarga and the rebellion was put down by the end of December, the same year.

The last general disturbance before 1857 took place in Aurangabad in September 1853, when a severe clash occurred between Arabs and the Contingent troops at Jaswantpura, a suburb of Aurangabad, details of which are as follows<sup>1</sup>:

"On September 22nd 1853, a large body of Arab mercenaries in the service of Mansingh Rao, Raja of Dewalgaon, placed their master under restraint, demanding their arrears of pay, and threatening his life. The Arabs had taken up a position at Jeswatpura, just outside the Roshan Gate of Aurangabad City. The Aurangabad troops under Brigadier Mayne, consisting of the 5th Cavalry, 2nd Company Artillery, and 6th and 7th Infantry moved out to coerce the rebels. A desperate action ensued, the Arabs in the city also being with difficulty restrained from taking the enemy's side, while some of them opened fire from the walls. There was considerable loss on both sides.

In his despatch, the Resident congratulated Brigadier Mayne on his personal bravery, which, he said, 'added to the well-earned fame and renown which you so deservedly won on the hard-fought battlefields of Afghanistan and the Punjab.'

The casualties in killed in this action were, in addition to the British officers, mentioned below:—

No. 2 Company Artillery.—1 man killed.

7th Nizam's Infantry:—1 Jemadar, 1 Naik, and 5 sepoys killed.

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 186-187.

6th Nizam's Infantry:—1 Subadar, 1 Fifer, and 3 sepoys killed.

‘The Most Noble the Governor-General in Council has read with so much satisfaction the report he has received of the severe and gallant affair which has taken place between a portion of the Hyderabad Contingent and a body of Arabs at Jeswantpora, that he must request the officiating Resident to place in General Orders this marked expression of the approbation with which the Government of India regard the conduct of the officers and troops who were engaged on this occasion.

The Governor-General in Council expressed his approbation of this affair in the following terms, under date 19th October 1853:—

The heavy loss sustained on either side affords the strongest testimony of the service which has been so effectually performed.

In carrying by assault a strong position held by Arabs, whose courage and obstinacy of defence are known to all, the troops of the Contingent have well earned the praise which the Governor-General in Council is pleased to bestow on their steadiness and gallantry.

The Governor-General in Council desires especially to record his approbation of the conduct of Brigadier Mayne, who, in command of this detachment, has exhibited judgement and skill and all the soldierlike spirit he has so often shown before.

The Governor-General in Council offers his best thanks to Major Lloyd, to Captain Abbott, and Captain Hare, Brigade-Major, to Captain Shakespear, Lieutenant Vaughan, and Lieutenant Frankland, as well as Doctor Orr and Captain Remington for the part they have severally taken on this occasion, and not less to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the force.

The Governor-General in Council has seen with deep regret that Captain Commandant Parker, and Ensign Bosworth, who volunteered, have fallen in the attack in which they bore themselves so gallantly and well.’ ”

A fuller version of the incident is as follows<sup>1</sup>:

<sup>1.</sup> *A History & Descriptive Sketch of H.E.H. the Nizam's Dominions*, Vol. II, pp. 331-333.

“ In the year 1853 Aurangabad was the scene of a sharp conflict between the Contingent troops and a body of Arabs in the pay of the Raya of Devalgaum. The Raja Mansing Rao, was extravagant to a degree, and was hopelessly plunged in debt. Having allowed the pay of his Arab retainers to fall considerably in arrears, they, about the middle of September 1853, put him under restraint, and threatened to take his life unless he paid up their dues. Destitute of the means of satisfying his creditors, and seeing that his life was placed in jeopardy, the Raja apprised Brigadier Mayne, then commanding the station, of his perilous situation, and that officer, having ascertained the facts of the case, sent a summons to the Arabs to give him up. The Arabs refused, whereupon it was resolved to make a demonstration of the troops in the station in order to bring them to their sense. Accordingly one morning in the first week of October of that year, the 5th regiment of cavalry, 6th regiment of infantry, and a battery of artillery, under Brigadier Mayne’s command, were marched up to the scene of action, which lay near a Hindu temple situate in Jasvanta-pura, just outside the Raoshan gate. Here the Brigadier found the Arabs established in a strong position, and determined to fight. The disposition of the troops having been made, some of the officers sat down to breakfast, near a chabutra, just outside the city walls. While they were thus engaged, an Arab Chaous of the city appeared on the ramparts and upon a signal from him a volley, as unexpected as it was deadly, was poured upon the party of officers and men. In a moment all was confusion. Boswell, of Ahmednagar, who was staying in Aurangabad on leave, and who had bravely volunteered his services on the occasion, received a fatal wound. Some of the troopers were killed. The firing now became general. Lieutenant Vaughan received a bullet wound in the arm, from the effects of which he died some weeks after. Captain Parker, commanding the 6th regiment of infantry, was also killed. After an obstinate resistance the Arabs were defeated and dispersed, and the imprisoned Raja was released. The Contingent troops did not come unscathed in the conflict. Its loss in killed was more than fifteen, and forty wounded.”

The above incident shows the spirit of defiance which more than fifteen, and forty wounded.”

## CHAPTER XV.

### GENERAL FRASER'S EFFORTS AT REFORMS AND THE POLICY OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

General Fraser came to Hyderabad as a Resident in the year 1838. He perceived very early that the Government of Hyderabad was involved in financial difficulties due to the pernicious principle of farming out districts and assignment of revenues for meeting its debt obligations. The expenditure on its irregular army was very heavy with the result that while on the one hand the debts of the State were increasing, there was also an annual deficit of about 60 lakhs of rupees in the State finances. Hyderabad had paid heavily for its financial difficulties when in 1822-23 Hyderabad had to forgo the Peshkash from the Northern Circars once for all to meet its obligation to Palmer & Co. Difficulties on the same scale were mounting up in Hyderabad in 1840-41. There was no attempt at reforming the administration and the uncertain policy of the Residents after the departure of Sir Charles Metcalfe in not forcing Hyderabad to adopt measures of revenue reforms and cutting down expenditure, had brought the administration virtually to a standstill. General Fraser perceived that Chandulal the Minister had outlived his usefulness and that he was the general obstacle to reforms. Chandulal had stood by the British, assisted them in the third Maratha war, agreed to the establishment of the Contingent, had never opposed its increased numbers or expenses and had accepted any and every measure which would benefit the East India Company in any way; but he had never shown any urge to reform the administration. His one aim was to maintain his power with the help of the British.

The Government of India was always reluctant to ask for reforms in the State on the grounds that this would amount to interference in the internal affairs of the State; but where it was the question of the consolidation of the Contingent the Government of India always found means to take strong and effectual measures without any scruples. General Fraser urged constantly the necessity for reforms in the State but this was not agreed to by the successive Governor-General

of his period, *viz.*, Lord Auckland, Lord Ellenborough, Lord Hardinge and Marquis Dalhousie.

General Fraser's first efforts were directed towards the removal of Raja Chandu Lal from his post. This result was achieved when owing to increasing financial embarrassment and the lack of support from the Resident, Raja Chandu Lal made one last desperate attempt in April 1843 by applying for a loan of one crore of rupees to clear off the debts of the State in lieu of assignment of territory yielding 17 lakhs of rupees annually as security for the payment of the debt. This was not agreed to with the result that Raja Chandul resigned in 1843. He was succeeded by Siraj-ul-mulk after a long delay of 18 months. Siraj-ul-mulk's ministry was also a failure as nothing could be done to meet the financial obligations. Meanwhile Lord Dalhousie had arrived in India. After a brief tenure as Minister, Siraj-ul-mulk was removed from his office on 10th of November 1848 and Shams-ul-umara was appointed as minister in his place. Lord Dalhousie continued to insist on the discharge of the debt for the Contingent and would do nothing to accept the Resident's recommendations for reforms in the State. Shams-ul-umara too resigned after a brief period of five months. The prospect of the settlement of debt remained as remote as ever and the monthly payment of the Contingent continued to remain in arrears. Lord Dalhousie directed the Resident to require that the whole amount should be paid by the 31st of December 1850; in case of failure decided steps which would mean the exaction of territorial security for the payment of the amount would be taken. Lord Dalhousie even enquired of the districts which would be useful for this purpose. It was found that these districts would be the Berars. The average annual expenses of the Contingent were about 40 lakhs of rupees; besides this the Nizam's own army consisting of irregulars was costing the Government of Hyderabad double this sum. It was due to this heavy expenditure and also maladministration that the Government of Hyderabad had run into heavy debts. The debts of Hyderabad to the East India Company had by 1850 amounted to 64 lakhs of rupees. The duties of Shams-ul-Umra were now entrusted to Raja Ram Buksh. Even he could not carry on for a long time and after a brief interval Siraj-ul-Mulk was once again made the Minister. The Hyderabad Government had by this time paid upwards of 42 lakhs of rupees under heavy pressure

and a second instalment of about 32 lakhs of rupees had been promised to be paid by the end of October 1851. As by this time, the Nizam had announced that in the reduction of troops contemplated, the Contingent would not be included, Lord Dalhousie decided in January 1852 not to proceed for some time to extreme measures. These extreme measures which had been contemplated were to take over some districts in mortgage as security for the debts. Although this plan was suspended for some time, protracted correspondence went on between the Resident and the Minister on the very partial and imperfect manner in which the arrears of the Contingent was being paid. By this time Lord Dalhousie had made up his mind to have the Berar province by means of treaty. He had already on 10th of April 1852 directed the Resident to make every possible arrangement for the regular payment of the Contingent, "abstaining at this moment from pressing for the payment of the principal of the Company's debt." This Lord Dalhousie achieved by the treaty of 21st of May 1853. General Fraser had resigned in November 1852 and he was succeeded by Colonel Low. On taking charge, the Resident had to advance a large sum of money from the Company's treasury to pay the Contingent so that by March 1853 the debt of the Government of Hyderabad had again gone up to 45 lakhs of rupees. In April 1853 the Resident under the orders of the Government of India placed before the Nizam a proposal for a new treaty. This treaty concluded on 21st of May 1853 laid down that "in lieu of the present Contingent the company agreed to maintain an auxiliary force to be paid from the Nizam's revenue and entitled the Hyderabad Government and to provide for the regular payment of this force and certain obligations." The Nizam agreed to assign districts yielding an annual gross revenue of 50 lakhs of rupees. Reciprocally the Government of India accepted that any surplus revenue accruing from these districts, after the necessary charges were met, were to be made over to the Nizam. The Treaty secured to the Nizam the full use of the auxiliary troops. It also released him from the liability of being called upon to supply a large military force in times of war and from the immediate payment of 50 lakhs of rupees.

Thus the province of Berar and the districts of Osmanabad and Raichur were taken over by the East India Company and these regions passed under its direct administration. The Minister, Siraj-ul-Mulk, died on 27th of May 1853 and was succeeded in his office by his nephew Salar Jung.

This, in brief, is the history of the Hyderabad Contingent till 1853. The role which it played in enforcing order throughout the Hyderabad State has been described in the foregoing pages. In the absence of any determined efforts on the part of the British to encourage the Government of Hyderabad to reform the administration or undertaking the reforms themselves by decided interference in the internal affairs of the State, the Contingent in playing the role of only putting down the rebellions, appears to the students of history as an engine of suppression of the popular discontent against the State. The British started the Contingent initially to place a portion of the Nizam's troops on a disciplined footing. There were doubts for sometime as to whether it was proper for the native troops to be trained on the European pattern but as the British found that the Nizam and his Minister were too willing to do whatever pleased them most, they were keenly interested in maintaining the Contingent Force, the expenses of which were chargeable to the Nizam, in sufficient strength with a view to improve their military position in India. They were reluctant to introduce reforms in Hyderabad on the ground that it constituted an interference in the internal affairs of the State. But where the Contingent was concerned they never hesitated to take extreme measures to maintain its position. They never considered that the maintenance of the Contingent was not an obligation on the Nizam under the treaty, that it was very costly and out of all proportion to requirements, that it provided a good field for the exercise of patronage on an unrestricted scale and finally that the Nizam had no control over it but had only to meet the expenditure, reasonable or otherwise, incurred on it. This then was the role played by the Contingent in the history of Hyderabad up to 1853. Very soon it was to be called upon to take part in resisting the great popular upheaval in India, *viz.*, the First War of Independence of 1857 A.D.

## CHAPTER XVI

### ZULFECAR ALI BAIG'S TRIAL

In the year 1851 A. D. strong discontent was caused in the Contingent at Aurangabad due to an injudicious act of the Commanding Officer Capt. Yates when he called for a list of the inferior class of Muhammadans in his regiment. There used to be two classes of horsemen in the cavalry. The right of owning horses in the regiment—the right of each horse being termed an *Assamee* was heritable and saleable. This gave the person a social position and influence. The owners of these horses were called *Silladars*, while men riding horses which were not their property were called *Bargheers*. These men of the cavalry owning horses were supposed to be *ashraf* or men of birth. The *Bargheers* did not own horses. They were not different in their social position from the *Silladars* as in most cases they happened to be the relatives of the *Silladars* and could look forward to the possibility of purchasing or inheriting the *Assamee*. Capt. Yates felt that some *Bargheers* had found their way into the ranks though they could not be considered to be men of birth. To prevent such recruits in future, he ordered a list to be prepared. Although this was proper, the attempt to make public distinction between *Silladars* and *Bargheers* was resented because in practice, as pointed above, the *Bargheers* and *Silladars* did not maintain much social distinction due to their intimate relations with each other. The Risaldar Mir Zulfecar Ali Baig who himself owned 37 horses pointed out the inadmissibility of the preparation of such a list. This had no effect. Discontent was thereby caused in the regiment as a majority were against the classification proposed by Capt. Yates. When he noticed this discontent Capt. Yates felt that Zulfecar Ali Baig must have encouraged this feeling and taken part in the conspiracy against the Commandant. Zulfecar Ali Baig was arrested, placed under confinement and ordered for trial. A number of English Officers of the Contingent were in favour of Zulfecar Ali Baig, who fearing miscarriage of justice, applied for the trial to take place at Bolarum by European Officers. This was allowed as Zulfecar Ali Baig felt that due to the influence of Capt. Yates and Brigadier

Mayne justice could not be secured in Aurangabad. With this case were mixed up other cases also. Karamat Ali, a non-commissioned Officer of the 5th Nizam's cavalry, had been charged of having sent an anonymous petition to the Resident. The Panchayat of the regiment had found Karamat Ali guilty, but General Fraser was advised that there was no evidence of guilt. The verdict was therefore not confirmed and the sentence was set aside. Justifying the transfer of Zulfecar Ali Baig's trial to Bolarum, the Resident General Fraser had explained as follows on 17th November 1851 A.D.<sup>1</sup>

" Since these trials commenced, and during their progress, so violent a party spirit has exhibited itself among many officers at Aurangabad, that had I allowed my attention to be withdrawn from the primary and essential business in hand, by the mutual attacks and recriminations of these gentlemen, the investigation and settlement of the original charges preferred against the prisoners would have been rendered a matter of secondary consideration; and the whole case would have become involved in most embarrassing confusion. It is to put a stop as far as possible to any further manifestation of this objectionable spirit, and to bring back the European Officers to a calmer and more rational conduct than that by which their proceedings have hitherto been marked, that I have removed the trials from Aurangabad to Bolarum, within the sphere of my own more immediate and direct authority."

These trials came to an end in April 1852 A.D. when Risaldar Zulfecar Ali Baig was honourably acquitted. The Government of India agreed to this acquittal and also to the point that the conduct of Brigadier Mayne was arbitrary in regard to the trials held at Aurangabad and that Brigadier Mayne had shown a want of due subordination to the authority of the Resident. The injudicious conduct of Capt. Yates was also concurred with by the Government of India. The action of the Resident in suspending Captain Commandant Yates from the functions of his commission was also approved. As Capt. Yates was guilty only of serious errors of judgment, he was placed in other appointment without command of troops until provided with a pension.

While approving of the action taken by the Resident, the Government of India imputed motives of party feeling

1. General Fraser's *Memoirs*, pp. 898-899.

to the Resident as well. They had felt that the Resident should not have issued the general order of 8th April 1852 A.D. nullifying the acquittal of the Risaldar while the subject of the charges was still under the consideration of the Government of India. They also held that the suppression of all enquiry into the alleged connection of Capt. Orr with the authorship and publication of the offensive and unbecoming letter "Nizamat" in the *Bombay Times* of the 18th October, 1851 A.D. revealed a bias of feeling on the part of the Resident. General Fraser justly resented these imputations and held that<sup>1</sup>—

"It is not in my recollection that I ever submitted those charges for the consideration or orders of the Government of India.

"The confirmation or otherwise of the sentence passed by a General Court Martial, is vested in the Resident by His Highness the Nizam, under the sanction of the Government of India; and with respect to the Resident's confirmation or otherwise of the sentences of General Punchayuts in the Cavalry Division, he acts in this respect in conformity with the practice that has obtained in the Contingent, without a single exception, from its first formation to the present day. In finally disposing, therefore, of the verdict and sentence of the Court which sat at Bolarum, without further reference to the Government of India, I am not aware that I assumed an authority which I did not rightfully possess."

The Nizam alleged suppression of enquiry into the authorship and publication of the letter referred to above. This is what General Fraser has to say in his letter dated 17th September 1852 on this point.<sup>2</sup>

"It is true I did suppress that inquiry, because I considered it objectionable in two points of view,—first, that if the inquiry was expedient at all, the time and occasion were not suitable for it, in the very midst of the military trials at Aurangabad. Those proceedings would have been embarrassed and obstructed by the intervention of fresh matter having no immediate or direct relation to those trials; and with this additional anomaly, that both the prosecution in the one, and the proceedings in the other, were to be

1. General Fraser's *Memoirs*, p. 401.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 402-403.

superintended and conducted by the same officer, Captain Strange.

"But secondly, and what I consider of more importance than the first objection, I do not regard, and never have regarded, articles in newspapers to be a fit subject for military inquiry. If there is a reasonable expectation that positive proof can be obtained against an officer in the army as the author of a false and infamous statement in a newspaper, he is, of course, subject to have charges preferred against him, and to be brought to a court-martial. But with regard to a mere preliminary inquiry, for the purpose of eliciting from a suspected officer an acknowledgment of his offence, and consequent crimination of himself, I consider this as being no more warranted by Military than by Civil Law; and the legality of such an assumption of power by superior authority seems to me to be so uncertain and problematical that I know not in what manner an officer could be proceeded against who, under these circumstances, should deny the lawfulness of such inquiry, and repudiate any obligation to make an admission which would involve an acknowledgment of guilt. What an officer might choose to do voluntarily is another question. I am now speaking of the matter as a duty of obligation.

"It seems to me that the course of procedure to which an officer should have recourse, who finds himself the subject of a defamatory attack in a newspaper, is plain and obvious. He has either to prefer charges against the suspected writer, if an Officer of the Army, with a view to his being brought to a court-martial, provided the accuser possesses sufficient proof to establish the charges, or, failing this, to prosecute the publisher of the paper in a Civil Court for libel.

"But since the Government of India is of opinion that inquiry into Captain Orr's supposed offence should not have been suppressed at the time when I did so, I have only to observe that it is now open to Brigadier Mayne or Captain Yates to prefer a regular charge against this officer; when, if I find that there appears to be sufficient evidence to substantiate it, I shall order him to be brought to a Court-martial, and the case regularly and legally disposed of."

In reply to General Fraser's letter of 6th October 1852 the Government of India, while agreeing that an inquiry into the matter of the authorship of the letter was

inexpedient, maintained that its strictures and censures were justified.

The view taken by the Govt. of India was resented by the General. This coupled with the differences which General Fraser had developed with Lord Dalhousie in the matter of the treaty to obtain the Berars led to his decision to retire from service. Although the death of his brother occurred at this time and the inheritance to which he had succeeded thereby required his departure from Hyderabad; yet, as the *Memoirs* of General Fraser will show, the Government of India's strictures on the Resident in the Bolarum trial of Mirza Zulfecar Ali Baig had an important share in his decision to resign.

Zulfecar Ali Baig's trial has been narrated here only to show how the injudicious conduct of the European Officers in Aurangabad led to a widespread resentment and disaffection amongst the native troops of the Contingent forces.

## CHAPTER XVII

### MUTINY OF 1855 A.D.

An account of the next disturbance, which took place in the Hyderabad Contingent troops in 1855, together with the details of the attack on Brigadier Mackenzie and the subsequent developments is as follows<sup>1</sup> :—

#### DISTURBANCE IN 1855

"On the 21st September 1855 the 3rd Cavalry of the Haiderabad Contingent, stationed at Bolarum, became in a very excited condition during the Moharram, which was then being celebrated. The excitement was caused by an Afghan convert to Christianity being sent into the lines during the Moharram to preach Christianity and denounce Mahommedanism. He was pelted out of the lines with stones on two or three occasions. A few days afterwards Brigadier Mackenzie forbade the cavalry tabut from being taken out for the purpose of being immersed in water, in consequence of the day falling on the Christian Sunday. This created a great deal of excitement. But on the urgent representation of Major Orr, commanding the regiment, the order was withdrawn, but of course (it) took some time to become known in the regiment. Unfortunately on that evening, about 4 or 5 o'clock, a procession composed chiefly of camp followers and people from the lines of the regiment (not sowars) passed Brigadier Mackenzie's house with flags and tomtoms. The Brigadier was walking in his garden with his chaprassi, and assisted personally in seizing the flags and taking them inside his own house, upon which people rushed into the lines crying out "*Din! Din*" and a great concourse of people, consisting of camp followers and servants, and of the Rissala accompanied by Ghulam Kadar, the only sowar present, rushed into Brigadier Mackenzie's house to seize the flags. The Brigadier was wounded by Ghulam Kadar, an Arkati man, with a sword cut in the head. On recovering their flags they left, and no further outrage occurred. At dark some native officers came to the house

1. *Historical & Descriptive Sketch of His Highness the Nizam's Dominions* by Hossain Bilgrami & Willmott, Vol. II, pp. 386-397.

of Captain Murray, who had been absent from the lines when the outbreak took place, and begged him to accompany them to the lines of the regiment, as the men were in a great state of excitement. During the night everything remained quiet, but some of the native officers sent mounted sowars for the purpose of ascertaining whether a force was moving from Sikandarabad against them; of course this evinced some organization and gave a bad appearance to the occurrence. The next day the regiment was paraded, and the native officers called upon to give up the offenders who attacked Brigadier Meckenzie's house. But there was no loyal response, the officers pretending their inability to discover the persons concerned. Consequently the troops were called out from Sikandarabad to act against the regiment. The regiment was again paraded, and the native officers begged that no action should be taken until a day or two after Moharam. It was, however, brought to the notice of Colonel Briggs by a Daffadar, Mahomed Husen, that he knew the man who had assaulted Brigadier Mackenzie, and orders were given to the officer in command of the regiment to allow Mahomed Husen, the Daffadar, to arrest the sowar who committed the act. He accordingly picked out Ghulam Kadar, the sowar, from the ranks, who was immediately placed in confinement. Not the slightest opposition or resistance was made to the arrest of the individual. The regiment returned to its lines and the troops marched back to Sikandarabad. A court of inquiry was instituted, and it was found that the attack upon Brigadier Mackenzie was perfectly unpremeditated, and that the only sowar inculpated was this Arkati, Ghulam Kadar. A full report of all the circumstances was forwarded by the Resident to the Government of India. Lord Dalhousie was the Governor-General, and on a recommendation by the Resident, that in consequence of the apathy and total neglect of the native officers to afford any assistance, the whole of them, together with the Daffadars who were present with the regiment on the day of the assault, were dismissed the service, and promotions in their room were drafted from the other regiments of cavalry. This regiment did good service against the mutineers of the Bengal army in 1857, and captured, when serving under the command of Colonel (now Lord) Napier of Magdala, 20 guns of the Gwalior mutineers.

The following is the official description of the occurrence as set forth in Lord Dalhousie's resolution, dated Fort William, 23rd January 1856:—

' It appears from the result of a court of inquiry held at Bolarum, the proceedings of which have been laid before Government, that on the evening of the 21st of September 1855 a very serious outrage was perpetrated on the person of Brigadier Golin Mackenzie, commanding the Southern Division of the Haidarabad Contingent, by certain sowars and followers of the 3rd Regiment of Cavalry of the contingent, during the celebration of the festival of the Moharram at Bolarum. The most Noble the Governor-General of India in Council, having maturely considered the circumstances under which this lamentable occurrence took place, and having directed that the persons concerned in committing the deadly outrage upon the person of Brigadier Mackenzie shall be tried for the offence in the usual form is pleased to promulgate for general information the conclusions to which he has come, and the measures which he considers it necessary to adopt, on the present occasion. It appears that on the 20th of September a Cantonment order was issued at Bolarum by Brigadier Mackenzie regulating the arrangements for conducting the processions of the different regiments at the station, so as not to interfere with one another; and the order declared that no procession, music, or noise would be allowed on any account whatever from 12 O'clock on Saturday night the 22nd to 12 O'clock on Sunday night the 23rd of September. On the 21st a subsidiary order was issued modifying this declaration, it having been ascertained that Sunday, the 23rd, was a day of the festival, on which processions were indispensable to its due celebration. The orders thus issued were, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, in their general tenor, unusually stringent. The first order was not only unusual, but objectionable, in that it put forward the Moharram in direct conflict with the Christian Sabath, and so introduced a religious element into the prohibition. But this order was withdrawn. It further appears that on the evening of the 21st of September a procession was observed by Brigadier Mackenzie proceeding along one of the roads by which the passage of processions had just been prohibited in orders. As the party approached his own residence Brigadier Mackenzie sent word to them to be silent and to proceed to their own lines; but the messengers, of whom several were sent, were unsuccessful. Upon this disregard of his orders the Brigadier himself went up to the procession to enforce compliance and finding no obedience paid to him, and being met with shouts of defiance, he seized two standards after struggling with the bearers, and wresting a sheathed sword from

the hand of one of the parties the Brigadier struck the man with it. One or two followers who were of the procession were taken up, and the rest then dispersed. The standards and sword were quietly retained by the Brigadier. Shortly afterwards an armed mob issuing from the cavalry lines, and having among them, as it appears, many sowars, broke into Brigadier Mackenzie's garden, murderously assaulted him, and followed him into his house threatening his life. By the same mob Lieutenant Murray, second in command of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, was wounded and knocked down, and violence was offered to several gentlemen and ladies who happened to pass along the road where they were collected. Some of the ringleaders have been arrested, and with them the law of the land will deal. It is with sincere regret that the Governor-General in Council finds himself bound to say that in his opinion the immediate and the real cause of the outrage by which Brigadier Mackenzie has so severely suffered was the act of the Brigadier himself in rushing from his compound into the midst of a Mussulman rabble roused by the excitement of the Moharram, and there seizing their standards and coming into personal conflict with them. The Governor-General in Council entertains a high respect for Brigadier Mackenzie as a good and distinguished soldier, and as honourable, conscientious and gallant a gentleman as the ranks of the army can show. His Lordship in Council therefore looks with not less regret than disapprobation on the intemperate act which has produced so much evil, and has brought down such grievous suffering upon the Brigadier himself. This officer will be compelled by the severity of his wounds to quit Bolaram, and proceed on leave to England. But the act of the Brigadier did not justify the murderous violence of those with whom he interfered. Neither did it justify the mutinous conduct of the sowars of the 3rd regiment of cavalry. It is clear to the Governor-General in Council from the evidence before him, that the greater part of the regiment in the lines was in a state of open mutiny, some rushed into the streets, cutting and hacking at the passers-by, and brutally assailing even women in their course. Their European officers were not allowed to approach them. They paraded without orders from their European officers, and without any of the usual calls to parade, but by the direction of their Rissaldar. They were armed, mounted, and equipped. They sent out videttes to watch the approach of other troops sent for from Sikandarabad, and acted as a military body guided by other orders

than those of their regular European superiors. Such proceedings are manifestly destructive of all discipline, and tend not less to destroy all confidence in the fidelity of troops that serve the Government. They appear to the Governor-General in Council to call for grave animadversion and for severe punishment. They appear to His Lordship in Council to call the louder for animadversion and punishment that this is not the first time that the Hyderabad Cavalry have been guilty of violence towards their European officers. The Governor-General in Council is convinced that he would be perfectly warranted in disbanding the whole regiment, if he so pleased; but it is not his intention to have recourse to so sweeping a measure. His Lordship in Council holds that in every such case as this it is to the Native Officers that the Government has a right to look for the maintenance of order and fidelity in the corps. Native Officers have long been in the habit of thinking that if they only keep themselves clear from any manifest participation in the disaffection of their corps, if they abstain themselves from any overt act of disobedience or mutiny, no blame will be imputed to them, and they will be allowed to escape with impunity. The Governor-General in Council regards this as a most pernicious feeling, which Government should lose no opportunity of eradicating. The Native Officers of the 3rd Cavalry of the Hyderabad Contingent will accordingly now be dealt with as responsible for its conduct. That they could have exercised a control over their men is clear, for when one of their number, Jamadar Shah Mirza Beg, loyally refused to join their tumultuous parade, and ordered the fifth troop to remain in their quarters, though a very few men had in the first instance paraded, after the Jamadar's order not a man of the troop appears to have quitted the lines. That with the exception of Jamadars Shah Mirza Beg and Mozaffar Khan the Native Officers did not control their men is shown by the whole tenor of the evidence. They tolerated, if they did not abet, the mutiny; they did all they could to screen their men from blame or punishment; and they lent no assistance whatever to the authorities in their attempts to discover the men of the regiment who were accused of having committed the murderous assault on the life of Brigadier Mackenzie. Having regard to these considerations, the Governor-General in Council has resolved on, and hereby directs, the dismissal from the service of the Native Commissioned Officers of the 3rd Cavalry, as a fitting and an effectual measure of punishment. There will be several exceptions to it. Jamadar Shah

Mirza Beg, whose conduct was loyal and obedient, will of course, be excepted. Officers who were on detachment or were absent from the lines or were confined by sickness will also in justice be excepted. Jamadar Mozaffar Khan is also excepted, he having invited the interposition of the European Officers.

Jamadar Shah Mirza Beg is appointed Rissaldar in the regiment, in the room of Rissaldar Mir Banda Hasan, now dismissed. In making the necessary promotions in succession to native officers dismissed, it is the desire of the Governor-General in Council that no man of the corps who was present in the lines during the days of the tumult and mutiny shall receive advancement unless he belonged to the fifth troop. The Orderly Sowar attached to Brigadier Mackenzie on the 21st of September, Gafur Khan, Bargir, is advanced to the rank of Naib Daffadar. The Governor-General in Council considers it necessary to note the conduct of the Infantry Guard at the Brigadier's house on the 21st of September. It is proved that the permanent havildar's guard made no attempt whatever to resist the mob, or defend the person of the Brigadier. The Jamadar who came subsequently with another infantry guard refused to seize the rioters who were pointed out to him. Brigadier Mackenzie, it appears, had enjoined the havildar's guard not to load when he first saw the mob coming; but that injunction was, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, no justification to the guard for not resisting when it saw the mob actually cutting down its officer before its eyes. The plea of the Jamadar, that he would not take orders from the man who pointed out the culprits, is, in the judgment of the Governor-General in Council, perfectly worthless. Cowardice in a soldier is as much to be condemned as mutiny. To defend his officer is certainly not less his duty than to obey him. For some men of the two infantry guards there appears to be the palliation that they were placed where possibly they might not have distinctly seen what was passing; some were posted as sentinels; one had in charge a prisoner. But the Governor-General in Council can see no palliation or excuse for the conduct of the leaders of these guards; and His Lordship in Council, holding the commanders as mainly responsible, accordingly directs that Havildar Bhavani Uppadia, of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, and Jamadar Samjavan, of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, of the Hyderabad Contingent, who commanded the two guards, be dismissed the service. The

Governor-General in Council, in closing this statement of his views of the lamentable occurrences at Bolaram above detailed, feels constrained to observe that the evidence before the Court of Inquiry has not left a favourable impression on his mind in regard to Captain Sutherland G. G. Orr, commanding the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, nor satisfied His Lordship in Council that that officer exhibited as much vigour, resolution, or determination to expose and punish the mutinous conduct of his corps, as Government would have expected to see in the European Commandant of the Regiment. The Governor-General in Council embraces the present occasion to reiterate in the strongest manner the injunction so repeatedly given to officers in the service of Government, never to interfere with religious observances of the natives of India under their control further than is actually necessary for the preservation of the public peace and maintenance of discipline and order. In conclusion, the Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct that this General Order, pointing out as it does the duties, responsibilities and liabilities of Native Officers in case of mutiny, shall be not only issued to the Hyderabad Contingent, but communicated to all other forces and contingents also under the immediate orders of the Government of India.”

From the history of the Contingent forces in Hyderabad and the Subsidiary forces it will be noticed that off and on discontent and disaffection continued to manifest itself among these forces. The anti-British elements in Hyderabad did not hesitate to make use of the spirit of disaffection to tamper with the loyalty of the troops. The instances of disaffection in these forces narrated in detail above are recapitulated below:—

1. Disaffection in the Nizani's troops and the exile of Noor-ul-Umra and Nimbalkar on charges of instigating the troops to insubordination in 1806 A.D.
2. Mutiny in the Nizam's troops in 1812 A.D. and manhandling of Capt. Gordon and subsequent punishment given to the mutineers.
3. Mutiny of troops against Capt. Clarke which took place at Nizamabad in 1812 A.D.
4. Mutiny at Mominabad and the assassination of Lt. Col. Evan Davies in May 1827 A.D.

5. Mubariz-ud-Dowla's attempts to seduce the native troops of the Subsidiary and Contingent Forces against the British.
6. Disaffection in the Subsidiary troops at Secunderabad and the refusal of the troops to take their pay without Bhatta in February 1842 A.D.
7. Disaffection in the Contingent Forces in Aurangabad and the trial of Zulfecar Ali Beg in 1851 A.D.
8. The Mutiny in Bolarum and the attack on Brigadier Mackenzie in 1855 A.D.

Although causes for such disaffection were latent in the behaviour of the officers in a number of cases, it cannot be denied that sufficient discontent existed in the troops to tempt men like Mubariz-ud-Dowla to attempt seduction among them.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### THE GROWTH OF ANTI-BRITISH SENTIMENTS IN HYDERABAD

The early connection of the Nizams with the French in the middle of the 18th century resulted in the establishment of a colony of the French and those of other Europeans in Hyderabad about the time. The French influence persisted till the beginning of the 19th century. The association of the leading chiefs and noblemen of Hyderabad with the French had its effect in the promotion of Hyderabad's interest in the European way of life. The English also started dealings with the Nizam and his court from as early as 1759 A.D. The first envoy of the East India Company to the court of the Nizam was Mr. Holland, who reached Hyderabad in 1779 A.D. This association with the English became stronger, at the end of the 18th century when British influence became paramount in Hyderabad. The relics of influence in Hyderabad can be seen in places like the Troop Bazars, the Gun Foundry, Mons. Raymond's tomb and the remains of the barracks once occupied by the French troops.

The Residents of the East India Company for a long time occupied the garden-house of Mir Alam. This was later on replaced by a well-built Residency in 1806 A.D., which was described as artistic, magnificent and perfectly English in its comforts by Sir James Mackintosh, who visited Hyderabad in December 1808 A.D. The Residency attracted a small colony of Europeans, East Asians, native Christians and the business people from the city. A small colony sprang up in Secunderabad, which had come into existence in 1805 A.D. Christian Missionaries also established themselves in these areas. A small beginning is also discernible in the field of education in the earlier half of the 19th century. The St. George's Grammar School, the oldest English School in Hyderabad, was established in the year 1834 A.D. and was attracting a number of pupils from the city. A medical school was started by the Resident at Bolarum in 1889 but was later closed and shifted on the Nizam's recommendation to the Residency in 1846 A.D. Speaking of this school, the administration report of Hyderabad for

1869-1870 A.D. compiled by C. B. Saunders, the then Resident, says as follows<sup>1</sup>:-

### SECTION III—DISPENSARIES

#### *Hyderabad Medical School*

423. The centre, or heart, of the whole dispensary system under the native Government is the Hyderabad Medical School, an institution which has long been to the Nizam's medical department all that the Engineering College described above is intended to prove towards that of public works.

Its aim is a high one, namely, the education of qualified practitioners of medicine and surgery, capable of assuming independent medical charges in the service of the Nizam's Government, or of entering upon private practice in different parts of the Hyderabad country.

The school itself is situated, like the Engineering College, outside the city, and indeed close to the Residency.

It has been presided over, ever since its first establishment in the year 1846, by the Residency Surgeon, who receives a distant salary from His Highness's Government in his capacity of Superintendent or Principal of this school. He has three assistants in the work of tuition, all of whom are servants of the Nizam.

The link thus existing between the school and the Residency has been a most advantageous one. At the same time, the institution itself pertains entirely to the native Government, and no interference in its management has ever proceeded from the Resident. Much of its success is due to the sustained personal interest which has been taken in it by Sir Salar Jung himself, and much also to the thoughtful and earnest advisers with respect to its administration whom he and his predecessors have found in its successive Superintendents. Among these indeed have been several of the most eminent past or present members of the Madras Medical Service. Dr. W. Maclean, for example, who enjoys, I am told, a European reputation as Principal of the Netley College in England; and Dr. George Smith, now Principal of the Madras Medical College.

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1. *Hyderabad Affairs*, Vol. V, pp. 282-283.

Anatomy, Physiology, Materia Medica, and Therapeutics, Surgery, Midwifery, and Medicine are the chief branches taught. Complete courses of lectures are delivered in the Hindooostanee language on the above subjects. The period of study usually found necessary to qualify a pupil for graduating is from five to seven years. After an examination conduct by a committee of medical officers unconnected with the institution, successful candidates are presented with diplomas by the Minister, and are thus fairly admitted to the ranks of the medical profession. Members of the committee have declared with surprise that some of the graduates were competent to pass the degree tests before the Board of London or Edinburgh.

Students are not required to pay fees. On the contrary, they receive small stipends from His Highness's Government during their period of study.

The school has turned out in all 45 graduates since its first establishment.

The number of students in regular attendance during the past session was 57. Of these, seven received their diplomas at the end of the year, and became eligible for Government service."

The Roman Catholic Mission started a school in 1855, which later on developed into the All Saints School in Hyderabad. After Sir Salar Jung became Minister in 1853 he initiated the first educational institution in the State. In 1855 he founded the Darul-ulum or Oriental College at Hyderabad. The languages taught at this institution were English, Arabic, Persian, Telugu, and Marathi. A Board of Governors was appointed and admissions to the school were granted by the Minister personally. A small monthly fee was charged, quarterly examinations were held by the Board of Governors and prizes consisting of books and scholarships varying from Rs. 8 to Rs. 50 per mensem were awarded annually by the Minister.

In reacting to Western influence the name of Shams-ul-Umra stands out prominently. He was the premier nobleman of Hyderabad. He was born in 1783 and died in 1863. He was from the very beginning of a scientific bent of mind. He has been described in 1808 A.D. as follows<sup>1</sup>:

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1. *Our Faithful Ally, the Nizam* by Capt. Hastings Fraser, p. 230.

" Shums-ool-Oomrah, the nominee of the English Government, was at this period about twenty-eight years of age, of a mild disposition and manners, and handsome in person. He was luxurious in all articles of European manufacture, and was ambitious of having his house, furniture, and equipage as nearly as possible conformable to European customs. He took great delight in mechanics, in all manner of handicraft work, and in the popular experiments of natural philosophy. He devoted nearly the whole of his time to these pursuits, leaving the management of his affairs and the command of his party to his maternal uncle, Umjid-ool-Mook."

Shams-ool-Omra took great interest in the propagation of learning and the production of suitable literature on various subjects especially of a scientific nature. He himself was an author of a number of books. Perceiving very early that what the people needed was the acquisition of knowledge through translations of useful works in Indian Languages, he established a Translation Bureau in Hyderabad in 1834 A.D. This Bureau was in existence till 1857 A.D. and a number of works were brought out by this Bureau. The Bureau was established in the Jahan-numa Palace of Shams-ool-Omra. This nobleman had also established a press about the same time. This was known as the *Sangi Chapekhana* or the stone press. We get a few names of the translators attached to the Translation Bureau. They are:—

1. Ghulain Mohiuddin Hyderabadi.
2. Mir Amman Ali Dehlvi.
3. Mr. Jones.
4. Monseigneur Nandres.
5. Mir Shujat Ali Karam.
6. Ratan Lal.
7. Mr. Joseph.

Shams-ool-Omra was very well acquainted with English and French and, as has been noted above, was himself the author of works on science. From the records it appears that about fifty of the works published by the Translation Bureau covered the subjects of theology, mathematics, geometry, physics, chemistry, astronomy, medicine—Western as well as Unani, engineering, history and literature. A majority of them was in Urdu, while a few were in

Persian. Shams-ool-Omra and his sons also wrote on scientific subjects. The publication of these works was a great landmark in the history of Hyderabad as for the first time subjects of modern education and thought began to be popularised, particularly in the Indian languages.

Shams-ool-Omra also started a number of schools, the most important of which was located in his palace and served as a centre for higher learning through the medium of Urdu. This school was known as Madras-e-Fakhria and was established in the year 1829. The subjects taught in this school were related not only to theology but to natural sciences like physics, chemistry, astronomy and mathematics. Students from this school were later admitted into the medical school started in the Residency in the year 1844 A.D. The strength of the school in 1854 A.D. was 428.

Besides the school, press and Translation Bureau Shams-ool-Omra maintained in his palace a very good library of books in Urdu, Persian, Arabic, English and French. He subscribed to a number of periodicals and newspapers. Old files of these papers are still available in the library of the Paigah noblemen. Names of some of the periodicals are noted below:—

1. Majm-ul-Akhbar (Persian), Bombay, 1843 A.D.
2. Kiran-ul-Saaidin (Urdu), Delhi, files for 1847, 1852, 1853, and 1854 A.D.
3. Fawaid-ul-Nazrin (Urdu), Delhi, files for 1849 and 1852 A.D.
4. Azim-ul-Akhbar (Urdu), Madras, files for 1850 to 1854 A.D.
5. Akhbar-e-Malwa (Urdu), files for 1851 and 1853 A.D.
6. Ahasan-ul-Akhbar (Persian), Bombay, files for 1851 and 1853 A.D.
7. Jam-e-Akhbar (Urdu), files for 1853 A.D.
8. Akhbar-ul-Haqaig (Urdu), Agra, files for 1853 A.D.
9. Umdut-ul-Akhbar (Urdu), Bareli, files for 1853 to 1856 A.D.
10. Amin-ul-Akhbar (Urdu), files for 1856 A.D.

11. **Kasf-ul-Akhbar (Urdu), Bombay, files for 1869 A.D.**

Shams-ool-Umra was the author of two books, *viz.*, (1) *Shams-ool-Hindsa*, a book on geometry, which was published as early as 1823 A.D. This was translated by Shams-ool-Umra himself from the French work of Monsieur Clarke. A second edition of this work was issued in 1830 A.D. This was in Persian. This book was included in the course for the school Madras-e-Fakhria. (2) The second book written by Shams-ool-Omra was also in Persian on geometry. Shams-ool-Omra's sons were also authors of books dealing with subjects like arithmetic, algebra, mensuration, etc. Under their patronage two important works of history were also published, namely *Tarik-e-Rashid-ud-Din Khani* and *Tarikh-e-Khursheed Jahi*.

It will be seen that Shams-ool-Omra was responsible for initiating interest in higher learning through the starting of schools and the absorption of western knowledge through translations of works of sciences from English and French into Urdu and Persian. The learning of English was slowly becoming popular by 1858 A.D. Shams-ool-Omra was, as remarked above, acquainted with English and French. Salar Jung I became Prime Minister in 1853 and knew English very well. Some of the noblemen had also started learning English. One example is that of Venkattappa Naik, the Raja of Shorapur, who under the tutelage of Meadows Taylor was given a good grounding in English and other subjects. It is well-known that Raja Venkattappa Naik later took a prominent part in the affairs of 1857 A.D. Thus society in Hyderabad was steadily reacting to western influences during the first half of the 19th century. The early French influence, the establishment of an English colony in Hyderabad and Secunderabad and the existence of European Officers in the Nizam's army made possible a closer contact between the Europeans and the people of Hyderabad. The results are seen in the starting of Mission Schools like the Saint George's Grammar School, the All Saints School, the establishment of a Medical School under the patronage of the Nizam, the establishment of the Darul-Ulum High School for the teaching of English along with Persian and other subjects and the independent efforts of men like Shams-ool-Omra in the field of education and in the production of scientific literature. There were also anti-English sentiments in Hyderabad which simmered from

1800 A.D. The people in Hyderabad were in touch with the affairs of Northern India, the Maratha States, Western India and Central India. The constant influx of people from Northern India, especially the trans-Indus Rohillas, the Sikhs and leading families of U.P. and Delhi, enabled a close touch to be maintained between Hyderabad and the other parts of the country. Maratha political life also dominated in Hyderabad till at least 1820 A.D. British policy in India, Afghanistan and Burma was followed keenly in Hyderabad. Sir Charles Metcalfe recalls the anxious inquiries, which the *qiladar* of Bidar was making about the fortunes of the British in the Burma campaign during the regime of Lord Amherst.

Raja Chandulal, who was the virtual dictator of Hyderabad from 1808 A.D. to 1843 A.D., was himself a Panjabi and probably induced the influx of a number of Sikhs into the State. He had received a letter from Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1810 A.D. touching on the general situation in Hyderabad. In fact, General Fraser himself was struck by the intimate knowledge of Sikh polities which Chandulal possessed. The Afghan War was also followed very keenly in Hyderabad by the general public. The Wahabi Conspiracy of 1839 shows how Hyderabad had become a centre of acute anti-British sentiments.

Thus throughout the first half of the 19th century Hyderabad was steadily reacting to Western influences through an attempt to absorb Western Knowledge and also through keeping alive the spirit of resistance to the British. How persistent and powerful was this antagonism to the British will be seen from the great outbreak of the year 1857 A.D. and the part which Hyderabad played in it.

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## ***ERRATA***

Page xi, line 16 from top, *read* " 19th Century " for " 18th Century."

Page 20, line 10 from bottom, *read* " person " for " perosn."

Page 65, footnote, *read* " Vol. 29 " for " p. 29."

Page 70, line 15 from top, *read* " Ambad " for " Aurangabad."

Page 154, line 10 from bottom, *read* " Jihad " for " Jihal."

Page 189, line 5 from bottom, *read* " oust " for " cust."

Page 189, line 6 from bottom, *read* " 1848 " for " 1818."

Page 193, last line, *read* " prevailed in the country down to 1857 " *in place of that entire line.*

Page 194, last line, *read* " Governors-General " for " Governor-General."

Page 211, line 14 of text from top, *read* " French " *after* " relics of."

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